Rationality, decisions and large worlds by Drechsler, Mareile
Rationality, Decisions
and
Large Worlds
Mareile Drechsler
A thesis submitted to the Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
of the London School of Economics and Political Science
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, October 2012.
To my parents.
2
Declaration
I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD
degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own
work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in
which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person
is clearly identified in it).
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted,
provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced
without my prior written consent.
I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the
rights of any third party.
I declare that my thesis consists of 57 782 words.
Mareile Drechsler
Statement of conjoint work
I confirm that Chapter 5 was jointly co-authored with Konstantinos Katsikopou-
los and Gerd Gigerenzer at the Center for Adaptive Behavior and Cognition, Max
Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin. I contributed 60% of this work.
3
Abstract
Taking Savage’s (1954) subjective expected utility theory as a starting point,
this thesis distinguishes three types of uncertainty which are incompatible with
Savage’s theory for small worlds: ambiguity, option uncertainty and state space
uncertainty.
Under ambiguity agents cannot form a unique and additive probability function
over the state space. Option uncertainty exists when agents cannot assign unique
consequences to every state. Finally, state space uncertainty arises when the state
space the agent constructs is not exhaustive, such that unforeseen contingencies
can occur.
Chapter 2 explains Savage’s notions of small and large worlds, and shows that
ambiguity, option and state space uncertainty are incompatible with the small
world representation. The chapter examines whether it is possible to reduce these
types of uncertainty to one another.
Chapter 3 suggests a definition of objective ambiguity by extending Savage’s
framework to include an exogenous likelihood ranking over events. The definition
allows for a precise distinction between ambiguity and ambiguity attitude. The
chapter argues that under objective ambiguity, ambiguity aversion is normatively
permissible.
Chapter 4 gives a model of option uncertainty. Using the two weak assumptions
that the status quo is not uncertain, and that agents are option uncertainty averse,
we derive status quo bias, the empirical tendency for agents to choose the status
quo over other available alternatives. The model can be seen as rationalising
status quo bias.
Chapter 5 gives an axiomatic characterisation and corresponding representation
theorem for the priority heuristic, a heuristic which predicts binary decisions be-
tween lotteries particularly well. The chapter analyses the normative implications
of this descriptive model.
Chapter 6 defends the pluralist view of decision theory this thesis assumes. The
chapter discusses possible applications of the types of uncertainty defined in the
thesis, and concludes.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Savage’s Foundations of Statistics, published in 1954, remains the classic work on
normative decision theory, and the basis for many economic models and standard
texts on decision theory. In the opening paragraph, Savage remarks
It is often argued academically that no science can be more secure
than its foundations, and that, if there is controversy about the foun-
dations, there must be even greater controversy about the higher parts
of the science. As a matter of fact, the foundations are the most
controversial parts of many, if not all, sciences.
It is indeed very important that a theory is based on the“right”basic principles or
axioms. However, these may be difficult to pin down. Although many academics
are agreed that Savage’s own postulates are very compelling, there has been much
controversy over the extent to which they are applicable, and over the question
whether they constitute requirements of rationality. This thesis is concerned
with the foundations of normative decision theory, and more specifically, the
correct principles to use in decision making under uncertainty. The overarching
question this thesis grapples with is how a rational actor should respond to various
sources, degrees and types of uncertainty, and which axioms and decision rules
seem appropriate in those cases where Savage’s theory is limited.
Before considering the role of the foundations of decision theory further, let us
step back to consider the role of decision theory more generally. Clearly, in
our everyday lives we are confronted with innumerable decisions, and nowadays
11
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making decisions is, perhaps, more difficult then ever: it is well known that
ordering a coffee at Starbucks requires a total of eight decisions1. We make
choices between partners, political parties, haircuts and holiday plans, mortgages
and masters degrees. Decisions vary in their importance within the course of our
lives: many are irrelevant (such as our choice of coffee at Starbucks), but many
others require detailed reflection.
The role of normative decision theory is to answer the question how a rational
agent ought to make decisions. The answer to this question is usually taken to be
that a rational agent ought to choose that act amongst all available acts which
maximises their expected utility, where the expected utility of an act is calculated
relative to the agent’s utility valuations on the consequences of the act, and the
agent’s (personal) beliefs regarding the likelihood of these consequences.
Savage’s (1954) subjective expected utility theory, which can be seen as the foun-
dation of Bayesian decision theory, shows that an agent whose preferences among
acts satisfy a set of simple and intuitively compelling axioms will act as if they
maximised their subjective expected utility, relative to a utility function on con-
sequences and a probability measure on the state space. Thereby, the axioms of
Savage’s theory are usually interpreted as requirements of rationality.
Savage’s theory is designed to apply to small worlds, decision settings in which
the agent’s problem can be represented using a decision matrix consisting of an
exogenously given state space, a set of consequences, and a set of acts. Using
a small world decision matrix, the agent then chooses that act in the set of
acts which yields the highest subjective expected utility. A small world decision
matrix is interpreted as containing all information which is relevant to the agent’s
decision problem.
However, as this thesis will argue, not all decision problems can be represented
within a small world decision matrix. In particular, in order for a decision problem
to be representable using a small world decision matrix, the agent must be able
1If you don’t believe this, here is the list of basic decisions to be made in ordering a coffee.
Drink type: Mocha, Latte, or Caramel Macchiato. Drink size: Short, Tall, Grande, Venti. Drink
style: iced or warm. Caffeination of espresso: regular, decaf., or half-caf.. Amount of espresso:
number of espresso shots. Milk type: non-fat, 2%, whole, half and half, and soy. Syrup type:
any of 15 flavours. Whipped cream: with or without. Also, there are a number of more obscure
dimensions, such as cup types and the exact temperature of the coffee; these are not listed within
the eight decisions mentioned.
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to reduce their uncertainty over what to do to uncertainty over what the true
state in a given set of states is. This will be feasible, as we shall argue, only in
special cases. Other types of uncertainty which are incompatible with a small
world representation may affect the agent’s decision problem. In particular, this
thesis distinguishes three types of uncertainty: ambiguity, where the agent is
uncertain with respect to the true probability distribution over the state space,
option uncertainty, where the agent is uncertain what consequences follow from
the exercise of any given action, and state space uncertainty, where the state space
the agent entertains may not be exhaustive. We will call decision problems which
feature ambiguity, option uncertainty or state space uncertainty large worlds,
cases where a small world representation of the decision problem is not feasible.
This thesis asks the question how a rational agent should make decisions in large
worlds. We will argue that under uncertainty, Savage’s axiomatic characterisa-
tion is not as compelling as it is in the small world case. However, when one
confines ones attention to a particular kind of uncertainty, it is possible to iden-
tify requirements of rationality suitable to the large world decision setting the
agent is faced with. The axiomatic frameworks thus obtained are very similar
to Savage’s framework for small worlds, as most elements of Savage’s framework
can be retained under uncertainty. However, extending Savage’s theory to allow
for a variety of sources of uncertainty may yield interesting new implications, as
this thesis hopes to show.
This chapter is structured as follows: section 1.1 introduces Savage’s (1954)
framework and explains the axioms of subjective expected utility theory. Sec-
tion 1.2 introduces Anscombe and Aumann’s (1963) reformulation of Savage’s
theory, and clarifies in what respects it differs from Savage’s original framework.
Section 1.3 introduces the notion of rationality normative decision theory is based
on, and shows the importance of probability theory within decision theory. Sec-
tion 1.4 presents the well-known paradoxes of rationality, the Allais and Ellsberg
paradoxes. Section 1.5 considers the notions of small and large worlds, and the
significance of uncertainty in decision theory. Section 1.6 gives an outline of the
chapters of this thesis.
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1.1 Savage’s framework
Savage’s achievement consisted in combining the subjective view of probability
predominant at his time with von Neumann and Morgenstern’s decision theory.
The axioms of the theory are intuitively convincing, and are therefore often in-
terpreted as standards of rationality. Savage’s theorem shows that given a set
of axioms on the agent’s preferences over acts, the agent will behave as if he
attached utilities to consequences and probabilities to states of the world. An
agent whose preferences can be so characterised will then make decisions as if he
maximised expected utility, relative to the corresponding subjective probability
distribution over the state space.
The agent’s decision problem in Savage’s framework2 consists in choosing be-
tween acts, which are functions from states of the world to consequences. In
particular, in Savage’s theory the set of acts includes all functions from states to
consequences. The state space is assumed to consist of mutually exclusive and
collectively exhaustive states, which detail all the relevant exogenous contingen-
cies an agent’s decision may depend on. Events are then collections of states,
and are therefore subsets of the state space. The set of consequences details the
outcomes of acts at all states. Also, Savage’s theory assumes states and conse-
quences to be primitives of the theory; acts are defined in terms of states and
consequences. Consider the following definitions:
States of the world : S = {..., s, ...}.
Events: E := 2S = {..., A,B,E, F, ...}.
Consequences: X = {..., x, ...}.
Acts: A := XS = {..., f(·), g(·), ...}.
The agent is assumed to have preferences over acts, expressed as a relation 
on A, where f  g is to be read as “the agent weakly prefers act f to act
g”. The relation  is assumed to have a corresponding symmetric equivalence
relation ∼, denoting “indifference”, as well as an asymmetric part, , denoting
“strict preference”. An event E is said to be null if f ∼ g for every f, g in
A which differ on E. Preferences over A induce preferences over consequences,
2We follow Machina and Schmeidler (1992) in the exposition of Savage’s framework.
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since consequences can be understood as constant acts, which lead to the same
consequence in every state. Then, Savage’s axioms are:
[P1] (Weak Order):  is a weak order on A:
(i) (Completeness): Either f  g, or g  f .
(ii) (Transitivity): If f  g and g  h, then f  h.
[P2] (Sure-Thing Principle): For all events E and all acts f(·), f∗(·), g(·) and
h(·): [
f∗(s) if s ∈ E
g(s) if s /∈ E
]

[
f(s) if s ∈ E
g(s) if s /∈ E
]
⇒
[
f∗(s) if s ∈ E
h(s) if s /∈ E
]

[
f(s) if s ∈ E
h(s) if s /∈ E
]
.
[P3] (Eventwise Monotonicity): For all consequences x, y, non-null events E
and acts g(·):[
x if s ∈ E
g(s) if s /∈ E
]

[
y if s ∈ E
g(s) if s /∈ E
]
⇔ x  y.
[P4] (Comparative Probability): For all events A,B and outcomes x∗  x
and y∗  y: [
x∗ if A
x if ¬A
]

[
x∗ if B
x if ¬B
]
⇒
[
y∗ if A
y if ¬A
]

[
y∗ if B
y if ¬B
]
.
[P5] (Nondegeneracy): There exist outcomes x and y such that x  y.
[P6] (Small Event Continuity):For all acts f(·)  g(·) and outcome x there
exists a finite set of events {A1, A2, ..., An} forming a partition of S such that:
f(·) 
[
x if s ∈ Ai
g(s) if s /∈ Ai
]
and
[
x if s ∈ Aj
f(s) if s /∈ Aj
]
 g(·)
15
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for all i, j ∈ {1, ..., n}.
[P7] (Uniform Monotonicity): For all events E and all acts f(·) and f∗(·),
if [
f∗(s) if s ∈ E
g(s) if s /∈ E
]
 ()
[
x if s ∈ E
g(s) if s /∈ E
]
for all g(·) and each x ∈ f(E), then:
⇒
[
f∗(s) if s ∈ E
h(s) if s /∈ E
]
 ()
[
f(s) if s ∈ E
h(s) if s /∈ E
]
for all h(·).
The completeness part of P1 requires that the agent be able to rank all acts in
the order of preference: Either the agent strictly prefers act g to act h or vice
versa, or he is indifferent between the two. This axiom precludes indecisiveness
on the part of the agent. The transitivity component of P1 holds that if an agent
prefers act f to act g, and also act g to act h, then he should also prefer act f to
act h.
P2 holds that if two acts have different subacts (f∗(s) and f(s) respectively) on
some event E, but agree on the event ¬E, then the ranking between the act should
not depend on the common subact on ¬E. This axiom implies the separability of
preferences across mutually exclusive events. The sure thing principle is a crucial
element of the framework, since it implies that the expected utility function is
linear in probabilities. We will discuss the axiom in greater detail in the context
of Allais’ and Ellsberg’s experiments at the end of this chapter, as well as in
Chapter 3.
The Eventwise Monotonicity condition, P3, requires that replacing a consequence
on a non-null event with another consequence which the agent prefers should
make that act preferable; this reading brings out the “monotonicity” aspect –
more is better – of the axiom. Technically, the axiom holds that the preference
for consequence x over y conditionally on event E should be independent of act
g(s) obtaining on the complement of E. The axiom can thus also be read as a
“state-independence” condition: The evaluation of consequences should not hinge
on the state they obtain in.
16
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Axiom P4, Comparative Probability, maintains that the subjective beliefs the
agent reveals through preferences over acts must be consistent: Given that the
agent has the preference x∗  x, then a preference of an act which yields x∗ if
event A occurs and x if A does not occur over an act which pays out x∗ if B
occurs and x if B does not occur reveals that the agent believes A to be more
likely than B. Replacing x∗ with y∗ and x with y should not make a difference
to subjective beliefs regarding the likelihood of A and B, given that y∗  y. The
axiom imposes that the agent’s personal beliefs should be independent of the
consequences used to elicit them. Axiom P4 is pivotal in the construction of the
subjective probability ranking of events.
The Non-degeneracy axiom, P5, is a non-triviality condition which holds that the
agent should not be indifferent between all consequences; this axiom is not very
restrictive.
P6, the Small Event Continuity condition, requires that for every consequence x
the state space can be partitioned sufficiently finely such that, if the agent has
preference f  g, replacing a consequence x for the act f on some element of the
partition leaves his preference between f and g unchanged. This makes the state
space infinitely fine-grained; S is then countable.
Finally, axiom P7, the uniform monotonicity condition, holds that if a conse-
quence x is conditionally worse than any of the consequences of an act f∗(s),
then the subact which pays out x should not preferred. This axiom allows for
infinite-outcome acts, and ensures the boundedness of the utility function on the
set of consequences.
Savage shows that, if the above seven axioms are satisfied by the agent’s prefer-
ences, then the agent will choose as if he maximised his expected utility relative
to his subjective probability and utility functions:
Theorem (Savage): If  satisfies Axioms 1 – 7, then there exists a unique,
finitely additive and nonatomic probability measure µ(·) on E and a state-independent
and bounded utility function u : X → R such that
f  g iff (1.1)∫
S
u[f(s)]dµ(s) ≥
∫
S
u[g(s)]dµ(s)
17
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Moreover, u is unique up to a positive linear transformations, and µ(E) = 0 if
and only if E is null.
Savage’s theorem will form the basis of the discussion of different types of uncer-
tainty contained in Chapter 2, and of the model of option uncertainty given in
Chapter 4.
1.2 The Anscombe-Aumann framework
Savage’s theory has been reformulated by Anscombe and Aumann (1963), whose
framework differs from Savage’s in that it allows for the existence of lotteries with
objectively known probabilities; in Savage’s framework, by contrast, probabilities
are only subjectively known. The Anscombe-Aumann framework distinguishes
between roulette lotteries (called ‘lotteries’ henceforward), the results of which
obtain with known chances, and horse race lotteries (called ‘acts’ henceforward),
the outcomes of which occur with subjectively known probabilities.
In the Anscombe-Aumann framework, the state space S is finite. The set of
lotteries L is modelled as finite support probability distributions over the set of
outcomes X . A typical lottery is denoted p, and is defined as p : X → [0, 1]. Also,
unlike Savage’s model, the Anscombe-Aumann framework permits for mixtures
of lotteries. The mixture operation is denoted α, with α ∈ [0, 1], and for two
lotteries p, q ∈ L, αp + (1 − α)q is defined pointwise over X . The set of acts is
denoted F with typical elements f, g. In contrast to Savage’s framework, where
acts are functions from states of the world into consequences, in the Anscombe-
Aumann framework acts are defined as functions from states of the world S into
lotteries L, so that an act pays out a gamble with known chances at every state.
The subset Fc of F denotes the set of constant acts (i.e. those that yield the
same lottery in every state). The agent then holds preferences over acts, with 
denoting weak preference. The asymmetric and symmetric components of  are,
respectively, denoted  and ∼. In summary:
States of the world : S = {..., s, ...}.
Algebra of Events: Σ = {..., A,B,E, F, ...}.
Outcomes: X = {..., x, ...}.
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Lotteries: L: [0, 1]X = {..., p(·), q(·), ...}
Acts: F := LS = {..., f(·), g(·), ...}.
Anscombe and Aumann then impose the following axioms on preferences:
[AA1] (Weak Order):  is a weak order on F .
[AA2] (Continuity): For all p, q, r in L such that p  q  r, there exist
α, β ∈]0, 1[ such that
αp+ (1− α)r  q  βp+ (1− β)r.
[AA3] (Independence): For all f, g, h in F and for every α ∈]0, 1[
f  g ⇔ αf + (1− α)h  αg + (1− α)h.
[AA4] (Monotonicity): For all f, g in F , if f(s)  g(s) for all s ∈ S, then
f  g.
[AA5] (Nontriviality): There exists at least one pair of acts f, g such that
f  g.
The interpretation of the weak order and nontrivility conditions matches that of
Savage’s axioms P1 and P5. The continuity condition performs, in the Anscombe-
Aumann framework the same function as Savage’s Archimedean axiom, as it
results in the continuity of the utility function. The independence axiom is the
equivalent, in the Anscombe-Aumann framework, of Savage’s axiom P2, the sure-
thing principle; it implies the separability of preference across mutually exclusive
events. The monotonicity condition holds that if at every state the lottery paid
out by act f is preferred by the agent to that paid out by g, then the agent should
prefer act f to act g.
Theorem (Anscombe-Aumann): If  satisfies Axioms AA 1– 5, then there exists
a function µ ∈ L and a function u : X → R such that for any f, g ∈ F
f  g iff (1.2)∑
s∈S
µs
∑
x∈X
fs(x)u(x) ≥
∑
s∈S
µs
∑
x∈X
gs(x)u(x)
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Furthermore, µ is unique and u is unique up to positive affine transformation.
In the Anscombe-Aumann framework, uncertainty is resolved in two steps: in
a first step the outcome of acts is determined by the state of the world, and
in a second step the outcome of the lottery the act yields is resolved. In the
theorem above, µs reflects the subjective probability of state s. fs(x) denotes the
probability of outcome x given that state s is true when act f is chosen, and u(x)
denotes the utility the agent attributes to the final outcome x.
We will use the Anscombe-Aumann framework in the discussion of ambiguity
contained in Chapter 3, since much of the literature on ambiguity and ambiguity
aversion is conducted within this framework.
1.3 Rationality
In the introduction, we claimed that rationality is often identified with the max-
imisation of expected utility, and in particular with the satisfaction of Savage’s
axioms of subjective expected utility theory. Savage’s framework can be seen as
the foundation of Bayesian decision theory, which continues to be the paradigm
in much of economics. In this section, we will investigate the main claims of
Bayesian decision theory.
One can identify at least three tenets of Bayesianism: first, the idea that all uncer-
tainty can be quantified in a single probability distribution satisfying the axioms
of probability theory. Second, the stance that agents should update their per-
sonal beliefs using Bayes’ law. Finally, Bayesianism in decision theory holds that
agents must maximise their expected utility relative to their subjective beliefs.
Let us investigate each of these tenets in greater detail.
The first tenet of Bayesianism requires agents to form a subjective likelihood or-
dering over events which can be represented using a unique and additive prior
probability distribution P (·) on the state space (S, 2S). Such a probability dis-
tribution will satisfy the axioms of probability theory:
[Axiom 1] P (A) ≥ 0 for all events A.
[Axiom 2] P (S) = 1
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[Axiom 3] P (A ∪B) = P (A) + P (B) for all disjoint events A and B.
Axiom 1 holds that the probability of all events is larger or equal to zero. Axiom
2 holds that the probability of the state space is equal to one. Axiom 3 states
that the probability of the union of two disjoint events A and B must be equal
to the sum of their individual probabilities. As we shall discuss later, axiom 3
above is violated systematically in experiments: people do not generally hold
preferences which are consistent with the existence of an additive probability
distribution over the state space, i.e. a distribution for which the sum of the
individual probabilities is equal to the probability of their union. Therefore, it
has been suggested in the literature that in order to accommodate the empirical
evidence suggesting that agents do not always hold beliefs which are representable
using a probability distribution satisfying these axioms, the axioms have to be
weakened; this topic will be pursued in greater detail in Chapters 2 and 3.
In Savage’s theory (and the Anscombe-Aumann reformulation of it), agents will
hold a unique probability distribution over the state space satisfying the axioms
above. To see how this is generated, consider Savage’s postulate P4, the compar-
ative probability axiom:
[P4] (Comparative Probability): For all events A,B and outcomes x∗  x
and y∗  y: [
x∗ if A
x if ¬A
]

[
x∗ if B
x if ¬B
]
⇒
[
y∗ if A
y if ¬A
]

[
y∗ if B
y if ¬B
]
.
The axiom shows that we can use constant acts x∗ and x with x∗  x to construct
a likelihood ordering, which we shall denote ∗ on S. In particular,
A ∗ B ⇔
[
x∗ if A
x if ¬A
]

[
x∗ if B
x if ¬B
]
The idea is that whenever the agent prefers an act which yields outcome x∗ on A
and x on ¬A to an act which yields x∗ on B and x on ¬B, and the agent prefers
x∗ to x, then they must think that the event A is at least as likely as the event
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B. Axiom P4 then additionally imposes that this likelihood ranking of events is
independent of the constant acts used to elicit it. Jointly, axioms P1 – P6 imply
the existence of a unique and finitely additive probability measure on S:
Theorem (Savage): If  satisfies Axioms P1 – P6, then ∗ can be represented
by a unique probability measure on S. That is, there is a unique and finitely
additive probability P defined on S, such that for every A,B ⊆ S
A ∗ B ⇐⇒ P (A) ≥ P (B)
and if A ⊆ S and 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 there is a B ⊆ A such that
P (B) = ρP (A).
Let us now turn to the second tenet of Bayesianism, namely that an agent must
update their prior probabilities via Bayes’ rule. We have seen that Savage’s deci-
sion theory implies the existence of a likelihood ordering on events which can be
represented by a probability measure; agents thus hold prior probabilities for all
events. Then, Bayes’ rule requires that the agent updates the prior probabilities
to posterior probabilities as follows:
P (A|B) = P (B|A)P (A)
P (B)
(1.3)
In the above equation, A and B are events. P (A|B) denotes the posterior prob-
ability of A given B, P (A) and P (B) are the prior probabilities of events A and
B, and P (B|A) the conditional probability of B given A.
Savage’s decision theory, as expounded above, is a static framework, hence Bayes’
rule does not come into play directly. However, it is relatively simple to show that
Savage’s framework implies consistency with Bayes’ rule on a dynamic reading of
Savage’s framework. To this end, consider a conditional preference relation A
which is interpreted as the agent’s preference relation upon observing the event
A. That is to say, the agent now knows more than that any state in S is true,
since he knows that the true state is in A. Now define the preference relation
conditional on A as follows:
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f A g ⇔
[
f if A
h if ¬A
]

[
g if A
h if ¬A
]
Then by a straightforward extension of Savage’s theorem, it is possible to show
that the conditional preference relation A can be represented as follows (Ghi-
rardato, 2002):
Theorem (Representation of conditional probability): If A satisfies Axioms 1
– 7, then there exists a unique and finitely additive probability measure µ(·) on E
and a state-independent utility function U : X → R such that
f A g iff (1.4)∫
S
u[f(s)]PA(ds) ≥
∫
S
u[g(s)]PA(ds).
In the above equation, PA is the Bayesian update of the probability measure P
conditional on A. So if the agent’s conditional preferences A satisfy Savage’s
axioms, then the agent will behave as if they maximised expected utility relative
to the posterior probability PA. However, since this thesis is concerned only with
Savage’s static framework, we will not pursue the link between Savage’s theorem
and Bayesian updating any further.
The final tenet of Bayesianism holds that agents must maximise their expected
utility. To understand this requirement, note first that decisions were first studied
by Pascal and Fermat, who studied people’s gambling behaviour from a theoret-
ical point of view. Pascal and Fermat than held that rational choice consisted in
choosing the gamble with the highest expected value:
EV =
n∑
i=1
pixi
Thereby, ‘EV’ denotes expected value, and letting i = {1, ..., n} denote the event,
pi gives the probability of event i and xi denotes the payoff of event i. However,
the view that rational choice consists in choosing the gamble with the highest
expected value quickly came under attack, as it is contradicted by evidence on
the St. Petersburg paradox. The setup of the problem is as follows: a fair coin
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is tossed until “heads” comes up for the first time, at which point the game ends.
The payoff of the gamble is dependent on the number of times “tails” has come
up in consecutive tosses, and the payoff doubles with every toss of the coin. One
therefore wins $2k−1 for k tosses of the coin. The expected value of this gamble
is infinite: EV = 12 ·1 + 14 ·2 + 18 ·4 + 116 ·8 + ... =
∑∞
k=1
1
2 =∞. Yet most rational
agents would, at best, place a very small sum of money on this bet; this problem
therefore became known as a paradox.
In response to the St. Petersburg paradox, Bernoulli suggested that the expected
value does not reflect the subjective value a specific amount of money has for a
person. Hence, he concluded that rational choice consists in choosing that gamble
which has the highest expected utility:
EU =
∑
piu(xi)
where u(xi) is the utility transformation of payoffs, generally assumed to be
monotonically increasing. Of course, Savage’s theory satisfies this requirement,
as equation (1.1) shows.
One may ask, then, why the tenets of Bayesianism, as characterised here, form a
canon of rationality. The answer to this question is commonly given by appeal to
the Kantian notion of practical reason, the basic human capacity to resolve the
question of what to do. Practical reason is a normative approach, since it concerns
what the agent rationally ought to do. The answer to the normative question of
what is best to do is then that it is rational to act in one’s own best interest,
by maximising (subjective) expected utility. The axioms of (subjective) expected
utility theory then embody basic consistency requirements of the agent’s delib-
erations; we can judge the agent as rational or irrational depending on whether
their deliberations are consistent or not. As we can see, practical reason is a
framework, or calculus, of rationality. Notice that practical reason constitutes
an a priori notion of rationality, which proceeds from universally applicable first
principles. The axioms of Savage’s theory are usually understood as such a priori
consistency, or rationality requirements, the failure of which is attributed to a
flaw in the agent’s deliberations.
There is, however, much dispute over the question whether Savage’s axioms are
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indeed universally applicable, or whether they constitute requirements of ratio-
nality at all. We will answer the questions when Bayesian decision theory should
be seen as rational, and what requirements of rationality hold when Bayesian-
ism doesn’t, shortly. First, however, we will investigate the two most prominent
counterexamples against Savage’s theory.
1.4 Paradoxes of Rationality
Savage’s axiom P2, the Sure-Thing Principle, requires that preferences are sepa-
rable across events. This axiom has attracted particularly severe criticism, since
it has been shown to be violated systematically in empirical tests. Two different
empirical results are particularly noteworthy: the experiments of Allais (1953)
and Ellsberg (1961). The next two sections will introduce these two experiments.
The Allais paradox
Maurice Allais tested Savage’s sure-thing principle using the example of the gam-
bles given in Table 1.1. Gamble a1 pays out $1 million with certainty, whereas
gamble a2 pays out $5 million with a probability of 10%, $1 million with a prob-
ability of 89% and nothing with a probability of 1%. When asked to choose
between gambles a1 and a2, most people prefer gamble a1. Furthermore, gamble
a3 pays out $1 million with a probability of 11% and $0 with a probability of
89%, whereas gamble a4 pays out $5 million with a 10% probability, and nothing
with a 90% probability. When asked to choose between gambles a3 and a4, most
people prefer gamble a4.
As we can easily verify, the preference pattern a1  a2 and a4  a3 is inconsistent
with Savage’s Sure Thing Principle: gambles a1 and a2 have the same outcomes
for lottery tickets #12-100, therefore the consequences of these events should be
irrelevant to the agent’s preference between a1 and a2. Also, gambles a3 and a4
have the same payoffs for lottery tickets #12-100, therefore, this aspect should
be irrelevant to the agent’s preference between a3 and a4. But, crossing out the
column for lottery tickets #12-100, we can see that gamble a1 is identical to
gamble a3, and gamble a2 is identical to gamble a4. Savage’s sure thing principle
demands that an agent who prefers a1 to a2 (a2 to a1) should also prefer a3 to a4
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#1 #2-#11 #12-100
a1 $1M $1M $1M
a2 $0 $5M $1M
a3 $1M $1M $0
a4 $0 $5M $0
Table 1.1: The Allais paradox
(a4 to a3). The typical preference of a1 over a2 and a4 over a3 is thus inconsistent
with the principle. Allais’ problem is usually referred to as a“paradox”since most
people find the sure-thing principle intuitively compelling as a requirement of
rationality, and simultaneously have the intuition that they would like to choose
a1 and a4.
We will discuss the Allais paradox in greater detail in Chapter 3, where we will
attempt to reconcile the paradox with Savage’s theory. However, for now let us
consider the various responses that have been made to Allais’s paradox. Consider
Savage’s own response first (1954, p.103):
It seems to me that in reversing my preference between Gambles 3
[here: a3] and 4 [here: a4] I have corrected an error. There is, of
course, an important sense in which preferences, being entirely sub-
jective, cannot be in error; but in a different, more subtle sense they
can be. Let me illustrate by a simple example containing no reference
to uncertainty. A man buying a car for $2,134.56 is tempted to order
it with a radio installed, which will bring the total price to $2,228.41,
feeling that the difference is trifling. But, when he reflects that, if he
already had the car, he certainly would not spend $93.85 for a radio
for it, he realizes that he has made an error.
As this quote suggests, Savage thinks that upon reflection, people would see that
their preference of a4 over a3 were in error, and would therefore reverse their
preference if given the opportunity. This stance is denied by Shafer (1986), who
argues that preferences can not be in error. In particular, Shafer (1986) argues
that the example given by Savage is just evidence to the effect that preference
is not invariant under different measurements: in the context of buying the car,
it seems to the man that it’s best to buy it with the radio installed, whereas in
case the man were not buying a car, it would seem to them that the radio is too
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expensive. However, as Shafer argues, Savage assumes that only one of the two
ways of asking himself whether or not to buy the radio is correct, namely that
where the agent assesses his preference between the radio and the money it costs
outside the context of buying a car. But, Shafer points out, it is ultimately up to
the man to decide which representation of the decision problem is best suited to
determining whether or not he would like to buy the radio; perhaps it is in the
context of buying the car that he can best place a value on his desire for a radio.
Shafer argues that preferences can not be in error in this way. In Chapter 3, we
will argue that the preference pattern commonly revealed in Allais’ paradox are
not in error, but they may be interpreted as reflecting the difficulty an agent has
with constructing a suitable model which allows the agent to form preferences
amongst Allais’ gambles.
Whilst as we have seen, Savage believes that the preference patterns stated by
the agents in Allais’ paradox are in error, Savage also holds that if agents truly
wish to violate the sure-thing principle even on reflection, then the sure-thing
principle is to be abandoned:
If, after thorough deliberation, anyone maintains a pair of distinct
preferences that are in conflict with the sure-thing principle, he must
abandon, or modify, the principle; for that kind of discrepancy seems
intolerable in a normative theory. [...] In general, a person who has
tentatively accepted a normative theory must conscientiously study sit-
uations in which the theory seems to lead him astray; he must decide
for each by reflection – deduction will typically be of little relevance –
whether to retain his initial impression of the situation or to accept
the implications of the theory for it.
Whilst Savage argues that the sure-thing principle has no normative force if agents
wish to violate it even on reflection, Savage also thinks that no rational agent
would wish to maintain the preference pattern violating independence if given
the chance to revise his decision. So Savage denies that people “truly” prefer
a4 to a3, they are just taken in by the strong appeal of irrational decisions. As
we shall argue in Chapter 3, cases of decision making under ambiguity present
just such a case where even on reflection agents wish to violate the sure-thing
principle; in contrast, we agree with Savage that in cases of risk, such as in Allais’
paradox, the sure-thing principle is compelling as a normative requirement.
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Allais himself denies the view that the sure-thing principle is valid even under
risk. He believes that adherence to Savage’s sure-thing principle should not be
considered a question of rationality at all, and that, indeed, choosing according
to psychological factors should be permissible. This is expressed in the following
quote:
Il convient de noter en passant que ces e´lements ne sont pas qualifie´s
d’“irrationnels”. Il est admis qu’un individu “rationnel” peut avoir une
e´chelle des valeurs psychologiques diffe´rentes de l’e´chelle des valeurs
mone´taires et qu’il peut avoir une propension plus ou moins grande
pour la se´curite´ ou pour le risque. Il paraˆıt admis que c’est la` une
question de psychologie et non de “rationnalite´” 3.
We have, then, identified two distinct responses to Allais’ paradox: first, denying
its relevance on the grounds that it reveals a common flaw of reasoning, and
secondly, denying the sure thing principle. The first response is endorsed by
Savage, and the second by Allais. Those who believe that the empirical failure of
the sure thing principle indicates that the principle be abandoned have suggested
variants of expected utility theory without independence. For instance, Machina
(1982) provides an expected utility model without independence (the expected
utility equivalent of the sure-thing principle).
However, a third response to the Allais paradox is feasible (Steele, 2006), which at-
tempts to reconcile the Allais paradox with the sure-thing principle. This position
is defended, for instance, by Broome (1991). According to Broome’s argument,
the consequences of the gambles in the Allais paradox are not “sure experiences
of the deciding person” of the kind Savage had in mind, since they fail to in-
corporate the agent’s attitude to risk. Then, the outcome of the first gamble
is more valuable to the agent since the payoffs are obtained with certainty; the
“certainty” aspect of lottery a1 should thus be factored into the outcome of the
lottery, such that the payoff of the lottery becomes “$1 Million + δ”, where δ
reflects the additional value of the outcome due to certainty of the payoff. Under
this new version, call it Allais∗, the sure-thing principle is not longer violated.
3It is useful to note in passing that these elements are not labeled“irrational”. It is admissible
that an individual may have a separate scale of psychological values from the scale of monetary
values, and that he may have a larger or smaller propensity toward risk. It seems that this is a
question of psychology rather than “rationality”.
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There are at least two reasons why re-describing outcomes in the way proposed
by Broome (1991) is illegitimate. The first makes references to what Broome calls
the rectangular field assumption, which Broome himself recognises as a counter-
argument to his position. In Savage’s theory, acts are defined as function from
states of the world to consequences. Then the set of acts comprises all possible
functions from states to consequences – including the original Allais gambles. The
agent is required to have preferences over all acts thus defined. The rectangular
field assumption therefore implies that the Allais paradox cuts against the sure-
thing principle. Re-describing outcomes in the way suggested by Broome is thus
incompatible with the rectangular field assumption contained in Savage’s theory,
and is hence illegitimate.
The second reason why Broome’s re-description strategy is unsuccessful is that
on Broome’s position, probabilities are interpreted both as beliefs (which are
used as decision weights) and as carriers of utility. A Bayesian would reject
this position, since a rational decision maker should not attach utility values to
beliefs, as Broome’s argument would suggest. One basic premise of Bayesian
decision theory is that values and beliefs can be separated, a credo Broome’s
argument breaches.
For these two reasons, Broome’s re-description strategy of Allais’ paradox seems
unsuccessful. However, we agree with Broome’s view that the sure-thing principle
is compelling as a normative requirement in situations of risk; Chapter 3 will
therefore give its own attempt for reconciling Allais’ paradox with Savage’s sure-
thing principle.
The Ellsberg paradox
A second objection to Savage’s sure-thing principle was made by Ellsberg (1961).
The Ellsberg gambles are given in table 1.2. The setup is as follows: an urn
contains 90 balls, 30 of which are red, and the remaining 60 are black or yellow
in an unknown proportion. The probability of drawing a red ball is then 1/3, and
the probability of drawing a black (respectively yellow) ball is within the closed
interval [0; 2/3]. Then, gamble e1 pays out $100 if a red ball is drawn, and gamble
e2 pays out $100 if a black ball is drawn. When choosing between e1 and e2, most
people opt for e1. Furthermore, gamble e3 pays out $100 if a red or yellow ball
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red black yellow
e1 $100 $0 $0
e2 $0 $100 $0
e3 $100 $0 $100
e4 $0 $100 $100
Table 1.2: The Ellsberg paradox
is drawn from the urn, and e4 pays out $100 if a black or yellow ball is drawn.
When given the choice between e3 and e4, most people choose e4.
These choices are inconsistent with Savage’s sure-thing principle. We can see this
if we focus on the last column of the table: gambles e1 and e2 have the same
payoff if a yellow ball is drawn. Then, the agent’s choice between gambles e1 and
e2 should be dependent only on the outcomes in the events red and black. Also,
gambles e3 and e4 have the same payoff in the event yellow, so the agent’s choice
between e3 and e4 should also be based only on the events red or black. But then,
the restricted gamble e1 becomes the same as the restricted gamble e3, and the
restricted gamble e2 becomes the same as the restricted gamble e4. Therefore,
Savage’s sure-thing principle requires that an agent who prefers e1 to e2 (e2 to
e1) should also prefer e3 to e4 (e4 to e3).
The choice of e1 and e4 is inconsistent with the existence of a unique probability
distribution over the states. This can be easily verified if we focus on the event
‘black’. A choice (interpreted as strict preference) of e1 over e2 would suggest that
the person believes the event ‘red’ to be more likely than ‘black’: both gambles
pay out the same amount, and the only reason why the agent would prefer e1 to
e2 is that he believes ‘red’ to be more likely than ‘black’. This indicates that the
agent believes the probability of ‘black’ to be less than 1/3. But then, a choice
of e4 over e3 indicates a belief that ‘black’ is more likely than ‘red’, since both
gambles pay out the same amount in the event ‘yellow’, and a strict preference
of e4 over e3 can arise only if the agent holds ‘black’ to be more likely than ‘red’.
This yields a probability of ‘black’ greater than 1/3.
The results of Ellsberg’s experiment are usually interpreted as arising from aver-
sion to the uncertainty over the probabilities of the states ‘black’ and ‘yellow’: we
have seen that the agent can entertain any probability assignment for the states
‘black’ and ‘yellow’ in the range of [0; 2/3]. Whenever the agent does not hold
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a “sharp” prior probability for every state, this type of uncertainty is referred
to as “ambiguity”. Then, agents who are averse to ambiguity behave as if the
uncertainty regarding the correct probability distribution over the states could
be turned against them: in each decision situation, they act as if one of the less
favourable distributions were the true distribution. In the present case, this im-
plies acting as if the probability of ‘black’ is less than 1/3 for gamble e2, and as if
the probability of ‘black’ was greater than 1/3 in gamble e4. We will discuss the
concept of ambiguity in greater detail in Chapter 2, and give definitions of the
concepts of ambiguity and ambiguity aversion in Chapter 3.
Ellsberg suggested the above gambles in order to show that it is not the case that
all uncertainty can be quantified within a single probability distribution, as the
first tenet of Bayesianism would suggest. This is expressed in the following quote:
A number of sets of constraints on choice-behavior under uncertainty
have now been proposed, all more or less equivalent or closely similar
in spirit, having the implication that – for a “rational” man – all
uncertainties can be reduced to risks.
However, since there is systematic evidence to the effect that people’s preferences
are not compatible with beliefs which are representable using a unique and addi-
tive subjective prior probability distribution, the first tenet of Bayesianism does
not cohere with evidence. I will argue, in the course of this thesis, that ambiguity
is a type of uncertainty which is incompatible with Savage’s subjective expected
utility theory for small worlds, and that it should therefore be understood as
a type of uncertainty pertinent to large world settings, which require separate
theoretical treatment.
One may wonder, at this point, what the difference between the Allais and Ells-
berg paradoxes is. Both constitute a violation of the sure-thing principle and are
very similar in structure. The main difference lies in the fact that whilst Allais’
paradox may be seen as a violation of the third tenet of Bayesianism, namely that
agents maximise expected utility, Ellsberg’s paradox is commonly understood as
a violation of the first tenet of Bayesianism, that all uncertainty is quantified in
a unique and additive probability distribution. More specifically, Allais’ paradox
is compatible with probabilistic sophistication4, the requirement that the agent’s
4The concept of probabilistic sophistication is explained in greater detail in section 3.3.
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beliefs can be modelled as a probability distribution satisfying the axioms of prob-
ability theory given in section 1.3, whereas Ellsberg’s experiment is not (Machina
and Schmeidler, 1992). This thesis adheres to the view that the third tenet of
Bayesianism is a requirement of rationality, whereas the first is not.
The view that agents should not be required to quantify all uncertainty in a
unique and additive probability distribution over the state space has famously
been argued by Schmeidler (1989) and Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). The au-
thors give the following example to motivate this claim: suppose you are asked to
bet on a coin. You have a coin in your pocket which you have flipped frequently
and therefore you know that the relative frequency of heads is approximately
50%. I also have a coin in my pocket, but you know nothing about my coin. Now
Bayesian reasoning requires that you should assign probabilities to the events
of each of the coins landing heads. Of course, the probability for the first coin
landing heads should be 50%. Also, due to the symmetry of one’s ignorance with
respect to the unknown coin, one should assign a probability of 50% to the second
coin landing heads. Now both coins have been assigned a probability of 50% for
heads. But this, Schmeidler argues, seems dubious: one would presumably prefer
to bet on the first coin, since the probability assignment is based on facts rather
than by default.
Guided by this intuition, Gilboa and Schmeidler have developed two different
models for choice under ambiguity: First, Schmeidler’s (1989) nonadditive prob-
ability, or Choquet expected utility (CEU) model relaxes the additivity of prob-
ability and thereby permits for the modal behaviour observed in Ellsberg’s ex-
periment, and secondly, Gilboa and Schmeidler’s (1989) maxmin expected utility
(MEU) model, which relaxes the uniqueness of the probability distribution. Both
models aim to reconcile Ellsberg’s paradox with Savage’s framework (or rather,
Anscombe and Aumann’s reformulation of Savage’s framework). In particular, in
the CEU model agents maximise their expected utility with respect to nonadditive
beliefs called capacities. In contrast, in the MEU model agents will choose that
act amongst the set of acts which maximises subjective expected utility under
the assumption that the least favourable of all possible probability distributions
is the true distribution.
It has been argued in the literature, however, that the MEU model is too extreme
in the sense that agents should not be required to choose as if the least favourable
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of all possible probability distributions were the true distribution; such a decision
rule seems too conservative. In particular, Jaffray (1989) has suggested to make
use of Hurwicz’s (1951) α-criterion in cases of ambiguity. Suppose that c and
C are the worst and best payoffs the agent may receive from choosing a partic-
ular act. Then Hurwicz’s criterion demands that the agent chooses that action
which maximises (1 − α)c + αC, where α reflects how optimistic or pessimistic
the agent is with respect to ambiguity (Binmore, 2009). In a similar vein, Ghi-
rardato, Maccheroni and Marinacci (2004) have proffered the so-called α-MEU
model, according to which an agent will choose that act which maximises a con-
vex combination of the least and highest expected utilities that could result from
the choice of a particular action. We will pursue the topic of ambiguity further
in Chapter 3 of this thesis.
1.5 Uncertainty, small worlds and large worlds
Savage’s subjective expected utility theory is designed to be suitable to small
world decision situations. What, however, is a small world? Savage himself
distinguishes between small worlds and grand worlds using the following two
proverbs: you are in a small world if you can look before you leap, and you are
in a grand world if you must cross the bridge when you come to it. That is to
say, the agent is in a small world decision problem if it is feasible to optimise by
maximising subjective expected utility, whereas the agent’s decision problem is
one of a grand world whenever the uncertainty contained in the decision problem
is so severe that the agent cannot rationally respond to it. Savage then gives
a number of everyday examples of typical small world reasoning, in particular
(Savage, 1954, p.8):
1. Whether a particular egg is rotten.
2. Which, if any, in a particular dozen of eggs are rotten.
3. The temperature at noon in Chicago yesterday. [...]
4. The infinite sequence of heads or tails that will result from repeated tosses
of a particular (everlasting) coin.
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State
Options Good Rotten
break into bowl six-egg omelet no omelet, and five
good eggs destroyed
break into saucer six-egg omelet, and a five-egg omelet, and a
saucer to wash saucer to wash
throw away five-egg omelet, and one five-egg omelet
good egg destroyed
Table 1.3: A small world decision matrix
Savage then argues that these examples have certain features in common. Most
importantly, in each case the agent is uncertain about a some feature, such as
the goodness of an egg, the temperature, or the number of heads and tails in
coin tosses. This uncertainty can then be expressed, or quantified, within a state
space which captures all uncertainty pertinent to the decision problem.
Formally, a small world model is associated with the existence of a decision matrix
such as the one contained in Table 1.3. The table illustrates a man’s decision
problem when cooking an omelet. In the example, the man has already broken
five eggs into a bowl, and now considers breaking the sixth egg into the same
bowl. This decision depends on whether he thinks that the sixth egg is good or
rotten, and what likelihood these cases have. He then evaluates the available acts
of ‘breaking the egg into a bowl’, ‘breaking the egg into a separate saucer’, and
‘throwing it away’ in light of the consequences each of these acts would have in
each of the states. We will now discuss the elements of the table, namely a state
space, consequences and acts, in greater detail.
Savage characterises a state of the world as a description of the world leaving no
relevant aspect undescribed. So the state space resolves all uncertainty contained
in the decision problem, by enumerating all relevant contingencies the agent’s
decision problem may depend on. This is contrasted, in Savage’s terminology,
with the world itself, which is the object the agent is uncertain about, and the
true state of the world, which is that state in the state space which obtains as
the world unfolds and the uncertainty is resolved.
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Savage then introduces the comparative notion of larger and smaller worlds.
While we will explain this distinction more formally in Chapter 2, the idea is
that a larger world contains more details regarding the decision problem than a
smaller world. So, for instance, when deliberating whether to take an umbrella
to go out for a walk, one might either consider the smaller world states ‘rainy’
and ‘sunny’, or the more detailed, larger world states ‘rainy and windy’, ‘rainy
and not windy’, ‘sunny and windy’ and ‘sunny and not windy’. We can see, then,
that the states ‘rainy’ and ‘sunny’ form a partition of the larger world state space:
the state ‘rainy’ can be understood as the disjunction of the two states ‘rainy and
windy’ and ‘rainy and not windy’, and similarly for the state ‘sunny’. A smaller
world then neglects the distinction between the case where it is windy or not, but
does not elide any large world state entirely. However, a small world model may
elide a large world state entirely, Savage argues, when the state is considered
“virtually impossible” by the agent. Savage characterises precisely under what
conditions a small world is a satisfactory representation of the “grand world” –
an ultimately refined model of the world – this shall be discussed in Chapter 2.
A consequence, according to Savage, is then “anything that may happen to a
person” (Savage, 1954, p.13), it is construed as an experience of the deciding
person, or, as Savage puts it, a “state of the person” as opposed to a “state of
the world”. A typical consequence will, under this conception of it, detail every
aspect of the person’s experience which might be relevant to them, such as money,
health, the well-being of others, and so forth.
The notion of an act is defined as a function from the state space into the set of
consequences; states and consequences are primitive notions, and acts are defined
derivatively. The set of acts contains all possible functions from states of the world
to consequences. More intuitively, Savage argues that an act just consists of a
combination of consequences for every state. This notion of acts may, of course,
yield acts which cannot be verbalised easily: for instance, what is the acts which
yields a global temperature rise of 1 degree celsius by 2025, and 3 degrees by
2100? In very simple decision settings such as that of the example of cooking an
omelet, it is, however, fairly straightforward to identify an act as that conduct of
the agent which brings about, for instance, the consequence of obtaining a ‘six-
egg omelet’ when the sixth egg is good, and ‘no omelet and five eggs destroyed’
when the sixth egg is rotten.
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Savage then considers the case where the agent does not know what consequences
follows at a particular state; for instance, where the agent does not know whether
one rotten egg will, in fact, spoil the entire omelet or not. This scenario, where
agents cannot assign a unique consequence to every state, will be integral to this
thesis; we will call this case option uncertainty, and discuss its implications in
Chapter 2. Savage contends, however, that if the agent is in this situation of
uncertainty regarding consequences, then the correct response would be to refine
the state space accordingly. For instance, if the agent is unsure of the result of
breaking a rotten egg into the bowl containing five good eggs, then the “right”
state space to use would not be ‘good’ and ‘rotten’, but rather ‘good and a rotten
egg does not spoil the omelet’, ‘good and a rotten egg spoils the omelet’, ‘rotten
and a rotten egg does not spoil the omelet’, and ‘rotten and a rotten egg spoils the
omelet’. This more refined state space then resolves the uncertainty regarding
the consequences of breaking the egg into the bowl fully, such that a unique
consequence obtains at every state. In Chapter 2, the argument Savage made to
the effect that uncertainty over consequences should be addressed by refinement
of the state space will be called the reduction argument, and we will argue in
Chapter 2 that it cannot be employed in all cases.
A further case Savage considers is that where the decision the agent makes leads
to a further decision, such that the formulation of the act ‘break into bowl’ does
not fully reflect the options the agent has. For instance, in the case of cooking an
omelet the agent might care about what to do when the omelet is indeed spoiled,
such as taking the family to the restaurant or eating toast for breakfast instead.
In this case, Savage argues, the description of the act contained in the list of
possible actions the agent constructed is not sufficiently detailed, such that the
agent should replace the act ‘break into bowl’ with a set of acts such as ‘break
into bowl, and in case of disaster have toast’, and ‘break into bowl, and in case
of disaster take family to the restaurant’. One might call this kind of uncertainty
act uncertainty. However, we will not consider this case in this thesis, since the
set of acts is, in Savage’s theory, derived from states and consequences. Hence, a
sufficiently fine-grained set of states and consequences will imply exhaustiveness
of the act space.
Let us now turn to the concept of a large world, and let us begin by considering
Savage’s definition of these, before proffering the view of large worlds advocated
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in this thesis. As pointed out above, Savage conceives of large world decision
as those cases where the agent must “cross the bridge when he comes to it”.
Binmore (2007) gives the example of financial economics as a typical case of a
large world in Savage’s sense: this would be a case where it is not straightforward
to see how an agent could rationally, or optimally, respond to the uncertainty he
is faced with. More specifically, for typical large world cases it is impossible to
construct a state space which satisfies Savage’s definition thereof, namely such
that it enumerates all aspects of the world leaving no relevant detail undescribed.
With respect to large worlds Savage argues, however, that the most sensible
way of resolving such decision situations is to break them down into smaller
decision problems which lend themselves to small world representations, thus
resolving, step by step, the complicated large world problem. For instance, when
we are faced with the complex problem of how much public money should be
invested in mitigating climate change within the next twenty years, the most
reasonable response would, according to Savage, be to construct a small world
model constrained to the forecast horizon for which we have sufficient information,
thus “confining attention to so small a world” that it is possible to find an optimal
response to the problem thus obtained. So not all decision problems which may
appear to require crossing the bridge when one comes to it really are so complex
that they prevent rational responses.
According to Savage, then, a large world is a refinement of a small world. In the
extreme case of an ultimately refined model, the large world becomes the grand
world, which includes all aspects of a decision problem. The role of the grand
world, in Savage’s theory, is to peg the concept of optimality: a decision is optimal
if it is optimal in a grand world, and a small world representation is suitable as
a representation of the decision problem to the extent that the decision in the
small world will cohere with the optimal decision made in the grand world. We
will elaborate on these notions from a more technical point of view in Chapter 2.
The view of the large world this thesis uses is slightly different from the one
Savage has in mind. In particular, in this thesis a large world is understood not
as a refinement of a small world model, but as a model in which a small world
representation is not feasible. The notion of the large world as used here refers
to decision situations where a model very similar to the small world decision
matrix can be constructed, but where the model explicitly admits uncertainty
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over some aspects of the small world model. The advantage of this conception of
large worlds is that it permits modelling the attitudes an agent has to particular
kinds, or sources, of uncertainty with precision – this is the aim of this thesis. We
can then model decision problems where the agent can neither fully “look before
he leaps” nor on the other hand must “cross the bridge when they come to it”;
rather, the agent modelled here rationally responds to uncertainty.
An assumption which is crucial to this endeavour is that the agent is consciously
unaware of the fact that the representation of the decision problem they con-
struct may be underspecified in some aspects. Once we assume that the agent
is consciously unaware, the agent can respond rationally to the uncertainty they
are faced with. Indeed, without this assumption, it is not clear what, from a
normative point of view, can be said about the agent’s reasoning within large
worlds.
Finally, it is important to now respond to the two questions to what extent we
advocate the Bayesian view of rationality, and what our view of rationality is when
the Bayesian framework is too restrictive. The answer to the first question is that
Bayesianism embodies the right principles of rationality within the constraints of
small world models, and should be employed when a small world decision problem
can be constructed. In large world problems where the agent faces significant
uncertainty, however, the Bayesian view may be too restrictive, necessitating
separate requirements of rationality. Making some progress in specifying the
rationality requirements in large worlds is the objective of this thesis.
1.6 Chapter conclusions
This chapter has presented the basic frameworks and concepts this thesis makes
use of. In particular, we presented Savage’s axiomatic framework and corre-
sponding subjective expected utility theorem. Furthermore, we have explained
the Anscombe-Aumann framework and its differences from Savage’s theory. The
baseline concept of rationality, namely Bayesianism, was explained. We then
considered the two most prominent counterexamples against Savage’s theorem,
the Allais and Ellsberg paradoxes. Finally, we gave an introduction to small and
large world models, facilitating our further discussion of uncertainty contained in
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Chapter 2. This thesis proceeds as follows:
Chapter 2 first explains Savage’s notions of the small and grand world and shows
why ambiguity, option and state space uncertainty are incompatible with the
small world representation; they may be seen as features of a “large world”, an
extension of Savage’s small world model to cases of uncertainty. Furthermore,
the chapter investigates the question to what extent it is possible to reduce these
types of uncertainty to one another.
Chapter 3 turns to the topic of ambiguity, arguing in particular that the con-
cept of ambiguity can not be captured accurately if ambiguity is defined subjec-
tively, i.e. in terms of preferences. Subjective definitions of ambiguity may either
under- or overestimate the presence of ambiguity, as ambiguity may not be re-
vealed through preferences when it is present, or may be attributed to preference
patterns which do not arise out of ambiguity. To solve this issue, we suggest
an objective notion of ambiguity, by stipulating the existence of an exogenously
given objective likelihood ranking over events. On our definition of ambiguity,
careful distinctions between ambiguity and ambiguity attitude are feasible. More-
over, Chapter 3 argues that in situations of ambiguity, Savage’s framework is too
restrictive; ambiguity aversion should be permissible in objectively ambiguous
decision problems.
Chapter 4 gives a formal model of option uncertainty, following Ghirardato (2001).
In particular, the model generalises Savage’s notion of acts, so that these are no
longer functions from states of the world into consequences, but correspondences
from states into consequences. We use Ghirardato’s framework to show that op-
tion uncertainty aversion can be used as an explanation of status quo bias, the
tendency that people prefer the status quo over other available alternatives. The
two weak conditions that the status quo is not itself uncertain, and that agents
are uncertainty averse, suffice to derive status quo bias. The model can be seen
as rationalising status quo bias.
Chapter 5 contains a paper co-authored with Konstantinos Katsikopoulos and
Gerd Gigerenzer at the Center for Adaptive Behavior and Cognition of the Max
Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin. Whilst the remainder of this
thesis can be seen as addressing the question which axioms are reasonable under
uncertainty, Chapter 5 asks which axioms are implied by a descriptively accurate
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model of choice, namely the priority heuristic. The paper gives an axiomatisation,
and corresponding representation theorem, of a class of lexicographic models
which includes the priority heuristic as a special case.
Chapter 6 explains and defends the pluralistic view of decision theory advocated
in this thesis, discusses the role of heuristics under uncertainty and concludes with
a discussion of the various applications of the notions of uncertainty developed
in this thesis.
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Types of Uncertainty
2.1 Introduction
In the last chapter, we have introduced Savage’s framework for small worlds, and
identified the main characteristics a small world model must satisfy: the agent’s
decision problem can be cast in terms of a choice over actions, the outcomes of
which hinge on an exogenously given state space. Savage’s theorem shows that an
agent whose preferences satisfy a number of basic postulates will act as if he were
maximising the subjective expectation of utility, relative to a utility function on
the set of consequences and a subjective probability function on the set of states
of the world.
This chapter argues that many decisions cannot be cast in terms of a small
world decision matrix; in particular, those where there is “too much” uncertainty
to permit a small-world representation. Let us start with a concrete example:
suppose you are the Head of State of Israel, and you must make a decision on the
question whether your country should launch a military attack on Iran, on the
grounds that you suspect Iran to be building nuclear weapons. There are many
complex factors which would influence such a decision, for instance, how likely
you think it really is that Iran is building nuclear weapons, and at what stage
their development currently is. Also, one would want to predict as precisely as
possible the ramifications of the decision to go to war: whether it is possible to
find and destroy any potential nuclear missiles, how many lives would be lost,
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and how likely it is that the conflict might spill over to other states. One may
also find it hard to evaluate how desirable each of these consequences are: how
do we weigh up lives lost against the threat of a nuclear armed Iran? Finally, one
may wonder whether there are any alternatives to going to war, and if so, how
good these would be.
The only source of uncertainty consistent with the small-world representation of
decisions is uncertainty regarding which state of the world prevails – this type
of uncertainty will be called “state uncertainty” – but arguably this is not the
only relevant type of uncertainty. In the real world, an agent is not faced with
a decision problem, but must rather construct it (see, e.g., Ghirardato, 2001):
states, consequences and acts are not usually given to the agent. Constructing
a decision problem can, however, be highly complex. For instance, according to
Savage (28, p.9), a state of the world is “a description of the world, leaving no
relevant aspect undescribed”. In some cases it may indeed be eminently simple to
identify a state space which can be so-described, but in many others, a decision
has to be made by the agent as to what counts as a “relevant” aspect and what
does not. Similarly, the agent must decide on what to include in the set of acts.
Not all decision problems lend themselves to a straightforward small-world rep-
resentation. Such decision situations are what Savage calls large worlds; cases
where the uncertainty is too severe to admit subjective expected utility max-
imisation. Even in a large world, however, not all uncertainties are alike. The
agent may face qualitatively different kinds, not just different severities, of un-
certainty, and these may require different responses. For instance, the example
of Israel’s decision whether to launch an attack on Iran above demonstrates that
there may be uncertainty over the correct probability distribution over states, as
well as uncertainty over the consequences of launching an attack. These kinds
of uncertainty may be perceived, by the decision-making agent, very differently:
one could imagine that when the possible consequences of one’s decision are that
many people may lose their lives, then one would be particularly averse to any
uncertainty over the consequences of one’s actions. This feature of uncertainty
over consequences would also suggest that the agent’s attitude to this kind of
uncertainty would be different to their attitude to uncertainty over the likelihood
of states. In the following, we will flesh out this argument, characterising the
different types of uncertainty which necessitate distinct treatment.
42
CHAPTER 2. TYPES OF UNCERTAINTY
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.2 begins with Savage’s own under-
standing of the small, large and grand worlds, and discuss the limitations of this
account. This is followed, in section 2.3, by a classification of the different types
of uncertainty characterised here. Section 2.4 then investigates the concept of
ambiguity in light of our classifications of types of uncertainty, and considers the
question to what extent ambiguity can be reduced to risk. Section 2.5 turns to the
concept of option uncertainty, and discusses four different ways of understand-
ing option uncertainty. The concept of state space uncertainty is investigated in
section 2.6. Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Savage’s notions of small, large and grand worlds
Savage distinguishes between small and large worlds using the following two
proverbs: you are in a small world when it is possible to “look before you leap”,
and you are in a large world when you must“cross the bridge when you come to it”
(Savage, 1954, p.16). Intuitively, planning ahead by maximisation of subjective
expected utility, i.e. looking before you leap, is feasible only in situations where
there are grounds to think that certain results would follow from one’s actions;
in contrast, if the decision situation is, for one reason or another, too complex,
then one must make decisions as events unfold, i.e. by crossing the bridge when
one comes to it.
Savage’s also introduces the notion of the grand world, where this is to be un-
derstood as an infinitely refined version of the small world, a model in which no
detail is elided. For instance, in the grand world consequences are to constitute
“sure experiences of the deciding person”, that is, they are no longer descriptions
of things that happen to an agent in a particular state, but rather levels of satis-
faction the agent experiences. On this strong notion of grand world consequences,
it almost appears as though what Savage had in mind is that grand world conse-
quences are in fact utility levels rather than descriptions of the state of the agent.
It is not easy to make sense of this conception of the grand world. A grand world
where consequences are mental states of a person will have acts and states which
no longer lend themselves to a natural interpretation – how are we to describe a
state which brings about a certain level of pleasure or pain? Moreover, in order
to obtain consequences which are experiences of the person, we would be forced
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to subscribe to the idea that our experiences are fully determined by exogenously
given states, which would imply a deterministic world view, a point to which
we shall return shortly. The details of the grand world model will become clear
through our discussion of the technical elements thereof.
One may also wonder about the relation between the grand world and the real
world. It seems like Savage intended the grand world to be very close to the real
world, since it is supposed to take account of all uncertainty which exists in the
real world. However, if the grand world is to be a model of the real world, then of
necessity some abstraction is required. But, as Box (1979) famously pointed out,
“all models are wrong” since all models are abstractions – this must then hold too
for the grand world model. So if the grand world abstracts from the real world,
it cannot be infinitely refined as Savage intended, since only the world itself is
infinitely refined. Perhaps we are to think of the grand world model as a model of
the real world which abstracts only from strictly irrelevant aspects – but, prima
facie, any aspect could become relevant to a decision problem, and hence, there is
no principled reason to exclude any aspect of the real world from the grand world
model. It is then unclear how we are to think of the grand world model; this
leads Shafer (1986) to call Savage’s grand world “an outrageous fiction”. Since
the grand world in its interpretation as an infinitely refined small world is so hard
to pin down, we will follow Shafer (1986) in giving an example of a small world
(Table 2.2) and a refinement thereof (Table 2.3) in order to illustrate Savage’s
formal account of small and grand worlds.
Let us now turn to Savage’s formal framework of the small and grand world.
Table 2.1 relates the concepts of the small and grand world model1. We will, in
the following, explain each element of Table 2.1 in detail. In order to explain the
relation between these concepts as clearly as possible, Tables 2.2 and 2.3 give an
example of a typical small world and its refinement. In particular, Table 2.2 is
the example we gave in Chapter 1 of a person cooking an omelet, and Table 2.3
is a refinement of it (Table 2.3 is taken from Shafer, 1986). In Table 2.3, the
decision maker realises that his guest can distinguish between eggs that are less
than 36 hours old – these eggs are called ‘Fresh’ – and eggs that are less fresh
– these latter ones are called ‘Stale’. Assuming that the first five eggs are all
1The notation we use here differs from that which we introduced in Chapter 1. This is in
order to give a precise explanation of Savage’s formal framework; however, the remainder of this
thesis will work with the notation of Chapter 1.
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Concept Grand world Small world Relation
States S = {..., s, s′, ...} S¯ = {..., s¯, s¯′, ...} s¯ ⊆ S
Events E = {..., A,B, ...} E¯ = {..., A¯, B¯, ...} [B¯] = ∪s¯∈B¯ s¯ ⊆ S
Consequences F = {..., f, g, ...} F¯ = {..., f¯ , g¯, ...} f¯ = f ⊆ F
Acts F = {..., f ,g, ...} F¯ = {..., f¯ , g¯, ...} f¯ ⊆ F¯ = fˆ ⊆ F
Probability P : S → [0, 1] P¯ : S¯ → [0, 1] P¯ (B¯) = P ([B¯])
Utility U : F → R U¯ : F¯ → R U¯(f¯) = E(f¯)
Table 2.1: The definitions of small and grand world concepts ac-
cording to Savage (1954, p.84).
equally fresh, an omelet made with exclusively fresh eggs will be called a ‘Nero
Wolfe omelet’. Refinement of the small world matrix taking the freshness of eggs
into account yields the decision matrix in Table 2.3. Notice that, since Table
2.3 is not an infinitely refined model, some of the concepts of Table 2.1 do not
translate with exactitude into the examples of Tables 2.2 and 2.3; however, it
is nevertheless instructive to study the relation between a small world and its
refinement.
Let us begin with the state space. As Table 2.1 shows, the grand world state
space is denoted S and has typical elements s, s′ etc. The small world state space
is denoted S¯ with elements s¯, s¯′. A small world state s¯ is, then, both an element
of the small world state space, and a subset of the grand world state space S. We
can see this easily by reference to Tables 2.2 and 2.3. Take, for instance, the small
world state ‘Good’. In the refinement, this comprises both of the more refined
states ‘Good and Fresh’ and ‘Good and Stale’. Therefore, the small world state
‘Good’ in Table 2.2 is a subset of the state space in Table 2.3.
Now turn to the concept of events. Events are subsets of the state space. The
set of grand world events is denoted E, with typical elements A,B. In the small
world, events are denoted E¯, with typical elements A¯, B¯, and so forth. Now, a
small world event is, of course, a grand world event. The small world event B¯ is,
in the grand world, an event
[
B¯
]
which collects all small world states s¯ ∈ B¯, and
is therefore a subset of the grand world state space S. For instance, the small
world event ‘Good’ in Table 2.2, is in the grand world Table 2.3, a set of states
{‘Good and Fresh’, ‘Good and Stale’}.
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The set of grand world consequences is denoted F with typical elements f, g etc.
The set of small world consequences is denoted F¯ , with elements f¯ , g¯. Small
world consequences can then be understood as grand world acts. This is slightly
counterintuitive, as one might think that grand world consequences are just more
refined versions of small world consequences, just like grand world states are
more refined versions of small world states. But Savage thought of grand world
consequences as sure experiences of the deciding person, such as ‘pleasure’ or
‘pain’, rather than descriptions of the result of an act. Then, a small world
consequence, such as ‘six-egg omelet’ can be understood as a grand world act as
follows: it is a function from the very fine-grained, grand world state space to
levels of pleasure or enjoyment experienced by the agent when consuming the six
egg omelet. We can see, then, that the grand world consequence of experiencing a
certain level of satisfaction is not just a more detailed description of the outcome
‘six-egg omelet’, but rather a consequence determined by the act of consuming a
‘six-egg omelet’ in a particular (mental) state. Although Table 2.3 is not a grand
world, we can use the tables to see how a small world consequence can be seen as a
grand world act. Take, for instance, the consequence ‘six-egg omelet’ in the small
world matrix of Table 2.2. This can be seen as an act the consequences of which
depend on the states ‘Fresh’ and ‘Stale’, then yielding the final consequences
‘six-egg Nero Wolfe omelet’ and ‘six-egg ordinary omelet’.
Formally, Savage writes f¯(s¯) for the small world consequence of the small world
act f¯ at the state s¯. Then the notation Savage uses to convey the intuition that
small world consequences can be understood as grand world acts becomes slightly
counterintuitive. First, note that the small world consequence f¯(s¯) is both an
element of F¯ and an element of F. Let us focus on the latter interpretation, so
we have f¯(s¯) ⊆ F. Now that we understand the small world consequence f¯(s¯) as
an element of the set of grand world acts, it is clear that the consequences of this
act must depend on grand world states. So then, Savage writes f(s; s¯) for the
grand world consequence of the small world consequence f¯(s¯) (understood as a
grand world act) at the grand world state s. The counterintuitive aspect of this
notation is the following: the notation f(s; s¯) would suggest that the function f
in fact depends on two separate variable variables, namely s and s¯. But of course,
s is an element of s¯ as we explained above, so that f does not depend on two
separate variables.
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Finally, the set of grand world acts is denoted F, with elements f ,g. Grand
world acts are, of course, functions from the set of grand world states S to the
set of grand world consequences F . The set of small world acts is denoted F¯,
with elements f¯ , g¯. Similarly, small world acts are mappings from the set of
small world states S¯ to the set of small world consequences F¯ . Formally, Savage
then argues that each small world act f¯ uniquely gives rise to a grand world act
which he calls fˆ as follows: fˆ(s) ≡ f(s, s¯(s)). We can then see that the grand
world act fˆ depends on the small world state s¯, e.g. ‘Good’, and the particular
grand world information ‘Fresh’ contained in s. Whilst Savage’s notation is, as he
acknowledges, counterintuitive, the intuition that each small world act uniquely
gives rise to a grand world act is easily conveyed by Tables 2.2 and 2.3.
With this formal framework at hand, Savage turns to the question under what
conditions a small world model is an adequate representation of the more complex
grand world. When a small world model is adequate, it is called a real microcosm,
and if it is not, a pseudo microcosm. There are two conditions, listed in the last
two rows of Table 2.1, which must be satisfied for a small world model to be a real
microcosm: intuitively, the small world model must yield a probability function
over the state space and a utility function over consequences, both of which agree
with those obtained from the grand, i.e. infinitely refined, world. In particular,
the probability distribution obtained from the grand world, denoted P , assigns a
probability p ∈ [0, 1] to each state in S, and the probability distribution obtained
from the small world, denoted P¯ , assigns a probability p¯ ∈ [0, 1] to each state in
S¯. As we have seen, small world states are subsets of the grand world state space,
and each small world event gives rise to a corresponding grand world event. The
probability distributions obtained from the small and grand world should assign
the same probability to any event. Secondly, the utility function obtained from
the grand world is denoted U and assigns a real number to every grand world
consequence, and the utility function obtained from the small world is denoted
U¯ , and it assigns a real number to every small world consequence. As we have
seen, every small world consequence can be seen as a grand world act. Then,
the utility function obtained from the small world is adequate if it is equivalent
to the expected utility of the corresponding grand world act. As Savage showed,
if the axioms of subjective expected utility we listed in Chapter 1 are satisfied,
then the small world utility function always satisfies this requirement.
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This is not so for the requirement on probabilities. As Savage himself realised,
the probability distribution resulting from the analysis of a small world decision
matrix may fail to agree with that obtained from the grand world. In particular,
there are two different ways in which probabilities of small world states can be
computed: first, since the small world state space is a partition of the grand
world state space, the probability distribution over the small world states can
be obtained by calculating the marginal distribution of the distribution over the
grand world states. For instance, suppose that in Table 2.3, p(Good and Fresh) =
1
6 and p (Good and Stale) =
1
6 . Then the probability of the state ‘Good’ in Table
2.2 should be p¯ (Good) = 16 +
1
6 =
1
3 . Second, one can elicit the probability
distribution over the small world states from the agent’s preferences over small
world acts, as explained in Chapter 1. However, these two methods of computing
the distribution over states may fail to yield the same result. It is due to this fact
that Savage postulated the existence of an infinitely refined grand world, such that
small world probabilities are correct if they cohere with those computed from the
infinitely refined grand world. In other words, the correct probability distribution
for the agent to use is ‘pegged’ by the grand world model, which allows Savage
to call a small world adequate whenever the probability distribution obtained
from it coheres with that which is had from the grand world. As Shafer (1986)
remarks, however, whether or not one’s small world probabilities do indeed cohere
with their equivalents in the grand world is impossible to verify.
We have seen, then, that Savage’s notion of the grand world is in fact very
demanding and hard to conceptualise. But maybe such a strong notion of the
grand world is not required to talk about uncertainty. As we will argue in the
following, there are certain types of uncertainty which are incompatible with a
small world treatment, but which can nevertheless be characterised precisely.
These types of uncertainty can be seen as features of a more modest grand world
than Savage’s. In the next section, we will start with a general overview of
the topic of uncertainty, and then focus more specifically on the taxonomy of
uncertainty this chapter advocates.
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State
Acts s1 . . . sn
f xf1 . . . xfn
...
...
. . .
...
h xh1 . . . xhn
Table 2.4: Savage’s decision problem.
2.3 Types of Uncertainty
A good starting point for our discussion of uncertainty is Luce and Raiffa’s (1957,
p.13) classification, which distinguishes between situations of certainty, i.e. cases
where each action leads invariably to a specific outcome, risk, which are cases
where an action leads to one of a set of possible specific outcomes, where each
outcome occurs with an objectively known probability, and uncertainty, namely
cases where actions have sets of possible consequences, but where the probabilities
of these outcomes are completely unknown. Similarly, Knight (1921, p.19) defines
risk and uncertainty as follows:
“But Uncertainty must be taken in a sense radically distinct from the
familiar notion of Risk, from which it has never been properly sepa-
rated. [...] The essential fact is that “risk” means in some cases a
quantity susceptible of measurement, while at other times it is some-
thing distinctly not of this character. [...] It will appear that a mea-
surable uncertainty, or “risk” proper, as we shall use the term, is so
far different from an unmeasurable one that it is not in fact an un-
certainty at all.”
Under Luce and Raiffa’s definition, uncertainty refers to the case where probabil-
ities are “completely unknown”, whereas under Knight’s definition, uncertainty
refers to cases where uncertainty is“unmeasurable”. Both situations will be called
ignorance in the present context, the absence of any probabilistic information.
This chapter advocates a more wide-ranging classification of uncertainty than
those suggested by Luce and Raiffa (1957) and Knight (1921). To this end,
consider Savage’s simple setting of a small world decision matrix, as characterised
in Table 2.4. In general, the most basic form of uncertainty an agent faces is that
of what to do. In order to use Savage’s framework, an agent must be able to
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reduce that uncertainty to uncertainty over what the true state is. This source
of uncertainty, which we call state uncertainty, is the only source of uncertainty
compatible with Savage’s theory, and it pertains exclusively to an exogenously
given state space. Savage’s theory then exacts that the agent ought to form
subjective beliefs over the state space whose objective probability is unknown,
such that the agent can then compare acts based on their subjective expected
utility.
However, this view of uncertainty is restrictive, as it precludes other sources of
uncertainty. In particular, this thesis advocates a distinction between different
types of uncertainty along the following dimensions (see Bradley and Drechsler,
forthcoming):
1. Type. The first distinction relates the type of uncertainty to the nature
of the judgement being made. We distinguish three basic types of uncertainty:
conceptual, empirical and ethical, corresponding to three types of question we
can ask about them.
1. Conceptual uncertainty is uncertainty about what is possible or about
what could be the case. For instance, in thinking about how to represent
a decision problem we might be unsure as to what the possible states of
the world are or what possible consequences could follow from the choice
of an action. This uncertainty thus concerns the make-up of the space of
states and consequences, and hence what actions are logically possible. (In
the most extreme case of conceptual uncertainty, the agent is unaware of
certain states and/or consequences).
2. Factual / empirical uncertainty is uncertainty about what is the case (or
has been or would be the case). It arises in connection with our descriptive
judgements. Such uncertainty can be present even if all conceptual uncer-
tainty is resolved, since we may be sure about what the relevant possible
states are, but unsure as to which is the one that actually holds.
3. Ethical2 uncertainty is uncertainty about what is desirable or what should
be the case. It arises in connection with our evaluative judgements. Ethical
2The term ethical uncertainty may be understood by some readers as implying uncertainty
pertaining to moral values. This is not the use intended in this thesis: ethical uncertainty refers
to uncertainty pertaining to value in general, not just moral value. The terminology goes back
to Ramsey’s (1926) seminal paper “Truth and Probability”.
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uncertainty can be present even if all conceptual and empirical uncertainty
is resolved: we may be sure what the state of the world is, but unsure what
value to attach to the consequences that follow from performing an action
when that state is the prevailing one.
2. Severity. A separate dimension relates to the difficulty the agent has in
making a judgement about the uncertain prospects they face. We classify severity
by reference to the situation which gives rise to it. In order of decreasing severity:
1. Ignorance: When the agent has no judgement-relevant information.
2. Ambiguity: When their information allows for some assignment of beliefs,
but is insufficient to assign precise probabilities to all prospects.
3. Mild uncertainty: When the agent has sufficient information to assign a
precise probability to all prospects.
4. Certainty: When the value of the judgement is given.
The case of “mild uncertainty” comprises both the cases where the agent can as-
sign subjective or objective probabilities to prospects. “Risk”, which is commonly
understood as the availability of objective probabilities, may be regarded as the
limiting case of mild uncertainty.
In the above classification, we may understand the “type” dimension of uncer-
tainty as listing different sources of uncertainty. An agent who faces conceptual
uncertainty is uncertainty about how best to model a given decision problem; the
agent is unsure what states and consequences (and, hence, what acts) are feasible.
In contrast, under empirical / factual uncertainty, the agent is unsure not about
how to model a given decision situation, but rather about the situation itself –
the agent’s uncertainty concerns the way the world is, and how it will evolve; the
agent is therefore unsure about objective facts. Finally, under ethical uncertainty,
the agent is uncertain with respect to what values best reflect their beliefs and /
or desires; these are subjective facts. Within the “type” dimension of uncertainty,
we do not intend to imply that any particular type of uncertainty poses greater
or lesser difficulty to the agent than another. The “severity” dimension of uncer-
tainty concerns the degree, or extent, to which an agent is uncertain. Severity
ranges from ignorance, where the agent has no information concerning the likeli-
hood of events, to certainty, where the agent knows that a particular event is true.
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Of course, the “severity” dimension measures uncertainty on a scale, such that
ignorance is a situation with greater severity of uncertainty than, for instance,
mild uncertainty.
In the above classification, the dimensions “type” and “severity” are to be thought
of as orthogonal; that is to say, an agent may face any combination of type of
uncertainty and severity of uncertainty. For instance, we can associate ambiguity,
the case where the agent is unable to assign a precise probability to every state,
with conceptual, factual / empirical and ethical uncertainty as follows: an agent
may perceive a decision problem as ambiguous when they are uncertain as to what
states are feasible. As a result, the agent may not be able to assign probabilities
to the states they are aware of; the agent then faces ambiguity of the conceptual
kind. Secondly, an agent may perceive ambiguity as a result of their ignorance
of the generating distribution; the agent then faces ambiguity of the empirical
/ factual type (for instance, Ellsberg’s experiment pertains to ambiguity of the
empirical / factual kind). Finally, an agent may perceive ambiguity as a result
of ethical uncertainty, i.e. whenever the agent is unsure as to what probability
distribution best represents their belief; the agent then faces ambiguity of the
ethical uncertainty type. Similarly, we can associate any other type of uncertainty
with any severity.
The kind of uncertainty Savage’s theory applies to, namely state uncertainty, is
mild uncertainty of the empirical / factual type: it pertains to the question what
the true state is; the agent then holds a subjectively known probability distribu-
tion over the state space. However, it is the aim of this chapter to characterise,
along the dimensions given above, three additional types of uncertainty. Firstly,
ambiguity, the case where the agent’s uncertainty is more severe. Secondly, op-
tion uncertainty, the case where agents are uncertain as to what consequence
follows from the exercise of an act at a particular state, they therefore envisage
several consequences as possible at every state. Finally, state space uncertainty,
which refers to the case where the state space is not exhaustive, permitting for
unforeseen contingencies.
In this chapter, we will characterise each of these types of uncertainty along the
dimensions identified above. This raises, however, the further question to what
extent ambiguity, option and state-space uncertainty are genuinely separate: can
we reduce option uncertainty to ambiguity? Can we convert state space uncer-
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red black yellow
e1 $100 $0 $0
e2 $0 $100 $0
e3 $100 $0 $100
e4 $0 $100 $100
Table 2.5: The Ellsberg paradox
tainty into ambiguity or option uncertainty? In the following, we will argue that
there is indeed some scope for reduction, but in each case a type of uncertainty
exists which cannot be reduced. Also, we will argue that even though reduction is
feasible in principle, total uncertainty is preserved. The uncertainty surrounding
any decision problem has to be addressed on some level of the analysis, since it
cannot be done away with.
Before we proceed to a more detailed treatment of these types of uncertainty, let
us investigate the question how this account of uncertainty relates to Savage’s
conception of small and grand worlds. In the previous section, we have seen
that Savage’s notion of a grand world is a very demanding one, in the sense that
it is an infinitely refined version of the small world, which makes it a scenario
even Savage himself found hard to conceptualise. We have also noted that the
three types of uncertainty discussed here are incompatible with the small world
setting. However, nor are they cases of the grand world Savage had in mind:
as we shall see, these are minimal extensions to the small world setting, rather
than features of an infinitely refined model. For clarity of exposition, we will
therefore call these scenarios large world decision situations, since they are, one
might argue, intermediate between the small and the grand world. Let us now
turn to a detailed analysis of these types of uncertainty.
2.4 Ambiguity
In Chapter 1, we have introduced the Ellsberg paradox as a violation of Savage’s
axiom P2, the sure-thing principle, and showed that ambiguity aversion can ex-
plain the Ellsberg paradox. Let us now proceed to take this further, by asking
what characteristics ambiguity has. For ease of reference, the Ellsberg paradox
is reproduced in Table 2.5.
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First, note that in the Ellsberg paradox, a small world decision matrix of the
form given in Table 2.4 is available to the agent. In the Ellsberg setup, the agent
is given well-defined acts to choose from, where these yield precise outcomes at
each state, and are therefore functions from an exogenously given state space
(‘red’, ‘black’, ‘yellow’) to a set of outcomes (‘$0’, ‘$100’). In each state, a
unique outcome follows with certainty, and the state space is exhaustive, such
that no unforeseen contingencies can occur. Given that the agent has a small
world decision matrix at hand, subjective expected utility maximisation would
be feasible in principle. We will argue in the following that this is not so under
option- and state space uncertainty, each of which is incompatible with a small
world representation.
Secondly, note that ambiguity concerns the refinement of the agent’s probabilistic
information relative to the refinement of the state space. An agent will per-
ceive ambiguity only if the state space is perceived to be more fine-grained
than the probabilistic information the agent has. For instance, in the Ells-
berg paradox, the agent knows objective and precise probabilities for the events
{‘red’, ‘black or yellow’}, namely p(red) = 13 and p(black or yellow) = 23 . As we
can see, the agent’s probabilistic information is coarser grained than the state
space {‘red’, ‘black’, ‘yellow’}.
It is also easy to see that the absence of precise probabilities over the states ‘black’
and ‘yellow’ would be irrelevant if all acts yielded the same consequences in the
states ‘black’ and ‘yellow’. For instance, if all acts ei with i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} yielded
ei(black) = ei(yellow) = $100, then the agent would be indifferent between bet-
ting on black and betting on yellow, and so the expected utility of the acts ei
would be independent of the probability distribution over ‘black’ and ‘yellow’. At
the risk of belabouring the obvious, ambiguity becomes decision-relevant only if
the state space is more fine-grained than the probabilistic information the agent
has and if it is the case that which consequence comes about hinges on the so
specified state space.
Thirdly, ambiguity regarding objectively given probability distributions is empir-
ical/factual uncertainty, in the sense that it is uncertainty over the question what
is the “right” probability distribution over the state space. In Ellsberg’s exper-
iment, there is an (objective) fact of the matter of what the correct probability
distribution over the state space is, and this fact is determined before the agent
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faces the decision problem. Were the agent to play the Ellsberg gambles several
times, he could observe the relative frequencies of black and yellow balls, so that
the ambiguity would disappear.
One can imagine, however, situations where the agent perceives subjective ambi-
guity, in the following sense: when faced, for instance, with the task of assigning
a unique probability to the event that the horse Silver Charm wins the Kentucky
Derby, the agent might not hold a sharp subjective belief regarding this event.
Perhaps the agent finds his beliefs best represented by a probability interval. In
this case, ambiguity would be ethical uncertainty, since the agent is now unsure
which subjective belief he should hold.
Let us now consider the question whether ambiguity is genuinely distinct from
mild uncertainty, the case where the agent has access to either a subjective or
objective probability distribution over the state space. Indeed, Bayesians would
argue that there is no need to treat ambiguity as a separate category of uncer-
tainty, since all uncertainty can and should be quantified in a single additive
probability distribution over the state space, such that ambiguity is reduced to
mild uncertainty. There are at least two ways in which this stance can be made
precise. The first would be to argue, as de Finetti (1977) does, that ambiguity is
meaningless, since all probabilities are equally well known to ourselves (Camerer
and Weber, 1992). Under this strong subjectivist view, any consistent assignment
of probabilities to the events ‘black’ and ‘yellow’ in Ellsberg’s paradox will be
defensible.
A second interpretation of ambiguity is that it can be expressed as a second or-
der probability distribution. For instance, in Ellsberg’s paradox the probability
of drawing a black ball is in the range [0; 23 ]. Then, we can assign a second or-
der probability distribution over the values in this interval, interpreted as the
likelihood that each of the possible distributions is the correct one3. Since in
Ellsberg’s problem there is no information about the likelihood of each distri-
bution, using the principle of insufficient reason4 would lead one to assigning a
3Indeed, de Finetti (1937) shows that if one interprets objective probabilities as limiting rel-
ative frequencies, then every subjective probability is a second-order probability of the objective
probability distribution.
4The principle of insufficient reason holds that when there are n mutually exclusive and
collective exhaustive events, and the agent’s information regarding their likelihood is symmetric,
then the agent should assign probability 1
n
to each of the events.
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uniform distribution over the values in the interval. By computing the expected
value of the second order distribution, one can reduce ambiguity to mild un-
certainty; then, the second order information is quantified within the first order
distribution. This procedure would reduce ambiguity to mild uncertainty, thereby
enabling (subjective) expected utility reasoning.
The arguments against the strong subjectivist view as well as the reductionist
stance are well-known. There are two arguments which are typically made. The
first draws on the example we gave in Chapter 1 of a person betting on a coin
for which the chance of heads and tails are known to be equal versus betting
on a coin with unknown probabilities. Most people would prefer to bet on the
first coin, since the probability assignment was made on the basis of observed
frequencies rather than on the basis of the symmetry of the agent’s ignorance.
Schmeidler (1989) expresses this as follows:
The probability attached to an uncertain event does not reflect the
heuristic amount of information that led to the assignment of that
probability.
Schmeidler’s argument is based on observations about human cognition: in many
situations, there is insufficient information for the agent to form a unique sub-
jective probability distribution. Returning to the example we gave in the intro-
duction of this chapter, suppose we ask an agent to assess the likelihood of the
two states ‘Iran is building nuclear weapons’ and ‘Iran is not building nuclear
weapons’. Bayesian reasoning would require the agent to assign a unique point
in the real unit interval to these states, yet it does not seem to be a requirement
of rationality to do so. In such situations, too much information seems to be lost
by doing so.
A second argument against the subjectivist / reductionist stance comes from the
descriptive observation that agents appear to be averse to ambiguity. This is
shown most clearly in Ellsberg’s two urn example. In the experiment, the first
urn contains 50 black and 50 red balls, and the second urn contains 100 balls
which are all either red or black. In experiments, people prefer betting on a red
ball from the first urn to betting on a red ball from the second urn, and also
prefer betting on a black ball drawn from the first urn to betting on a black ball
drawn from a second urn. However, people are indifferent between betting on
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red or black from the first urn, and also indifferent between betting on red or
black from the second urn. These results would suggest that agents are averse
to ambiguity, as they prefer betting on known chances rather than unknown
ones. Since some would argue that these results are errors of reasoning, tests of
the robustness of these results have been conducted, in which subjects had the
opportunity to reverse their choices. After conducting such tests, MacCrimmon
(1968) argues that the original (ambiguity-averse) choices were indeed mistakes,
and Slovic and Tversky (1974) argue that they were not.
In Chapter 3 of this thesis, we will investigate the question whether ambiguity
aversion is irrational in greater detail. The present discussion was intended to
show, however, that the reductionist stance can be granted only at the cost of
both cognitive unease and descriptive inaccuracy. However, arguing against the
Bayesian view requires relaxing the rationality requirements on the agent; it is
not easy to see, however, how this can be done in a principled way. Chapter 3
will attempt to give an answer to these questions.
2.5 Option Uncertainty
In Savage’s small-world representation of a decision problem actions are associ-
ated with definite consequences, one for each state of the world. These conse-
quences are, in Savage’s words,“sure experiences of the deciding person” (Savage,
1954), and the description of them includes all decision-relevant aspects. But
in real decision problems we are often unsure about what consequence follows
from a particular action at a particular state, and this uncertainty affects our
decision-making. For instance, we may be uncertain whether taking an umbrella
will certainly have the consequence of keeping us dry in the event of rain. Per-
haps the umbrella has holes, or the wind will blow it inside out or the rain will
be blown in from the sides. Uncertainty of this kind is an endemic feature of
decision making, for it is rarely the case that we can predict consequences of our
actions in every detail. For most decision situations, the precise consequence will
be irrelevant. However, in some cases the details of the consequences will matter
to the decision maker to the extent that his choice of act hinges on these details.
We will call situations where the agent does not know what consequence follows
from an action at a particular state situations of option uncertainty, and we will
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discuss its implications in the following.
There are at least three different reduction strategies one might pursue in con-
nection to option uncertainty. Firstly, reducing option uncertainty by refinement
of the state space, secondly, by treating acts and consequences as primitives and
viewing states as functions of acts and consequences, and thirdly, by interpreting
option uncertainty as uncertainty over the value of consequences. A final view on
option uncertainty is to model it directly as an extension of Savage’s framework
for small worlds, namely by re-defining acts as correspondences from states to
sets of consequences. In the following, I will explain each of these views and
discuss their respective merits.
Let us begin with what is perhaps the most common response a decision theorist
would make to option uncertainty, namely the view that uncertainty over the
consequences of actions can be addressed by refinement of the state space until
all contingencies are taken care of. This view was, in fact, advocated by Savage,
as the discussion of small worlds contained in Chapter 1 showed. In connection
with this view, consider the following example: suppose I am throwing a ball,
and the consequence of this action is that it lands in a particular place, but I
am uncertain as to where exactly it will land. Then the reductionist might argue
that given sufficient information regarding the speed and direction of wind, the
air pressure, the mass of the ball, the angle at which the ball was propelled, and
so forth, it will be possible to predict where exactly the ball will land. However,
there are at least two reasons why this strategy will not work on all occasions.
Firstly because according to our best scientific theories the world is not purely
deterministic. Only if it were deterministic would it be the case that the precise
conditions under which a ball is thrown do determine where exactly it will land;
in the absence of a deterministic set-up, however, such claims cannot be made.
A second reason why the reduction strategy might fail is that even if we are in
a purely deterministic set-up, it may be subjectively impossible for the decision
maker to conceive of and weigh up all the relevant contingencies which need to
be taken account of in order to predict where the ball will land. The reasoning
capacities necessary to specify such a fine-grained state space are most likely
well beyond a human being’s cognitive capacities. Savage (1954, p.16) himself
conceded that it is
“utterly beyond our power to plan a picnic or to play a game of chance
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State
Acts s(ai, x1,i) . . . s(ai, xm,i)
a1 x11 . . . x1n
...
...
. . .
...
am xm1 . . . xmn
Table 2.6: A small world with states as functions of acts and conse-
quences.
in accordance with the principle [of considering all relevant contin-
gencies], even when the world of states and set of available acts to be
envisaged are artificially reduced to the narrowest reasonable limits”.
Finally, even if we granted that a decision maker were able to conceive of such
fine-grained states, it would most likely be impossible for the agent to assess
their likelihood, in which case the agent is faced with a decision problem under
ambiguity. The reduction strategy then does not eliminate uncertainty, but much
rather converts it into uncertainty over the likelihood of states.
A second view on option uncertainty is to take acts and consequences as prim-
itives, and to define states as functions of these5. Letting ai denote acts and
xij the consequences of act ai, we can write s(ai, xij) for the state that maps
action ai into consequence xij (see Table 2.6). A state then specifies the con-
ditions sufficient to bring about a consequence with certainty. This conception
of states has been proposed, for instance by Fishburn (1970) in the economic
literature, and Lewis (1981) in the philosophical one. Fishburn’s model is in
fact designed to treat not option, but state space uncertainty (which we discuss
in the next section), namely the case where agents have incomplete knowledge
regarding the state space, and hence rationally construct it from acts and conse-
quences. Then, a state just gives the conditions under which a particular utility
level is achieved (Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini, 1998). Similarly, Lewis inter-
prets states as “dependency hypotheses” – maximally specific propositions about
the conditions under which an act brings about a particular consequence. Many
causal decision theorists follow Stalnaker’s (1981) suggestion that states should
be interpreted as a conjunction of conditional sentences of the form ‘If action a1
were performed then consequence x11 would follow; if action am were performed
5In Savage’s theory, states and consequences are primitive notions, and acts are defined in
terms of these.
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State
Acts s1 . . . sn
a1 x(a1, s1) . . . x(a1, sn)
...
...
. . .
...
am x(am, s1) . . . x(am, sn)
Table 2.7: A small world with coarsened consequences.
then consequence xm1 would follow; if ...’. Then, the state of the world just spec-
ifies the conditions under which the conjunction of these conditional sentences is
true (Bradley, Decision Theory with a Human Face, forthcoming).
This reduction strategy will convert uncertainty over outcomes into uncertainty
regarding what state will suffice to bring about a particular consequence with
certainty. Using Stalnaker’s definition of states, the agent would be uncertain
under what conditions the conjunction of conditional sentences that describe it
are true. However, this reduction strategy comes at the cost of an increase in the
severity dimension of uncertainty, since the agent’s probabilistic information may
now be coarser-grained than the state space6. The agent then faces a decision
problem under ambiguity rather than option uncertainty.
A third reduction strategy would be to coarsen the description of the consequence
sufficiently to be certain that it will follow from a particular act at a particular
state. This is the strategy Savage advocated, for he remarks (Savage, 1954, p.84):
“I therefore suggest that we must expect acts with actually uncertain consequences
to play the role of sure consequences in typical isolated decision situations”. Pur-
suit of this strategy leads to a small-world representation as in Table 2.7, where
x(a1, s1) is the consequence of act a1 at state s1. The description of x(a1, s1) is
now assumed to be less than maximally specific.
Coarsening the consequences until they are sure to follow in a particular state
will convert option uncertainty into ethical uncertainty, since now, we may not be
sure what value to attach to a consequence which is so described. For instance,
consider the act of taking an umbrella in a rainy state. Then we can be sure that
the umbrella will keep our head from getting wet, but it may or may not protect
6Notice that by an increase in the severity dimension, we do not wish to imply that there
is greater uncertainty in the decision problem overall once the reduction is performed. We do
wish to imply that whilst total uncertainty is conserved, the reduction strategy implies that the
agent will have greater difficulty in assigning probabilities to states.
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State
Acts s1 . . . sn
a1 {x111, x211, ..., xs11} . . . {x11n, x21n, ..., xt1n}
...
...
. . .
...
am {x1m1, x2m1, ..., xum1} . . . {x1mn, x2mn, ..., xvmn}
Table 2.8: A small world with acts as correspondences from states
into consequences.
out feet. Then the value of the consequence of taking an umbrella in a rainy state
may depend on factors (such as our feet getting wet) which by assumption we
are unable to identify. Whatever (single) utility value we attach to such a coarse
consequence will be surrounded by uncertainty.
A final view on option uncertainty is to enumerate all feasible consequences which
the agent thinks might follow from an act at a particular state. Then no fur-
ther uncertainty surrounds these fine-grained consequences, such that each con-
sequence is to be understood as a “sure experience of the deciding person”. An
act then yields a set of possible consequences at a particular state, where only
one of the set of consequences will be the true consequence. This strategy leads
to a small world matrix as in Table 2.8. This case has received some attention
in the literature: the case of option uncertainty can be modelled in a Savage
framework by replacing Savage’s notion of acts as functions from states to con-
sequences by a notion of acts which understands these as correspondences from
states into sets of consequences. A model which pursues this strategy has been
given by Ghirardato (2001), and this model will be discussed in greater detail in
Chapter 4. An epistemic approach to what we call option uncertainty has been
taken by Mukerji (1997).
In summary, we have seen that ‘pushing’ option uncertainty into the state space
by refinement leads to an increase in the severity dimension of uncertainty, such
that the agent must make decisions under ambiguity rather than mild uncer-
tainty7. A similar argument holds for the case where states are re-defined as
function of acts and consequences. Conversion of option uncertainty to ethical
7Notice that by an increase in the severity dimension, we do not wish to imply that there
is greater uncertainty in the decision problem overall once the reduction is performed. We do
wish to imply that whilst total uncertainty is conserved, the reduction strategy implies that the
agent will have greater difficulty in assigning probabilities to states.
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uncertainty implies that the utility value of consequences becomes uncertain. The
final strategy illustrated here does not reduce option uncertainty to any other kind
of uncertainty, and represents feasible consequences individually; the uncertainty
is then addressed directly. From this discussion we can see that no reduction
strategy eliminates uncertainty, but rather just moves the uncertainty around in
the decision matrix, so to speak – at one level of the analysis, the uncertainty
must be addressed.
The belief that reduction would eliminate uncertainty is, however, not the only
fallacy the reductionist may commit. A second one would be to think that the
reduction will leave the decision problem unchanged. We have seen earlier in this
Chapter in our discussion of Savage’s conception of small and grand worlds that
the probability distribution over the state space may change with refinement,
such that the expected utility of acts computed using a small world model may
not cohere with that computed from its refinement. Since the reduction strategies
work using a refinement of the state space, the same effect may occur. Moreover, a
large body of empirical evidence on framing effects demonstrates that preferences
are generally not invariant under different representations of decision problems
(see, e.g. Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). Framing effects may occur in the case at
hand particularly since the reduction strategies convert option uncertainty into
different kinds of uncertainty – ambiguity or ethical uncertainty – which may
yield different psychological responses from agents. Chapter 3 of this thesis will
investigate the topic of option uncertainty further.
2.6 State Space Uncertainty
In Savage’s framework, the state space is a primitive of the theory, and is ex-
ogenously given. Indeed, the principle that the agent is supposed to conceive of
all relevant contingencies can be seen as a basic tenet of Bayesianism (Gilboa,
2004, p.17). In real decision problems, however, a state space the elements of
which are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive may not be given, or
may be hard to construct. There are, in the real world, events which most people
would argue are unforeseen contingencies, eventualities that even the educated
decision maker fails to anticipate. For instance, natural disasters, such as the re-
cent tsunami and subsequent nuclear meltdown in Japan are events most agents
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would have omitted as a potential contingency in their decision problem.
There are a number of ways in which the term“unforeseen contingencies”has been
used in the literature. We will here distinguish two understandings of the term:
First the case where the state space is insufficiently fine-grained, and secondly
the case where a state is omitted from the state space entirely. In the following,
we will investigate each of these interpretations and discuss to what extent they
can be reduced to ambiguity or option uncertainty. But before we do so, let
us briefly consider the connection between Savage’s framework and unforeseen
contingencies. In particular, whilst Savage’s state space permits for the former
case of state space uncertainty, it rules out the latter.
In the beginning of this chapter, we explained the connection between small and
grand worlds, where the grand world state space is an exhaustive list of all fea-
sible contingencies. Then, in the grand world, states are complete descriptions
of all contingencies, in the sense that at a so-described state, a particular con-
sequence follows with certainty. By construction, the grand world state space is
exhaustive. In the small world, the agent only considers a partition of the grand
world state space. Then, of necessity there is variation in individual small world
states which the model does not capture. This variation can be either irrelevant
or unforeseen by the agent. It is only through this variation in the small world
states that unforeseen contingencies can occur in a Savage framework. Unfore-
seen contingencies can occur in Savage’s framework when the small world state
space is insufficiently fine-grained. In contrast, since the state space in Savage’s
theory is assumed to be exhaustive, there is no single state which can be elided
entirely.
Let us now focus on the former case, namely where unforeseen contingencies
come about through omission of decision-relevant details in the description of
the states, and consider the question whether this is separate from ambiguity.
Suppose, for instance, that I am interested in whether I should take an um-
brella with me or not, and in my deliberation I consider the state space S =
{‘sunny’,‘rainy’}. However, my decision would in fact best be represented using
a state space which includes details about whether it is windy or not, as follows:
S ′ = {‘sunny∧windy’, ‘sunny∧¬windy’, ‘rainy∧windy’, ‘rainy∧¬windy’}. Then,
by using the state space S rather than S ′, I treated the states ‘sunny∧windy’ and
‘sunny∧¬windy’, as a single state, which I called ‘sunny’. But this does not seem
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substantively different from ambiguity, for the following reason: the consequences
of acts hinge on the more fine-grained state space, whilst the states themselves are
coarser-grained. Then, the agent’s beliefs are formed only over the coarser state
space, ‘rainy’ and ‘sunny’, rather than the full state space. In our discussion of
ambiguity, we argued that one of the characteristics of ambiguity is that it is per-
ceived when the agent’s probabilistic information is coarser than the state space
on which consequences hinge. This, however, is the case when we consider state
space uncertainty as the omission of decision-relevant details from the description
of the states: If unforeseen contingencies come about through an insufficiently
fine-grained state space, then the agent holds relatively coarse-grained proba-
bilistic information relative to the state space on which consequences depend. So
this case does not seem substantively different from ambiguity. Notice, however,
that this conception of unforeseen contingencies is popular in the literature. For
instance, it is used by Ghirardato (2001), Modica et al. (1998), Skiadas (1997)
and Walker and Dietz (forthcoming).
A second conception of state space uncertainty is the case where the agent fails
to foresee a state entirely, rather than eliding details of its description. It may
help to first clarify what it means to fail to foresee a state. In particular, the
interpretation intended here is not the case where the agent (erroneously) at-
taches the probability zero to a possible event, since this interpretation would
be compatible with the subjectivist view, under which a decision is optimal if it
is made consistently with the agent’s personal beliefs and desires. If the agent
believes that a state is impossible and acts accordingly, then his decision is by
definition optimal. Hence, this case does not require a new model. Furthermore,
an unforeseen contingency is also not a state which the agent is unaware of: that
would be the extreme case where the agent does not know what the concept of
that state means. Much rather, an unforeseen contingency is a case where the
agent has just not thought to include the given event in the state space (Dekel,
Lipman and Rustichini, 1998). In this sense, state space uncertainty is empiri-
cal/factual uncertainty as we have previously characterised it: it concerns what
states are possible. The agent faces, however, no ethical or conceptual uncer-
tainty, since he does not face uncertainty over values, and is in principle aware of
all contingencies.
There are, again, two ways in which an agent can elide an event. First, such
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that the agent has anticipated the outcome of the event, but not the event itself,
and secondly, such that neither the state nor the corresponding outcome were
considered. In the first case, the agent uses a state space, S = {s1, ..., sn} which
enumerates all contingencies he can think of. However, the agent’s state space S
omits the state sn+1 with consequence xi,n+1. Suppose now that the consequence
xi,n+1 was entertained by the agent as a potential result of a different state,
say sn. Then at state sn, the agent perceived both xi,n and xi,n+1 as possible
consequences. This, however, seems like a case of option uncertainty rather than
unforeseen contingencies.
Finally, the agent can fail to foresee both the state sn+1 and its consequence
xi,n+1. It is this case which most intuitively captures the notion of an unforeseen
contingency, as exemplified by the nuclear meltdown in Japan. In the Japan
example, the agent is not unaware of the possibility of such an event – nuclear
meltdowns have happened before and hence the agent can be assumed to be
familiar with the notion of a nuclear meltdown – and he also would have given
the contingency of a nuclear meltdown a positive probability, had he thought of
it, but he just didn’t think to include it in his decision problem.
This case of uncertainty cannot easily be reduced to any other type of uncertainty.
Also, it clearly cannot be integrated within Savage’s framework; it is ruled out by
the assumption of an exogenously given state space. In a decision situation with
unforeseen contingencies of this kind, the agent cannot construct a small world
decision matrix, and the “look before you leap” principle becomes uninformative.
The agent must then“cross the bridge when he comes to it”. Given that the agent
cannot construct a small world decision matrix in the case of unforeseen contin-
gencies, he will also not be able to decide optimally: the concept of optimality is
defined relative to a decision matrix.
Although the case of unforeseen contingencies through an excessively coarse-
grained state space is, perhaps, more popular in the literature than that where
states are elided, there exist some models which, implicitly or explicitly, treat
this latter case. In particular, Gilboa and Schmeidler’s (1995) theory of case-
based decisions is usually credited with suitability to such scenarios. In their
model, decision makers evaluate prospects according to both their similarity to
previously encountered problems and their utility. The model can account for
unforeseen contingencies to the extent that these bear resemblance to previous
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decision problems.
The most prominent model for unforeseen contingencies is, perhaps, Kreps’ (1992)
model, which introduces unforeseen contingencies into Savage’s framework. Kreps
argues that we recognise an agent’s anticipation of unforeseen contingencies by
their preference for flexibility; this allows Kreps to infer which states of the world
the agent subjectively considers possible. Whilst retaining most of Savage’s the-
ory, the main departure from Savage’s theory is that in Kreps’ model the state
space is subjective. Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (2001) extend Kreps (1992) to
the case where the subjective state space can be derived from the agent’s prefer-
ences, giving a more solid interpretation of the state space. A further extension
has been suggested by Epstein and Seo (2009), who derive a unique state space
from preferences; the authors provide axiomatic foundations for these preferences,
and show that the state space is uniquely determined by the agent’s ranking of
menus. These theories, however, don’t directly engage with the normative ques-
tion of how an agent should deal with the possibility of unforeseen contingencies.
There is therefore considerable scope for further investigation; however, this the-
sis will not pursue the question of rational choice under state space uncertainty
any further.
2.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have first introduced Savage’s notions of small and grand
worlds, and argued that Savage’s notion of a grand world is very demanding. We
claimed that such a demanding notion of grand worlds in not necessary to talk
about uncertainty. The Chapter then proceeded to identify different dimensions
of uncertainty and characterised different kinds of uncertainty along those dimen-
sions. In particular, uncertainty may vary in type (conceptual, empirical/factual
and ethical) and severity (ignorance, ambiguity, mild uncertainty and certainty).
The chapter argued that the kinds of uncertainty identified here, namely ambigu-
ity, option uncertainty and state space uncertainty, differ along these dimensions.
In particular, we argued that ambiguity is perceived by the agent if the state space
is more finely grained than the agent’s probabilistic information. We argued that
ambiguity is factual/empirical uncertainty, and considered arguments for and
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against reducing ambiguity to risk. We concluded that reducing ambiguity to
risk comes at the cost of cognitive unease and descriptive inaccuracy.
Furthermore, we characterised four different conceptions of option uncertainty,
decision situations where consequences of acts are not unique. Option uncertainty
can be ‘pushed’ into the state space, but this comes at the cost of an increase
the severity dimension of uncertainty; the agent is then faced with a decision
problem under ambiguity. Option uncertainty can also be converted into ethical
uncertainty by coarsening consequences; there is then uncertainty over the true
utility of a consequence. Finally, we considered treating option uncertainty by
re-defining acts as correspondences, and argued that this is the most fruitful
approach for treating such decision problems.
Two different views on state space uncertainty were considered: an insufficiently
fine-grained state space, and an incomplete state space. We argued that the first
case can be reduced to ambiguity. Furthermore, we argued that the case where
an agent fails to foresee a contingency, but does foresee its consequence, can be
treated as option uncertainty. State space uncertainty of the kind where both a
contingency and its consequence was elided by the agent was characterised as a
“large world” problem, where agents can no longer maximise subjective expected
utility.
The main thesis of this chapter is that the reduction arguments, if they are
granted, come at the cost of an increase of severity dimension of uncertainty.
This is so since most reduction strategies transfer uncertainty into the state space,
thereby requiring the agent to hold very fine-grained beliefs. Rather than elimi-
nating uncertainty, reduction converts one kind of uncertainty into another, whilst
total uncertainty is conserved.
All three types of uncertainty – ambiguity, option and state space uncertainty –
can be modelled as extensions to Savage’s small world framework. Indeed, in each
case, such a model exists: ambiguity has been characterised in a Savage frame-
work by Sarin and Wakker (2004), a model of option uncertainty within Savage’s
framework has been given by Ghirardato (2001) and state space uncertainty has
been modelled as an extension to Savage’s framework by Kreps (1992). Shifting
the perspective to a grand world model of the kind Savage had in mind may then
not be necessary. Savage’s grand world requires an infinitely fine-grained state
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space, so that its consequences are experiences of the person rather than descrip-
tions of his circumstances. This model is so remote from practical applications
that its use is reduced to that of a theoretical construct. Yet, recourse to the
grand world is not required to make normative claims about decision making un-
der uncertainty, since by extensions of the small world framework, much insight
can be gained.
Chapter 3 will give a more detailed treatment of ambiguity, arguing that ambi-
guity may be objectively given. We investigate the normative implications of this
claim, and contend that Savage’s subjective expected utility must be weakened in
cases of objective ambiguity. Chapter 4 turns to a model of option uncertainty,
and uses the concept to explain status quo bias.
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Objective Ambiguity
3.1 Introduction
Consider the following example, due to Gilboa and Marinacci (2012): John and
Lisa are considering buying insurance against the risk of developing a heart dis-
ease. In order to decide which insurance policy is appropriate for them, they
would like to know the probability that they will develop such a disease within
the next ten years. Both are 70 years old, smoke, and do not have a blood pres-
sure problem. Their cholesterol level is at 310 mg/dL, and their HDL-C is at
45mg/dL. They each have a systolic blood pressure of 130. On the internet, they
type their data into calculators which estimate the risk of developing a heart
disease, and construct the table below.
As the table demonstrates, the different probability calculators don’t agree on
the likelihood of John and Lisa developing a heart disease within ten years. In
John Lisa
Mayo Clinic 25% 11%
National Cholesterol Education Program 27% 21%
American Heart Association 25% 11%
Medical College of Wisconsin 53% 27%
University of Maryland Heart Center 50% 27%
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fact, the probability of John developing a heart disease lies within the interval
[25%, 53%] and the probability of Lisa developing a heart disease lies within the
interval [11%, 27%].
The Bayesian paradigm, as expounded in Chapter 1, requires agents to form a
unique subjective prior probability over the state space. In the example, this
would mean that John and Lisa would each be required to form a unique prob-
ability judgement over the states {‘develop a heart disease within ten years’,
‘do not develop a heart disease within ten years’}. However, as ample empiri-
cal evidence demonstrates, agents do not, generally, hold preferences which are
consistent with beliefs which are representable using a unique and additive prior
probability distribution over the state space. This is usually attributed to the
presence of ambiguity, the concept that probabilities of some events may be vague.
In situations which are ambiguous, agents may hold preferences which are incom-
patible with the existence of a unique and additive probability distribution over
the state space, thereby revealing ambiguity aversion. A preference pattern is
called ambiguity averse when agents express a preference for acts which pay out
a given amount with a known probability over acts which pay out a given amount
with an unknown probability.
This chapter addresses the normative question whether, and in which situations,
ambiguity aversion is rational. To answer this question, we first offer a definition
of ambiguity. In particular, we will argue that ambiguity may be objectively
given. To model objective ambiguity precisely, we relax the assumption that
only states, acts, outcomes and preferences are observable. In particular, we
extend Savage’s framework to include, additionally to the mentioned elements,
an objective likelihood ranking  defined on the algebra of events 2S . Then AB
can be read as “A is objectively at least as likely as B”. In the unambiguous case,
for all events A,B ∈ 2S either AB or B A – the relation  is then complete
on the set of all events 2S . In contrast, in an objectively ambiguous decision
problem, there will be events C,D ∈ 2S such that neither C  D, nor D  C.
Events which cannot be compared via the objective likelihood ranking  will be
called ambiguous. The exogenous likelihood ranking  can be used to derive
definitions of a set of objectively unambiguous events Λ ⊆ 2S , and of a set of
unambiguous acts Aua ⊆ A.
In order to render the account of objective likelihood consistent with Savage’s
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framework, we assume that the agent’s subjective likelihood ordering on events,
∗, which can be derived from the comparative probability axiom of Savage’s
theory (axiom P4 of Chapter 1) coheres with the exogenous likelihood ranking:
whenever A is objectively more likely than B under , then A is also subjectively
more likely than B under ∗. This coherence is a particular case of David Lewis’
(1986) Principal Principle, which requires that subjective beliefs agree with ob-
jective chances. The Principal Principle is, in our view, normatively convincing,
and, as we argue, potentially coherent with Savage’s own view of objective prob-
ability.
An objective definition of ambiguity allows for careful distinctions between am-
biguity and ambiguity attitude. This distinction may be hard to make precise
under subjective definitions. On many subjective notions of ambiguity a decision
problem is identified as ambiguous whenever the agent’s preferences violate the
sure-thing principle, and as unambiguous otherwise. On subjective definitions,
ambiguity is therefore revealed through preference, rather than given exogenously.
Due to the fact that on subjective definitions of ambiguity, ambiguity is identified
only when the sure-thing principle is violated, subjective definitions may either
over- or underestimate the presence of ambiguity. Overestimations of the presence
of ambiguity arise when departures from subjective expected utility theory which
do not arise as a result of ambiguity are attributed to ambiguity. This may be the
case when risk-based violations of the sure-thing principle, as in the case of Allais’
(1953) paradox, are erroneously attributed to ambiguity. Underestimations of the
presence of ambiguity arise when ambiguity is not identified although the decision
problem is ambiguous. This would be the case whenever an agent does not violate
the sure-thing principle in an ambiguous decision problem; for instance, whenever
the agent does not violate the sure-thing principle in Ellsberg’s paradox. An
objective notion of ambiguity aids in overcoming these issues, allowing for careful
distinctions between the objective decision situation and the agent’s behaviour
in light of the decision situation.
Furthermore, on subjective notions of ambiguity it is impossible to assess in
which scenarios the agent’s failure to observe the sure-thing principle is a ratio-
nal violation of the theory and in which scenarios it is not. As we will argue,
violating the sure thing principle in situations of risk is not rational, whereas vio-
lating the principle in situations of ambiguity should be seen as permissible. The
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typical violation of the sure-thing principle situations of risk is given in Allais’
(1953) paradox. We will argue that violations of the sure-thing principle in Allais’
paradox are best understood as arising through a framing effect, which makes it
difficult for the agent to apply Savage’s theory successfully. In those cases where
agents are presented with the Allais paradox specified in a small world decision
matrix, they no longer wish to violate the sure-thing principle.
In contrast, violations of the sure-thing principle in situations of objective ambi-
guity are, as we argue, permissible. In particular, we will argue that ambiguity
may force the agent’s subjective likelihood ordering over events to be incom-
plete, so that agents are not willing to judge whether an event A is more likely
than B or vice versa. Agents may respond to the incompleteness of their subjec-
tive likelihood ordering over events by hedging uncertainty, thereby violating the
sure-thing principle. However, it seems permissible both to hold an incomplete
likelihood ordering over events under objective ambiguity, and to respond to this
incompleteness by preferring acts whose payoffs occur with known probabilities
to those whose payoffs occur with unknown probabilities.
It follows from our discussion that the sure-thing principle should be assumed to
hold on the set of unambiguous events, whereas it is permissible to violate the
sure-thing principle when acts are compared which are measurable with respect
to ambiguous events. On the view defended here both Schmeidlers’s Choquet
expected utility model, and Gilboa and Schmeidler’s (1989) Maxmin expected
utility model are too permissive, in that deviations from the sure-thing princi-
ple are admissible not only when acts are measurable with respect to ambiguous
events, but also when they are not. A normative model of ambiguity should per-
mit ambiguity aversion only in those situations which are objectively ambiguous.
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 3.2 turns to possible definitions
of ambiguity, identifying the limitations of subjective definitions, and suggest-
ing an objective notion of ambiguity. Section 3.3 defines a notion of ambiguity
attitude consistent with our objective view of ambiguity. Section 3.4 compares
the approach to ambiguity advocated here to the related literature. Section 3.5
contrasts the Allais and Ellsberg paradoxes, and argues that the sure-thing prin-
ciple is valid in the former, but not required in the latter problem. Section 3.6
concludes.
73
CHAPTER 3. OBJECTIVE AMBIGUITY
3.2 Defining ambiguity
Let us start by reconsidering the Ellsberg paradox, since much of the motivation
for studying ambiguity derives from the empirical finding of ambiguity aversion
in this example. Consider Table 3.1. In the Ellsberg paradox, an urn contains 90
balls, 30 of which are red and the remaining are black or yellow in an unknown dis-
tribution. Hence, the probability of drawing a red ball is 1/3, and the probability
of drawing a red or yellow ball is contained within the interval [0, 2/3] respectively.
Intuitively, the event ‘red’ is unambiguous as it obtains with a known probability,
whereas the events ‘black’ and ‘yellow’ are ambiguous, as they obtain with an
unknown probability. As we have observed in Chapter 1, agents generally prefer
act e1 to e2 and e4 to e3.
The preference pattern e1  e2 and e4  e3 is inconsistent with the existence of a
unique and additive subjective probability distribution, for the following reason:
if the agent attributed a subjective belief to the state ‘black’ of 1/3 or more, then
the agent would prefer gamble e2 to e1, as both have the same payoff, but the
payoff of gamble e1 occurs with a known probability of 1/3 whereas the payoff of
gamble e2 occurs with a probability which is not precisely known. Therefore, the
preference of e1 over e2 reveals that the agent must have attributed a subjective
probability of less than 1/3 to the event ‘black’. In contrast, the preference of e4
over e3 reveals that the agent must believe the event ‘black’ to be more likely
than 1/3: both gambles e3 and e4 pay out $100 in the state ‘yellow’, but e3
additionally pays out $100 in the event ‘red’ and e4 pays out $100 in the event
yellow. Hence, if the agent attributed a probability of less than 1/3 to black,
gamble e3 would be preferred. Since the agent prefers e4 to e3, they must have
attributed a probability greater than 1/3 to the event ‘black’.
The preference pattern e1  e2 and e4  e3 can be interpreted as arising out of
ambiguity aversion, as the inconsistency in the agent’s assignment of probabilities
to the event ‘black’ can be explained as resulting from aversion to the uncertainty
over the true distribution of black and yellow balls. In particular, the agent prefers
those gambles for which the payoffs obtain with a known probability to gambles
where payoffs obtain with an unknown probability: The payoff of e1 obtains with
a known probability of 1/3, and the payoffs of e4 obtain with a probability of 2/3,
whereas the payoff of e2 obtains with a probability within the interval [0, 2/3] and
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red black yellow
e1 $100 $0 $0
e2 $0 $100 $0
e3 $100 $0 $100
e4 $0 $100 $100
Table 3.1: Ellsberg’s three colour problem.
the payoff of e3 obtains with a probability within the interval [1/3, 1].
3.2.1 Subjective definitions of ambiguity
Most existing definitions of ambiguity define the concept subjectively, that is, as
a property of the agent’s preference relation. In particular, subjective definitions
of ambiguity equate the existence of ambiguity with the revelation of ambiguity
through particular preference patterns, such as the ones exhibited in Ellsberg’s
paradox. Subjective definitions proceed from an observability assumption, namely
that to an external observer, only states, acts and outcomes, as well as the agent’s
preferences over acts, are observable (Ghirardato, Maccheroni and Marinacci,
2004). The observability assumption implies that ambiguity is defined within the
constraints of a small world model, as exemplified in Table 2.4.
The motivation for modelling ambiguity subjectively is particularly well illus-
trated in Zhang’s (2002) exposition of Ellsberg’s four colour problem, shown in
Table 3.2. In the example, there are 100 balls in an urn, which may be black, red,
grey or white. It is known that 50 out of the 100 balls are either black or red, and
that there are also a total of 50 black or grey balls. The probabilities of ‘black
or red’ and ‘black or grey’ are then 1/2 respectively. In Ellsberg’s four colour
problem, individuals express a typical preference pattern of f1  f2, f4  f3, and
f5  f6.
The reasoning behind these preference patterns is plausibly the following: f1 is
preferred to f2 since the chances of obtaining $100 are the same (the probability of
the events ‘black’ and ‘red’ are each contained within the interval [0, 1/2]), whereas
f1 additionally yields a payoff of $1 in the event of a black ball being drawn. Acts
f3 and f4 are identical to f1 and f2, with the exception that both f3 and f4 pay
out $100 in the event ‘grey’. Hence, the sure-thing principle would require that
f1  f2 ⇒ f3  f4 or, respectively, f2  f1 ⇒ f4  f3. However, act f4 hedges
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black red grey white
f1 $1 $100 $0 $0
f2 $100 $0 $0 $0
f3 $1 $100 $100 $0
f4 $100 $0 $100 $0
f5 $1 $100 $100 $100
f6 $100 $0 $100 $100
Table 3.2: Ellsberg’s four colour problem.
the uncertainty over the distribution of balls in the urn: it pays out $100 whenever
a black or grey ball is drawn, which is known to occur with a probability of 1/2.
In contrast, act f3 does not hedge uncertainty, since it pays out $100 whenever
a red or grey ball is drawn – however, the probability of the event ‘red or grey’
is not known precisely. The preference pattern f1  f2 but f4  f3 violates the
sure-thing principle, consistently with a hedging rationale. Acts f5 and f6 are,
again, identical to f1 and f2 respectively, with the exception that f5 and f6 both
pay out $100 on the event ‘grey or white’. Just like previously, the sure-thing
principle requires that f1  f2 ⇒ f5  f6 or, respectively, f2  f1 ⇒ f6  f5.
Coherently with the sure-thing principle, agents express a preference of f5 over
f6, presumably for the same reason that act f1 is preferred to f2, namely because
f5 offers an additional chance of obtaining $1.
Zhang argues that what this example demonstrates is that we are able to assess
whether or not an event is ambiguous by observing preferences. In the example,
the agent’s preferences between f1 and f2 are reversed when a common outcome
is replaced on the event ‘grey’, yielding acts f3 and f4. However, when a common
outcome is replaced on the event ‘grey or white’, yielding acts f5 and f6 the
original preference of f1  f2 does not reverse. The difference between replacing
an outcome on only ‘grey’ and on ‘grey or white’ lies in the fact that the agent is
not able to assess the probability of the event ‘grey’, but they are able to determine
the probability of ‘grey or white’. The probability of ‘grey’ lies within the interval
[0, 1/2], it is hence ambiguous. In contrast, the probability of ‘grey or white’ is
exactly 1/2, since ‘grey and white’ is the complement of ‘black and red’, which is
known to occur with a probability of 1/2; the probability of ‘grey or white’ is thus
unambiguous. Intuitively, then, replacing an outcome on an ambiguous event
may reverse preferences, whereas replacing an outcome on an unambiguous event
will not. In the special case where all events are unambiguous, Zhang argues,
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the sure-thing principle of expected utility is always satisfied; only ambiguity
aversion will lead to violations of the sure-thing principle. This establishes the
intuition behind subjective notions of ambiguity: events are ambiguous whenever
the sure-thing principle is not satisfied on that event.
This reasoning leads Zhang to identify the absence of ambiguity with the criterion
that the sure-thing principle obtains. In particular, Zhang proposes the following
definition of unambiguous events:
Definition (Zhang, 2002): An event A is unambiguous if (i) For all acts f(·), f∗(·)
and outcomes x, y ∈ X:[
f(s) if s ∈ Ac
x if s ∈ A
]

[
f∗(s) if s ∈ Ac
x if s ∈ A
]
⇒
[
f(s) if s ∈ Ac
y if s ∈ A
]

[
f∗(s) if s ∈ Ac
y if s ∈ A
]
.
and if (ii) For all acts f(·), f∗(·) and outcomes x, y ∈ X:[
f(s) if s ∈ A
x if s ∈ Ac
]

[
f∗(s) if s ∈ A
x if s ∈ Ac
]
⇒
[
f(s) if s ∈ A
y if s ∈ Ac
]

[
f∗(s) if s ∈ A
y if s ∈ Ac
]
.
Otherwise, A is called ambiguous.
Part (i) of Zhang’s definition holds that whenever event A is unambiguous, then
the sure-thing principle should hold on the partition (A,Ac). The intuition be-
hind condition (i) follows that behind Ellsberg’s four-colour problem explained
above: whenever the event A is unambiguous, then preferences are separable
across (A,Ac). Notice that condition (i) is a special case of the sure-thing prin-
ciple where the subact on A is constant; the full sure-thing principle imposes
separability also for non-constant subacts g(s), g∗(s) instead of the constant sub-
acts x, y. The constancy of the acts on the event A is important as the condition
obtained when the outcomes x, y are replaced with g(s), g∗(s) may not be true:
we can not make any claims about the ambiguity of A when A leads to different
outcomes across its states. Part (ii) holds that the case where A is replaced with
Ac everywhere in (i) is true as well. This conditions is imposed because an event
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is unambiguous if and only if its complement is also unambiguous (Epstein and
Zhang, 2001).
A second observation which follows from Ellsberg’s four colour example is that
the set of unambiguous events will not satisfy the requirements of an algebra.
In particular, a σ-algebra B satisfies the property of closure under intersection,
that is, if two events A,B are each contained in B, it must also be the case that
A ∩ B is contained in B. However, from the four-colour example we know that
this property is not satisfied for unambiguous events: even though the events
A = ‘black or red’ and B = ‘black or grey’ are each unambiguous (each obtain
with a probability of 1/2), the intersection of A and B, namely event C = ‘red’
is ambiguous (the probability of ‘red’ is contained within the interval [0, 1/2]).
Zhang thus argues that the set of unambiguous events must form a λ-system,
which shares the properties of a σ-algebra with the exception that a λ-system
need not satisfy closure under intersection. A λ-system of events A with typical
element A is defined as follows:
(i) S ∈ A
(ii) A ∈ A ⇒ Ac ∈ A
(iii) If An ∈ A for n = 1, ..., and Ai ∩Aj = ∅, then ∀i 6= j, ∪nAn ∈ A.
Property (i) holds that the sure event must be an element of A. This requirement
should be satisfied for the set of unambiguous events, as the state space itself is
unambiguous: it occurs with probability one. Requirement (ii) is called closure
under complementation, and it holds that if an event A is in A, then so is its
complement Ac. This requirement should also be satisfied for the set of unam-
biguous events, since whenever the probability of some event A is known, then
the probability of its complement is just one minus the probability of A. Finally,
requirement (iii) is called closure under countable disjunctive unions, and it holds
that whenever the intersection of two unambiguous events Ai and Aj is empty,
then the union of Ai and Aj is also contained in A. This requirement should also
be satisfied for the set of unambiguous events, since whenever the probability of
events Ai and Aj are known, and there is no state s ∈ S contained in both Ai
and Aj , then the probability of the union of Ai and Aj is just the sum of their
individual probabilities.
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We have seen so far that Zhang’s (2002) definition of ambiguity identifies the
presence of ambiguity with the sure-thing principle being violated. However, on
Zhang’s definition of ambiguity, the presence of ambiguity may be either over- or
underestimated. It may be overestimated for the following reason: an agent may
violate the sure-thing principle not because of ambiguity aversion, but because of
risk-aversion. However, on Zhang’s definition, every violation of the sure-thing
principle is attributed to the presence of ambiguity. Zhang’s definition of ambi-
guity may then yield too small a set of unambiguous events, as even those events
where the sure-thing principle is violated due to risk-aversion will count as am-
biguous. Furthermore, Zhang’s definition of ambiguity may underestimate the
presence of ambiguity when it is the case that the agent assigns precise probabil-
ities to all events in spite of the fact that an event is ambiguous. For instance,
an agent who assigns precise subjective probabilities to the intuitively ambigu-
ous events ‘black’ and ‘yellow’ in Ellsberg’s three-colour problem will not violate
the sure-thing principle. On Zhang’s definition, the events ‘black’ and ‘yellow’
would therefore be unambiguous. Therefore, Zhang’s definition of ambiguity may
yield too small a set of unambiguous events. In summary, Zhang’s definition of
ambiguity works only in the special case where agents never violate the sure-
thing principle out of risk-aversion, and always violate the sure-thing principle in
situations of ambiguity.
There exist a number of alternative subjective definitions of ambiguity, for in-
stance, Epstein and Zhang (2001), Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002), Ghirardato,
Maccheroni and Marinacci (2004). However, none of the subjective definitions of
ambiguity is fully satisfactory in discerning cases of ambiguity from cases where
no ambiguity is present. We will explore the issues with subjective definitions of
ambiguity further in the next subsection.
3.2.2 Problems with subjective definitions
Subjective approaches to defining the notion of ambiguity within Savage’s frame-
work (or the Anscombe-Aumann framework) proceed from the basic intuition that
departures from (subjective) expected utility theory are induced by the presence
of ambiguity. Hence, violations of the theory are attributed to the presence of
ambiguity, such that the presence of ambiguity is identified with violations of the
sure-thing principle (respectively the independence axiom). This is in line with
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the observability condition, which permits as observable only the information
contained within a small world framework. However, there are three interrelated
problems subjective definitions of ambiguity suffer from:
1. Separation between ambiguity and ambiguity attitude. Subjective definitions
of ambiguity identify the presence of ambiguity with ambiguity-averse be-
haviour. The link between ambiguity and ambiguity aversion is direct: on
subjective definitions of ambiguity, there is ambiguity whenever the agent
reveals ambiguity aversion. Ghirardato, Maccheroni and Marinacci (2004,
p.137) defend this close link between ambiguity and preference-related traits
as follows: “as we are ultimately interested in modelling the ambiguity as
it affects behavior, we do not believe this to be a serious problem from
an economic viewpoint”. This argument seems unconvincing, for it seems
unclear how one can model ambiguity as it affects behaviour if ambiguity
itself is identical with ambiguity-averse behaviour. To put this point dif-
ferently, if it is impossible to distinguish ambiguity and ambiguity-averse
behaviour, then no claims can be made regarding the effects of ambiguity
on behaviour, ambiguity just is ambiguity-averse behaviour. It is then im-
possible to address the question of what kinds of behaviour are rational in
light of ambiguity, a point which we shall address in section 3.4.
2. Overestimation of the presence of ambiguity. As we have seen in our dis-
cussion of Zhang’s (2002) definition of ambiguity, subjective definitions of
ambiguity may overestimate the presence of ambiguity. This will occur
whenever risk-based violations of expected utility theory are spuriously at-
tributed to the presence of ambiguity. Zhang’s definition conflates these
two separate violations of expected utility theory. The view that subjective
definitions of ambiguity may overestimate the presence of ambiguity pro-
ceeds from the intuition that ambiguity may be present independently of
the revelation of ambiguity through preference, as argued in (1) above.
3. Underestimation of the presence of ambiguity. As we have seen in our dis-
cussion of Zhang’s (2002) definition of ambiguity, subjective definitions of
ambiguity may underestimate the presence of ambiguity. This occurs when-
ever an agent’s preferences are consistent with expected utility theory in
spite of the presence of ambiguity. As in point (2) above, subjective defini-
tions of ambiguity can be said to underestimate ambiguity when ambiguity
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is conceived of as separate from ambiguity-averse preference patterns.
By relaxing the observability assumption such that ambiguity is modelled exoge-
nously, one can obtain a definition of ambiguity which allows for a meaningful
distinction between ambiguity and behavioural traits whilst neither over-, nor un-
derestimating the presence of ambiguity. An exogenous definition of ambiguity
permits for a natural distinction between ambiguity and ambiguity aversion.
Relaxing the observability assumption requires, however, a departure from Sav-
age’s framework; it is presumably for this reason that to date objective notions
of ambiguity have, to the best of our knowledge, found little attention in the
literature on ambiguity cast within Savage’s framework (and the reformulation of
Savage’s framework contained in the Anscombe-Aumann framework). Savage’s
framework permits as observable only states, consequences, acts and preferences
over acts. Defining ambiguity objectively would require that additionally, the
objective information the agent holds is modelled precisely. However, Savage’s
framework is too restrictive to admit exogenously given objective information.
The constraints of Savage’s framework can be overcome by admitting exogenously
given objective probabilities and simultaneously assuming David Lewis’ (1986)
Principal Principle, which requires that subjective beliefs should cohere with
objective chances. Formally:
C(A|P (A) = x) = x (3.1)
where C stands for a subjective probability (i.e. a “credence”), P (A) is the
objective probability of event A (i.e. a “chance”), and x is the value of the
probability of A. The principal principle is intuitively plausible: if we know that
the objective probability of A is x and do not hold any evidence contradicting this,
we should believe the event A to be as likely as its objective probability. Applied
to Ellsberg’s three colour problem, this means that the agent should assign a
subjective probability of 1/3 to the event ‘red’ and a subjective probability of 2/3 to
the event ‘black or yellow’. The Principal Principle seems like a natural extension
to Savage’s theory. We will thus assume in the following that the observables
are not restricted to states, consequences, acts and preferences, but furthermore
include an exogenously given likelihood ordering over the algebra of events 2S .
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We assume furthermore that the Principal Principle is valid, hence rendering the
account of objective probabilistic information coherent with Savage’s framework.
Before turning to the definition of objective ambiguity advocated here, it is worth
pointing out that this extension of Savage’s framework may be consistent with
Savage’s own view of objective notions of probability, for he remarks (Savage,
1954, p.51):
Thus far, in this book, I have not argued against the possibility of
defining some useful notion of objective probability, but have con-
tented myself with presenting a particular notion of personal proba-
bility. Therefore, at this point it might be tempting to seek a dualistic
theory admitting both objective and personal probabilities in some kind
of articulation with one another.
And furthermore (1954, p.60):
Again, objectivistic views can be regarded as personalistic views ac-
cording to which comparisons of probability can be made only for very
special pairs of events, and then only according to such criteria that
all (right-minded) people agree in their comparisons.
Extending Savage’s theory by the Principal Principle would appear to provide just
such a “dualistic theory admitting both objective and personal probabilities”. In
the framework thus obtained, all probabilities are subjective, but some (or even
all) are informed by primitively given objective probabilities.
3.2.3 An objective definition of ambiguity
Assume then, that the agent’s decision problem consists of a small world decision
matrix including additional objective information. More specifically, we assume
henceforth that the agent’s decision problem consists of a set of states S, a set
of consequences X, a set of acts A : S → X and an exogenously given likelihood
relation  on the σ-algebra of events 2S . For events A,B in the set of events
2S , A  B can be read “A is at least as likely as B”. The agent will then form
preferences over acts in light of the consequences of acts, and will form subjective
beliefs informed by the exogenously given likelihood relation . Let us first define
a situation of risk, i.e. one where all events are unambiguous.
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Definition: Objective risk. Let  be a likelihood relation defined on 2S. Then
a decision problem is called unambiguous if  is complete on 2S.
 is said to be complete if for all A,B ∈ 2S , either A  B or B  A. As
ambiguous events cannot be compared in likelihood, whenever the exogenously
given likelihood relation  ranks all events in 2S in their likelihood, then all
events must be unambiguous.
Let us investigate this definition in light of Savage’s framework. Within Savage’s
framework, we can define a subjective likelihood relation ∗ from axiom P4, the
comparative probability axiom. In particular, axiom 4 holds that:
[P4] (Comparative Probability): For all events A,B and outcomes x∗  x
and y∗  y: [
x∗ if A
x if ¬A
]

[
x∗ if B
x if ¬B
]
⇒
[
y∗ if A
y if ¬A
]

[
y∗ if B
y if ¬B
]
.
From this axiom, we can construct ∗ as follows: For events A,B ∈ S and
consequences x, y ∈ X such that x  y,
A ∗ B ⇔
[
x if A
y if ¬A
]

[
x if B
y if ¬B
]
Intuitively, given that the agent prefers outcome x to outcome y, the agent prefers
an act which yields x if event A occurs and y if ¬A occurs to an act which yields
x when B occurs and y if ¬B occurs whenever they subjectively think that event
A is more likely than event B; this can be expressed in the subjective likelihood
ordering ∗.
Suppose now that the agent holds, additionally to states, consequences and acts,
the exogenous objective likelihood ordering . Then it suffices to assume, via the
Principal Principle, that ∗ and  agree:
A ∗ B ⇔ AB. (3.2)
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Equation (3.2) adapts the Principal Principle to Savage’s framework: The agent
ranks event A as subjectively more likely than B via ∗ whenever the objective
likelihood ordering, , ranks event A as more likely than B. For instance, by
equation (3.2) an agent is required to subjectively rank the event ‘black or yellow’
of Ellsberg’s three colour problem as more likely than ‘red’, since ‘black or yellow’
is objectively more likely than ‘red’. Let us now turn to the more complex case
of ambiguity.
Definition: Objective ambiguity. Let  be a likelihood relation defined on
2S. Then a decision problem is called ambiguous if  is incomplete on 2S.
The relation  is said to be incomplete when there exist events C,D ∈ 2S , such
that neither C  D nor D  C. Intuitively, events are objectively ambiguous
whenever there are two events C and D such that  does not rank these in
terms of their likelihood. It is important to note that  will not be able to
rank two events C,D in terms of their likelihood even if just one of the events,
say C, is ambiguous. Consider, for instance, Ellsberg’s three colour problem.
We know that the event ‘red’ occurs with a probability of 1/3, and that the
event ‘black or yellow’ occurs with a probability of 2/3. So the events ‘red’ and
‘black or yellow’ are unambiguous, and can be compared in likelihood: ‘black
or yellow’ is more likely than ‘red’. However, suppose we now want to compare
the unambiguous event ‘red’ with the ambiguous event ‘black’. Even though we
know the probability of ‘red’, we cannot compare ‘red’ and ‘black’ in terms of
their likelihood. Of course, two ambiguous events can also not be compared in
terms of likelihood: the events ‘black’ and ‘yellow’ are both ambiguous, and also
cannot be compared.
From the observation that  is complete only when two events both of which are
unambiguous are compared, it is easy to define the set of unambiguous events.
In particular, we call the set of unambiguous events Λ, since they will form a
λ-system. Of course, Λ is a subset of 2S , the set of all events.
Definition: Set of unambiguous events. Let  be a likelihood relation defined
on 2S. Then the set of unambiguous events Λ is given by the largest subset of 2S
such that  is complete on Λ.
Thus, the set Λ is the largest subset of 2S such that for all events A,B in Λ,
either AB or BA. It is easy to see this intuitively: if the set Λ is the largest
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subset of 2S such that  is complete, then adding any further ambiguous event E
to Λ would make  incomplete. Suppose that an ambiguous event E is added to
Λ. Then for any event F in Λ neither EF nor F E. This immediately yields
the definition of ambiguous events: the set of ambiguous events is just given by
2S \ Λ. 1
Let us illustrate the definition of unambiguous events using the Ellsberg three-
colour problem. There, the state space S is given by S = {R,B, Y }, where R
denotes ‘red’, B denotes ‘black’ and Y denotes ‘yellow’. The σ-algebra of events is
given by 2S = {S, ∅, R,B, Y,RB,RY,BY }, where RB denotes ‘red or black’, and
so forth. Then Λ, the set of unambiguous events, is given by Λ = {S, ∅, R,BY }.
The relation  is complete for all elements of Λ, since any two elements in Λ
can be compared in likelihood. The set of ambiguous events is given by 2S \Λ =
{B, Y,RB,RY }, and none of the elements of 2S\Λ can be compared in likelihood.
In the case of ambiguity, equation (3.2) must be modified such that now the
subjective likelihood ordering of events, ∗ agrees with the objective likelihood
ordering  only on the set of unambiguous events Λ:
AB ⇒ A ∗ B. (3.3)
Equation (3.3) holds that whenever the objective likelihood ordering  ranks an
event A as more likely than B with A,B ∈ Λ, then the subjective likelihood
ordering ∗ must agree. For instance, applied to Ellsberg’s three colour problem,
equation (3.3) holds that given that the event ‘black or yellow’ is objectively
more likely than the event ‘red’, then the agent must also subjectively hold the
event ‘black or yellow’ as more likely than ‘red’. So far, equation (3.3) merely
imposes the consistency of the subjective likelihood ranking ∗ with the objective
likelihood ranking . It does not make any claims with respect to the subjective
likelihood rankings between events on which  is incomplete, namely the set
2S \Λ. For instance, the relation  does not rank the events ‘black’ and ‘yellow’
in likelihood; ‘black’ and ‘yellow’ are elements of 2S \ Λ. The agent’s subjective
likelihood ranking between ‘black’ and ‘yellow’ is thus not determined by .
1More precisely, the relation  is a subset of (2S)2. The set of tuples (A,B) such that  is
complete is then given by the set Λ2 ⊆ (2S)2, whereas the set of tuples (A,B) such that  is
incomplete is given by (2S)2 \ Λ2.
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Then, if the agent’s preferences satisfy Savage’s axioms, the agent will hold a
complete subjective likelihood ordering of all events in 2S , where the subjective
likelihood ranking ∗ agrees with  on those events where  is complete. In
contrast, if the agent’s preferences do not satisfy Savage’s axioms, then ∗ may
not be complete; the agent’s beliefs are then not representable using a probability
measure on (S, 2S). As we shall argue below, under objective ambiguity the
agent’s preferences are not required to satisfy Savage’s postulates, such that it is
permissible that the agent does not hold a complete subjective likelihood ordering
∗.
It is also worth pointing out that the interpretation of Savage’s comparative prob-
ability axiom changes in light of equation (3.3). In particular, in a typical small
world scenario, Savage’s comparative probability axiom provides a definition of
the agent’s subjective likelihood relation ∗. In contrast, given that we are con-
sidering the case where the agent has access to an exogenously given objective
likelihood ordering , Savage’s comparative probability axiom is here interpreted
as a consistency condition between the agent’s preferences and the exogenously
given likelihood ranking . In particular, the agent’s preferences between acts
are consistent with the objective likelihood ranking  if preferences reveal that
the agent holds an event A to be subjectively more like than an event B whenever
A is objectively more likely than B.
The definition of unambiguous events leads to a natural definition of unambiguous
acts:
Definition: Set of unambiguous acts. Let Λ ⊆ 2S be a λ-system of events
such that  is complete on Λ. Then the set of unambiguous acts Aua ⊆ A is
given by the set of Λ-measurable acts.
In the above definition, Aua is the set of unambiguous acts, which is a subset of
the set of all acts A. That is, for an unambiguous act h the typical outcome x will
obtain on an event in Λ. More formally, letting h−1(x) designate the set of states
where act h yields outcome x, when h is unambiguous, then h−1(x) ∈ Λ . In
contrast, for an ambiguous act e ∈ A \Aua the typical outcome x will obtain on
an event e−1(x) which may be an element of the set of ambiguous events 2S \Λ.
Before we proceed, let us consider the role of the exogenously given likelihood
ordering . One possible interpretation of it is that it contains an objective
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likelihood ordering, such as the one given in the Ellsberg problem. This interpre-
tation of  is particularly suitable to the present context, since we are interested
in addressing the question whether the agent’s beliefs are required to be repre-
sentable using a unique and additive probability distribution in light of objective
ambiguity. However, one could conceive of  as any arbitrary exogenously given
likelihood ordering of events. But if we do not interpret  as an objective like-
lihood ordering, then a different justification than the Principal Principle would
need to be provided to motivate the coherence between the agent’s subjective
likelihood ordering ∗ and . In the following, we will think of  as containing
objective information.
3.3 Defining ambiguity attitude
In the previous section, we have given an exogenous characterisation of ambigu-
ity. Let us now turn to the question of what ambiguity attitude is. Ambiguity
attitude refers to the agent’s disposition toward the presence of ambiguity. Am-
biguity attitude, as opposed to ambiguity as such, is always a property of the
agent’s preference relation, since it concerns the agent’s subjective stance to the
presence of ambiguity. Three types of attitude are possible towards the presence
of ambiguity: ambiguity-neutrality, ambiguity-aversion and ambiguity-attraction.
We follow Epstein (1999) in characterising ambiguity attitude by first defining
relative ambiguity aversion, the notion that one preference relation is more am-
biguity averse than another, and then deriving a notion of absolute ambiguity
aversion.
Epstein’s account of ambiguity aversion coheres with our notion of objective ambi-
guity in the sense that Epstein assumes an exogenously given set of unambiguous
acts Aua. Our notion of objective ambiguity above can be seen as giving a foun-
dation for the use of an exogenously given set of unambiguous acts; our account
of ambiguity is then complementary to Epstein’s notion of ambiguity aversion. It
is important to point out the Epstein’s definition of ambiguity aversion is unique
in that it assumes a set of unambiguous acts; other existing definitions of ambi-
guity aversion, such as the one contained in Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002), do
not make reference to a set of unambiguous acts. Epstein suggests the following
notion of comparative ambiguity aversion:
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Definition: Relative ambiguity aversion (Epstein, 1999): Given two or-
derings 1 and 2, say that 2 is more ambiguity averse than 1 if for every
unambiguous act h ∈ Aua and every act e ∈ A:
h 1 (1)e⇒ h 2 (2)e (3.4)
In the above definition, acts h and e differ in the sense that act h is measurable
with respect to the set of unambiguous events Λ, whereas e is not. Then when-
ever the less ambiguity-averse preference relation 1 prefers (strictly prefers) the
unambiguous act h to the ambiguous act e due to the greater certainty h of-
fers, then the more ambiguity-averse relation 2 also prefers (strictly prefers) the
unambiguous act h to the ambiguous act e.
One feature of the above definition is that it implies that 1 and 2 are both
representable using an identical utility function (Ghirardato, 2004). To see why
this is so, consider the special case where both acts h and e which are ranked in
preference by 1 and 2 respectively are unambiguous; i.e. assume that h, e ∈
Aua. Then equation (3.4) above holds biconditionally, i.e. h 1 (1)e ⇔ h 2
(2)e. Let us show, by contradiction, that h 2 (2)e ⇒ h 1 (1)e. To
this end, assume that it is not the case that h 1 (1)e. This means that
h ≺1 (1)e. By implication of equation (3.4), this means that h ≺2 (2)e,
contradicting h 2 (2)e. Since 1 and 2 agree on the ranking of unambiguous
acts, they can be represented using the same utility function. Moreover, if the
set of unambiguous events Aua is sufficiently rich, then the preferences 1 and
2 on Aua can be used to compute the degree of probabilistic risk aversion of
preferences, and 1 and 2 will exhibit the same degree of risk aversion.
Having now defined a notion of relative ambiguity aversion coherent with our
framework, let us turn to the notion of absolute ambiguity aversion. In order
to define an absolute notion of ambiguity aversion, it is necessary to define an
ambiguity-neutral preference relation, relative to which another preference rela-
tion will be more ambiguity averse. To this end, Epstein refers to Machina and
Schmeidler’s (1992) notion of probabilistic sophistication. Let us briefly introduce
the concept of probabilistic sophistication in order to clarify why probabilisti-
cally sophisticated preferences can be seen as ambiguity-neutral. In particular,
an agent whose preferences are probabilistically sophisticated will hold a unique
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and additive probability measure pi on the state space (S, 2S). Then every act e
will be viewed, by a probabilistically sophisticated agent, as a lottery over out-
comes in X. Then the agent’s utility function is a function of the distribution
over outcomes induced by an act.
Let us explain this using Ellsberg’s three-colour problem, and suppose that the
agent holds the probabilities pi(‘red’) = pi(‘black’) = pi(‘yellow’) = 1/3. Consider
now the act e1 which pays out $100 in the state ‘red’ and $0 otherwise. The
act e1 can then be viewed as a lottery over outcomes, as it pays out $100 with a
probability of 1/3 and it pays out $0 with a probability of 2/3. Call this distribution
Θ. A probabilistically sophisticated agent will then hold a utility function which
is some function W of the distribution over outcomes Θ induced by acts. More
formally, consider a probability distribution pi on (S, 2S) and an act e. Denote
the distribution over outcomes induced by e relative to pi by Θpi,e. Then an agent
whose preferences are probabilistically sophisticated will hold a utility function
U(·) such that U(e) = W (Θpi,e), where W is some strictly increasing function.
A preference relation is said to be probabilistically sophisticated if it ranks acts in
utility purely in light of the probability measure on Θpi,e they induce, thus trans-
forming all acts into lotteries. A probabilistically sophisticated decision maker
will hold beliefs satisfying the axioms of probability theory, so that beliefs can
be represented using a probability measure. While a probabilistically sophisti-
cated decision maker may be risk-averse, they will always be ambiguity-neutral.
In contrast, the beliefs of an ambiguity-averse agent will not satisfy the axioms
of probability theory, and can therefore not be represented using a probability
measure. Epstein makes use of the notion of probabilistic sophistication to give
an absolute, rather than relative, notion of ambiguity aversion:
Definition: Ambiguity aversion (Epstein, 1999): Given two orderings ps
and , say that  is more ambiguity averse than ps if for every unambiguous
act h ∈ Aua and every act e ∈ A:
h ps (ps)e⇒ h  ()e (3.5)
According to Epstein’s definition of ambiguity aversion, an agent is ambiguity
averse if they are more so than a probabilistically sophisticated agent. Equation
(3.5) holds that whenever a probabilistically sophisticated decision maker prefers
89
CHAPTER 3. OBJECTIVE AMBIGUITY
an unambiguous act to an ambiguous one, then the ambiguity-averse decision
maker also ranks the unambiguous act as preferable to the ambiguous one. Notice
in particular that as observed earlier, ps and  are representable by the same
utility function. Hence, ps and  disagree on the ranking of acts only when the
two preference relations do not agree on the likelihood ranking over events.
Let us consider what this section, in conjunction with our notion of objective
ambiguity, has achieved. We criticised subjective accounts of ambiguity on the
grounds that they do not allow for a meaningful distinction between ambiguity
and ambiguity attitude. This problem is addressed by defining ambiguity ob-
jectively, since it is no longer the case that any particular attitude to ambiguity
reveals the presence of ambiguity. Furthermore, the richer framework suggested
here allows for precise distinctions between violations of the sure-thing principle
resulting from risk-related behaviour and violations resulting from ambiguity-
related behaviour.
3.4 Related Literature
Whilst in the above we have presented the necessity of an objective definition of
ambiguity as a response to Zhang’s (2002) definition of ambiguity, similar criti-
cisms can be made of alternative subjective definitions of ambiguity. In particular,
this section compares our objective definition of ambiguity with the definitions
provided by Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji (2005), Ghirardato and Marinacci
(2002) and Ghirardato, Maccheroni and Marinacci (2004).
Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji (2005) provide a representation result which al-
lows for a separation between ambiguity and ambiguity attitude. In particular, in
Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji’s model agents hold preferences over lotteries,
defined as functions which are measurable with respect to a partition of the state
space for which objective probabilities are given; these preferences are assumed
to satisfy the von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility axioms. Also, agents
hold preferences over so-called “second-order acts”, the payoffs of which are con-
tingent on which prior in a given set of priors is true. These latter preferences
are assumed to satisfy Savage’s axioms. These assumptions, together with a con-
sistency condition forcing the agents’ preferences between lotteries and second
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order acts to be consistent, allow the authors to prove the representation result.
The representation allows for a separation between risk and ambiguity attitudes,
where risk attitude can be measured by the curvature of the utility function, and
ambiguity attitude is measured by a function which attaches a particular weight
to each of the possible priors in a given set of priors.
In Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji’s model, agents will neither over- nor un-
derestimate the extent to which a given decision problem is ambiguous, since
ambiguity is identified by the agent not through violations of the sure-thing prin-
ciple, but rather directly through violations of the weak comparative probability
axiom; agents will identify an event to be ambiguous whenever their preferences
reveal that an event A is both more and less likely than another event B. Fur-
thermore, Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji’s result successfully distinguishes risk
from ambiguity attitude, as risk attitude is revealed from preferences over lot-
teries, whilst ambiguity attitude is revealed from preferences over second order
acts. However, Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji implicitly assume the validity
of the Principal Principle, by assuming that preferences over lotteries satisfy the
von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms. An agent who holds von Neumann Morgen-
stern preferences over lotteries will conform their subjective credences to objective
chances. A further potential weakness of the model concerns the interpretation of
ambiguity in the model. Note that in Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji’s model
ambiguity is a subjective feature revealed by the agent’s preferences. As Al Na-
jjar and Weinstein (2009, p.275) point out, it is not clear what it means for an
agent to use the “wrong” prior in a subjective setting. Under the subjectivist
view advanced by de Finetti (1974), “probabilities do not exist”, so that there is
no objective distribution which subjective credences may match or fail to match.
Ambiguity, in Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji’s model is then, strictly speak-
ing, uncertainty over something that does not exist. This issue regarding the role
of ambiguity aversion is addressed once we understand ambiguity as an objective
feature of the decision problem, in which case ambiguity is uncertainty over the
true objective probability distribution.
Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) as well as Ghirardato, Maccheroni and Mari-
nacci (2004) pursue a similar approach to Zhang (2002) and Epstein and Zhang
(2001) in defining ambiguity, in the sense that ambiguity is identified with vio-
lations of the sure thing principle. In contrast to Zhang (2002) and Epstein and
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Zhang (2001), the authors identify the presence of ambiguity not with departures
from probabilistically sophisticated behaviour, but rather with departures from
subjective expected utility maximisation more generally. However, violations of
subjective expected utility theory may occur, as pointed out above, either because
of risk-based violations of the theory, or because of ambiguity-based violations
of the theory. Hence, the approach suggested by Ghirardato, Maccheroni and
Marinacci will have a systematic tendency to overestimate the presence of am-
biguity. The authors concede that “we prefer to attribute all departures from
independence to the presence of ambiguity. However, the reader may prefer to
use a different name for what we call ‘ambiguity.”’ (Ghirardato, Maccheroni and
Marinacci, 2004, p.138). Such problems are avoided on an objective notion of
ambiguity, where the extent to which a given decision problem is ambiguous is
exogenously given.
3.5 Rationality under ambiguity
We now turn to the question whether ambiguity aversion may be rational. In the
following, we will argue that violations of the sure-thing principle are justified only
in cases of ambiguity, but not in cases of risk. In order to argue this stance, we
will compare the typical behaviour of agents exhibited in the Allais paradox with
that displayed by agents in the Ellsberg paradox. Let us begin with risk-based
violations of the sure-thing principle.
3.5.1 Risk-based violations of the sure-thing principle
Perhaps the most compelling challenge against the sure-thing principle under
risk is given in Allais’ (1953) paradox, illustrated in Table 3.3. In the Allais’
paradox, subjects are first given the choice between gambles a1 and a2, where
gamble a1 pays out $1 million for sure, whereas gamble a2 pays out $5 million
with a probability of 10%, $1 million with a probability of 89% and nothing with
a probability of 1%. Most people prefer a1 to a2. Subjects are next asked to
compare gambles a3 and a4, where a3 pays out $ 1 million with an 11% chance,
and nothing with an 89% chance, whereas gamble a4 pays out $5 million with a
10% chance and nothing with a 90% chance. Now most subjects prefer gamble a4
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#1 #2-#11 #12-100
a1 $1M $1M $1M
a2 $0 $5M $1M
a3 $1M $1M $0
a4 $0 $5M $0
Table 3.3: The Allais paradox
to a3. These preferences violate the sure-thing principle, since gambles a1 and a2
are identical to gambles a3 and a4 respectively with the exception that gambles
a1 and a2 pay out $1 million with an 89% chance, and gambles a3 and a4 pay
out nothing with an 89% chance.
The Allais paradox is a case of decision making under risk, since the agent is
provided with objective probabilities for all events. There is no ambiguity in
Allais’ paradox, since the likelihoods of all events are objectively known. Hence,
Allais’ paradox is a case of a small world decision problem: the agent holds well-
defined states, consequences, and acts defined as functions from the state space to
consequences. As illustrated in Chapter 1, many have aimed to reconcile Allais’
paradox with Savage’s theory, as the sure-thing principle is extremely plausible as
a normative principle: When two acts yield the same outcome in some state, then
that outcome should not matter to the agent’s decision. This chapter shares this
intuition, and will give its own attempt to reconcile the paradox with Savage’s
theory.
In particular, it is useful to think of the sure-thing principle as an axiom which
applies to a small world decision matrix, consisting of states, consequences, and
acts. Allais’ paradox, as presented in Table 3.3 satisfies this requirement. How-
ever, the options in Allais’ problem are not usually presented in the form of Table
3.3. In Allais’ original paper, the options are presented as follows (Allais, 1953,
p.527):
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(1) Do you prefer situation A or B?
Situation A: Certainty of receiving 100 million.
Situation B:

10% chance of winning 500 million
89% chance of winning 100 million
1% chance of winning nothing
(2) Do you prefer situation C or D?
Situation C:
11% chance of winning 100 million89% chance of winning nothing
Situation D:
10% chance of winning 500 million90% chance of winning nothing
There is a difference between presenting the decision maker with the problem as
in Allais (1953), and presenting them with the decision matrix in Table 3.3. The
difference is that in Table 3.3 the agent is provided with an exogenously given
state space, as Savage’s theory requires. In the problem as presented in Allais
(1953), however, the agent is not provided with an exogenously given state space,
so that the agent has to construct the state space. Whilst this task is fairly
straightforward when comparing Situations A and B, it is less so for Situations C
and D. In particular, it seems plausible that the fact that a state space is not given
to the agent might confuse the agent, such that the state space they construct
for Situations A and B does not agree with the state space they construct for
Situations C and D. In this case, the sure-thing principle does not apply.
For instance, when comparing Situations A and B the agent may reason that the
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relevant state space is given by the states in Table 3.3, namely S = {#1,#2 −
11,#12 − 100}. This state space allows the agent to compare the outcomes of
Situations A and B in a structured way. However, it is a much less obvious how a
state space should be constructed for situations C and D: the probabilities with
which payoffs are obtained for Situation C are 11% and 89% respectively, whereas
the probabilities with which outcomes obtain for Situation D are 10 % and 90%. It
is, prima facie, not evident how the state space should be partitioned to allow for
a useful comparison between Situations C and D. The agent might then reason
that the difference between obtaining an outcome with an 89% probability or
a 90% probability seems irrelevant, and similarly, that it is irrelevant whether
an outcome obtains with a probability of 10% or 11%. Perhaps the agent may
resolve this issue by simply constructing the state space S = {‘Win’, ‘Lose’}, and
comparing Situations C and D on that basis; the agent then decides for Situation
D. Given that the state spaces used to compare Situations A / B and Situations
C / D differ, the sure-thing principle no longer applies.
More importantly, when the paradox is presented as in Allais (1953), it is not
straightforward to identify the common outcome in Situations A / B and C /
D respectively. In contrast, it is much easier to see the common outcome in
Table 3.3. Agents who are presented with the problem as given in Allais (1953)
may plausibly agree with the sure-thing principle in the abstract, but may not
think that Situations A / B and C / D have a common outcome which would be
irrelevant to their decision.
This hypothesis is supported by the evidence in Carlin (1990). Carlin tested the
Allais paradox using a different frame, namely one where payoffs depend on the
numbers on a wheel. The setup of the Allais problem in Carlin (1990) therefore
provides a state space, given by the numbers of a wheel. Carlin finds that the
number of violations of the sure-thing principle is greatly reduced once the Allais
paradox is so-presented: only 20 out of 142 respondents made the typical choices
exhibited in Allais’ paradox. Similarly, Conlisk (1989) shows that when the Allais
gambles are formulated in a fashion that brings out the independence aspect, then
violations of the sure-thing principle are greatly reduced.
These results suggest that once the agent holds an exogenously given state space,
then they become aware of the irrelevance of a particular outcome which is com-
mon to two acts. In the absence of a given state space, agents may find it difficult
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to construct a state space. However, this is, as such, not a problem for Savage’s
theory, which presumes an exogenously given state space. Once a state space is
provided, agents find that they wish to conform their choices with the sure-thing
principle.
A further argument to the effect that the sure-thing principle is valid under
conditions of risk has been made by Samuelson (1952). In particular, Samuelson
argues that whenever outcomes of an act are complementary, then one cannot
assume that the two outcomes of an act affect preferences independently. This
may be the case for decisions the outcomes of which are nonstochastic. However,
when the outcomes of acts are risky, as is the case for lotteries, then the outcomes
of acts are never complementary: as only one state in the set of states will be
true, only one outcome will result of a particular act. Hence, lottery outcomes are
not complementary and should therefore affect preference independently. As we
are here concerned with preferences under situations of risk, complementarities
between outcomes will not arise and hence, the sure-thing principle is justified.
3.5.2 Ambiguity-based violations of the sure-thing principle
Recently, Al-Najjar and Weinstein (2009) have argued that the ambiguity aver-
sion literature is lacking in normative content: the project of the research area is
predominantly that of reconciling the descriptive evidence expressed in Ellsberg’s
paradox with the normative theory of Savage. Yet, as Al-Najjar and Weinstein
argue, it is not clear why ambiguity aversion would constitute a normatively more
convincing response to Ellsberg’s paradox than any other alternative theory, such
as a heuristic explanation of Ellsberg’s paradox. In this section, we will defend the
view that ambiguity aversion is normatively permissible, and that hence, agents
should be permitted to violate the sure-thing principle under ambiguity.
Let us first contrast the two competing views. On the view that Savage’s theory
holds in situations of ambiguity, ambiguity does not constitute a separate case
from the typical small world case we explained in Chapter 1. Under this view, the
agent should adhere to the sure-thing principle in situations of ambiguity, and the
agent’s beliefs should be representable using a unique and additive probability
distribution over the state space. On the opposing view, decision problems featur-
ing ambiguity cannot be represented using Savage’s theory for small worlds. The
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agent then need not adhere to the sure-thing principle, and the agent’s beliefs
may not be representable using a unique and additive probability distribution
over the state space. We will here defend this latter point of view.
Let us now characterise these two competing views in light of our framework of
objective ambiguity above. We have argued that when objective probabilities are
available, the agent must conform their subjective beliefs to the exogenously given
objective probabilities using the Principal Principle. Under ambiguity, however,
the objective likelihood ordering  may not be complete on the algebra of events
2S ; the objective likelihood ranking will be complete only for a subset Λ of 2S .
From equation (3.3) we know that the agent will also have a subjective likelihood
ordering which is complete on Λ. However, unless the agent subjectively ranks
those events in likelihood which cannot be compared via , say events A,B ∈
2S \ Λ, the agent’s subjective likelihood ranking will be incomplete also.
On the view that agents are required to treat ambiguous decision problems as
small worlds, agents are then obliged to rank ambiguous events in likelihood,
such that the incomplete subjective likelihood ordering ∗ is completed using
subjective beliefs. The so-obtained likelihood ranking ∗ will then be complete
on Λ as a result of the use of the Principal Principle, and will also be complete of
2S \Λ in virtue of the use of Savage’s axioms. In contrast, on the opposing view
defended here, the subjective likelihood ordering ∗ is required to be complete
on Λ on account of the use the Principal Principle, whereas it is not required
to be complete on 2S \ Λ, since the agent is not required to adhere to Savage’s
framework when judging ambiguous events.
Consider two objectively ambiguous events A and B, such as the events ‘black’
and ‘yellow’ in Ellsberg’s three-colour problem. Both events have an objective
probability within the range [0, 2/3]. The requirement that ∗ be complete im-
plies that the agent must either hold that ‘black’ is more likely than ‘yellow’, or
‘yellow’ is more likely than ‘black’, or the two events are exactly equally likely.
However, there seems to be no basis for such a judgement, as the agent does
not know which of the two events is more likely, and has no evidence supporting
the subjective likelihood ranking. The agent may therefore wish to withhold a
judgement regarding the relative likelihoods of the events ‘black’ and ‘yellow’.
This seems normatively justified, if the agent does not hold sufficient information
to make such a judgement.
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The argument that ∗ is not required to be complete amounts to claiming that
Savage’s comparative probability axiom has no normative force in situations of
objective ambiguity; agents should not be required to rank ambiguous events in
likelihood. It should then be normatively admissible that on the set of ambiguous
events 2S \ Λ the agent’s subjective likelihood ordering is incomplete, such that
for A,B ∈ 2s \ Λ neither A ∗ B nor B ∗ A.
Let us draw out the implications of this claim on preferences using Ellsberg’s
three-colour problem. Given that the agent cannot judge whether ‘red’ in more
likely than ‘black’ or vice versa, the agent cannot rank acts e1 and e2, as the two
acts differ only on the events in which the payoffs occur. Similarly, gamble e3
pays out $100 in the event ‘red or yellow’, whereas the event e4 pays out $100 in
the event ‘black or yellow’. Again, the agent cannot compare acts e3 and e4 since
their subjective likelihood ranking ∗ cannot rank the events ‘red or yellow’ and
‘black or yellow’ in likelihood.
Agents may respond to this incomparability of acts resulting from the incom-
pleteness of the subjective likelihood ordering by preferring acts which hedge
uncertainty to acts which do not. This can be interpreted as a principle of cau-
tion, where agents prefer betting on unambiguous acts to betting on ambiguous
ones. In the Ellsberg paradox, agents therefore prefer the unambiguous act e1 to
the ambiguous act e2, and also prefer e4 to e3, as e1 and e4 are measurable with
respect to unambiguous events, whereas e2 and e3 are not.
Let us investigate the question whether making decisions on the grounds of cau-
tion is a rational strategy in light of ambiguity. Return to the example in the
introduction of this chapter, where John and Lisa are trying to decide whether
or not to buy insurance against the risk of developing a heart disease. John and
Lisa cannot assess the likelihood of developing such a disease. Suppose, however,
that they know that if they were to develop a heart disease, they would not be
able to afford treatment unless they are insured. It certainly seems rational to
be cautious in this decision problem.
An agent who (i) holds an incomplete likelihood ordering over the set of events
and who (ii) responds to the incompleteness by hedging uncertainty will violate
the sure-thing principle on sets of ambiguous events. However, as we have argued
above, an agent should not be required to hold a complete likelihood ordering over
98
CHAPTER 3. OBJECTIVE AMBIGUITY
objectively ambiguous events, and may rationally respond to the incompleteness
by hedging uncertainty. Therefore, it should be permissible for an agent to violate
the sure-thing principle in situations of objective ambiguity.
3.5.3 Implications for axiomatic characterisations
It follows from our discussion that axiomatic characterisations should distinguish
cases of risk from ambiguity. Situations of risk can and should be modelled using
Savage’s framework for small worlds, and imposing the sure-thing principle on
preferences is justified. In contrast, in objectively ambiguous decision problems,
the sure-thing principle is not compelling from a normative point of view.
There exist, in the ambiguity aversion literature, two different ways of allowing for
ambiguity in axiomatic frameworks. In particular, the first tenet of Bayesianism
holds that agent must form a unique and additive probability distribution over
the state space. The ambiguity literature relaxes the first tenet of Bayesianism
by either relaxing the additivity, or the uniqueness of the probability distribution
representing beliefs. The ambiguity literature works predominantly within the
Anscombe-Aumann framework. Ambiguity is introduced into the framework by
weakening the independence axiom of the Anscombe-Aumann framework, which
holds that for any three acts f, g, h ∈ A and a constant α ∈ [0, 1], f  g ⇔
αf + (1− α)h  αg + (1− α)h.
Schmeidler’s (1989) nonadditive probability decision model (also known as the
Choquet expected utility, or CEU model) allows for ambiguity by restricting the
independence axiom so as to allow for nonadditive beliefs. Schmeidler proceeds
from the intuition that in situations of ambiguity, agents use opportunities to
hedge uncertainty. Consider the following example: act f pays out $1 in state
s1 and $0 in state s2, and act g pays out $0 in state s1 and $1 in state s2.
Suppose also that you do not know whether state s1 or s2 is more likely; the
states are ambiguous. Then you might prefer an act h = 1/2f + 1/2g to an act
h′ = 1/2g+ 1/2g = g, since act h pays out $1/2 in both states, whereas act h′ pays
out $0 in state s1 and $1 in state s2. Whilst act h fully hedges uncertainty, act
h′ does not. However, one can easily verify that a preference pattern of f ∼ g
and h  h′ violates the independence axiom. Proceeding from the intuition that
the hedging rationale leads to violations of independence, Schmeidler restricts the
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independence axiom to acts which are comonotonic, where comonotonic acts offer
no hedging opportunities. In particular, two acts f and g are said to be comono-
tonic whenever there are no two states s1 and s2 in S such that f(s1) ≺ f(s2)
and g(s1)  g(s2). Intuitively, for any two states two comonotonic acts increase
(decrease) in the same direction, therefore offering no hedging opportunities.
Let us investigate the connection of Schmeidler’s model to the present framework
of objective ambiguity. In particular, Schmeidler’s model permits hedging in that
the independence axiom is restricted to comonotonic acts. However, Schmeidler’s
model therefore also permits hedging in situations which are objectively unam-
biguous; for instance, an agent may wish to hedge uncertainty in situations of
pure risk. Hence, from our normative point of view Schmeidler’s model is too
permissive: it allows for ambiguity aversion in objectively unambiguous decision
problems. In order to render Schmeidler’s framework consistent with our notion
of objective ambiguity, agents would be required to satisfy the independence ax-
iom for all acts which are measurable with respect to unambiguous events, and
for comonotonic acts which are measurable with respect to objectively ambiguous
events. The agent is permitted to violate independence only on acts which are not
measurable with respect to unambiguous events and which are not comonotonic.
A second prominent model of ambiguity is Gilboa and Schmeidler’s (1989) Maxmin
expected utility, or MEU, model. The authors permit for ambiguity aversion by
relaxing the uniqueness of the probability distribution representing beliefs; the
agent then entertains several probability distributions. In particular, Gilboa and
Schmeidler weaken the independence axiom such that it applies only to mixtures
with constant acts x; Gilboa and Schmeidler call the so-obtained axiom Certainty-
independence (or C-independence).The C-independence axiom then reads for all
f, g ∈ A and x ∈ X, f  g ⇔ αf + (1 − α)x  αg + (1 − α)x. Intuitively,
mixtures with constant acts do not permit for hedging. Additionally, Gilboa and
Schmeidler impose an uncertainty aversion axiom, which holds that for any two
acts f, g ∈ A and a constant α ∈ [0, 1], αf + (1 − α)g  f . The uncertainty
aversion axiom imposes a weak preference for acts which hedge uncertainty.
Let us investigate Gilboa and Schmeidler’s model in light of our framework. Note
first that we have argued above that ambiguity aversion is rationally permissible
in situations of objective ambiguity; we have not argued that ambiguity aversion
is required. Gilboa and Schmeidler’s uncertainty aversion axiom contrasts with
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our normative view in the sense that agents whose preferences satisfy Gilboa and
Schmeidler’s axioms will always hedge uncertainty. This seems too restrictive,
as a normative model should not prescribe any particular attitude to objective
ambiguity. For instance, the preference patterns consistent with the sure-thing
principle in Ellsberg’s three-colour problem, namely e1  e2 (e2  e1) and e3  e4
(e4  e3) should be rationally permissible. Secondly, the agents modelled in
Gilboa and Schmeidler’s model may violate independence also on the set of un-
ambiguous acts, a position which seems too permissive. Just as for Schmeidler’s
CEU model above, the independence axiom should be assumed to hold for mix-
tures between all acts which are measurable with respect to the set of unambigu-
ous events; these acts may not be constant. Furthermore, the C-independence
axiom should be assumed for all acts; agents may then violate independence only
for acts which are measurable with respect to ambiguous events.
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter has introduced a definition of objective ambiguity by introducing
an exogenously given objective likelihood order  into Savage’s framework, and
requiring that subjective beliefs cohere with objective chances. We have used
this definition to define a notion of unambiguous events and unambiguous acts.
Within our framework it is possible to distinguish thoroughly between ambiguity
and ambiguity attitude. Our notion of ambiguity coheres with Epstein’s (1999)
notion of ambiguity attitude, which makes reference to an exogenously given set
of acts.
We have argued that whilst in situations of risk, Savage’s theory for small worlds
can and should be employed, in situations of objective ambiguity violations of
both Savage’s sure-thing principle and comparative probability axiom are ra-
tionally permissible. We have used this normative view to argue that both
Schmeidler’s (1989) Choquet expected utility and Gilboa and Schmeidler’s (1989)
Maxmin expected utility model are too permissive, as they admit violations of
the sure-thing principle also in cases where there is no objective ambiguity.
The account we have given of objective ambiguity opens up numerous possibili-
ties for further research. It may be interesting, for instance, to contrast decision
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problems which are objectively more ambiguous with others which are less so.
Our framework leads to a natural interpretation of the notion that one decision
problem is more ambiguous than another, in that a more complete exogenous
likelihood relation  will be associated with a lesser degree of ambiguity. Fur-
thermore, it may be instructive to study the relation of Schmeidler’s (1989) CEU
model and Gilboa and Schmeidler’s (1989) MEU model to the case of objective
ambiguity characterised here further, in particular with respect to the connection
of the exogenous likelihood ranking  to the nonadditive or nonunique beliefs
exhibited by agents in the CEU and MEU models respectively. Finally, it may be
interesting to study the connection between objective ambiguity and ambiguity
attitude empirically.
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Option Uncertainty Aversion:
Explaining Status Quo Bias
4.1 Introduction
In our daily lives, we often find it hard to assess what consequences follow from
our actions; indeed, it is perhaps in the minority of cases that we can be sure
that the exercise of an action will result in some consequence, even at a particular
state of the world. For instance, when European politicians decided to establish
a common currency contrary to the advice of economists who argued that the
Eurozone is not an optimal currency area, they may well have evaluated the
decision problem on the basis of its expected beneficial consequences, rather than
on worst-case reasoning. However, as the current European sovereign debt crisis
demonstrates, uncertainty aversion may not be completely irrational when much
is at stake.
As we have argued in Chapter 2, there are decision situations where the state
of the world may not fully determine the consequence of an action, such that
the agent can envisage a variety of consequences at every state; we labeled these
decision problems cases of “option uncertainty”. Under option uncertainty, conse-
quences cannot be treated as sure experiences of the deciding person, and Savage’s
(1954, p.84) claim that“we must expect acts with actually uncertain consequences
to play the role of sure consequences in typical isolated decision situations” seems
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to lack justification. We have argued that this type of uncertainty is a distinct
kind of uncertainty which should be treated separately from other types of un-
certainty, such as ambiguity.
This chapter will give a more detailed account of option uncertainty, by modelling
it formally. Rather than defining acts as functions from states of the world to
consequences as Savage does, we will generalise this notion by defining acts as
correspondences from states of the world into consequences. Each act is then as-
sociated with a set of consequences at every state. Ghirardato’s (2001) axiomatic
framework does just this, and we will therefore use this model as the basis of our
analysis.
Ghirardato argues that there are three different ways in which what we call option
uncertainty can come about: first if the decision maker has an underspecified
choice set, i.e. every act really is a set of acts. Then, the agent perceives several
possible consequences at any state, since the description of the act is not specific
enough to yield a unique consequence at every state. This case can be interpreted
as a case of coarse consequences, as discussed in Chapter 2. Secondly, the state
space may be insufficiently fine grained, such that the consequence of each act
at each state is not unique. We have argued in Chapter 2 that this is a case of
what we called state space uncertainty, and showed how this can be reduced to
ambiguity. The third and final case is that where the consequences of actions
are insufficiently fine-grained, so that they do not constitute “sure experiences
of the deciding person”, i.e. determinate psychological states. It is the first and
third case which are closest to what we mean by option uncertainty as we have
characterised it in Chapter 2.
Ghirardato’s model extends Savage’s axioms to the case of acts which are defined
as correspondences from states to consequences (axioms 1 – 7 below), and ad-
ditionally imposes two very weak axioms (axioms 8 and 9 below) to model the
agent’s attitude towards the uncertainty over consequences. Axiom 8 captures a
normatively appealing dominance condition: Assume that an act is constant, i.e.
it yields the same consequence in every state, and that it is moreover crisp, mean-
ing that consequences at every state are unique. Then if the unique consequence
is judged better than any of the consequences of a constant act with uncertain
consequences, then the former act should be preferred by the agent. Axiom 9
holds that for every set of consequences that results at a particular state, there
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is a single consequence which is better than it, and a single consequence which
is worse than it. This axiom implies the boundedness of the utility function.
With these two additional axioms, Ghirardato’s model extends Savage’s frame-
work to account for, and model attitudes to, option uncertainty. In particular,
Ghirardato shows that an agent whose preferences satisfy axioms 1 – 9 will act
as if maximising their expected utility relative to a probability measure over the
set of states and a convex combination of the least and most favourable utility
values of individual consequences.
A crucial aspect of the model is the assumption of conscious unawareness on
the part of the agent, namely the fact that the agent is aware of the limits of
his information. In particular, Ghirardato (2001, p. 250) points out that “in the
absence of such awareness there would be little interesting that a decision theorist
(or an economist, for that matter), could say”. It is in virtue of this premise that
the agent can be assumed to respond rationally to the lack of full information.
This chapter retains this assumption.
Besides Ghirardato (2001), a model which shares the assumption of conscious
unawareness and may also be interpreted as featuring option uncertainty is con-
tained in Walker and Dietz’ (forthcoming). Their model bears a strong resem-
blance to the present contribution, in that the state space does not resolve all
uncertainty. The main difference between Ghirardato (2001) and Walker and Di-
etz (forthcoming) is that whilst in Ghirardato’s model, the agent does not hold
beliefs regarding the likelihoods of individual consequences in a given consequence
set at a particular state, in Walker and Dietz’ model the agent does. It is in this
sense that the agents modelled in Walker and Dietz (forthcoming) can be seen as
more rational than those in Ghirardato’s model.
Using Ghirardato’s model as a starting point, we extend the framework in order
to model the Status quo bias. The status quo bias was originally observed as
an empirical phenomenon by Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988), and it holds
that when there is a status quo, agents generally dislike giving it up for other
alternatives. In particular, we assume that the status quo is an act which has no
option uncertainty; in Ghirardato’s model, a crisp act.
This conception of the status quo is particularly convincing when we interpret
option uncertainty as ethical uncertainty, namely uncertainty over what value
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best reflects the agent’s desire for a particular outcome. We argue that in the
case of the status quo, the agent may find it easier to resolve ethical uncertainty
than for other available alternatives. We assume further that agents are averse to
option uncertainty, in the sense that for any given set of consequences X which
an act yields at a particular state, the agent gives a relatively large weight to
their least preferred element in the set of consequences. In the model proposed
here, the agent is not uncertainty averse with respect to the status quo, but is
uncertainty averse regarding other available alternatives; it is in this sense that
the status quo is “privileged” over other alternatives. These two assumptions,
that the status quo act is crisp and that the agent is averse to option uncertainty,
imply that the agent will reveal a bias toward the status quo. Moreover, once
one grants that option uncertainty aversion may be rational, and that the agent
may be justified in conceiving of the status quo act as crisp due to uncertainty-
reducing information regarding the status quo, then the agent’s bias towards the
status quo is rational.
The paper closest in spirit to the present chapter is Bewley (2002). Bewley argues
that the presence of uncertainty may imply that the agent holds incomplete pref-
erences: if the agent is uncertain regarding the likelihoods of particular outcomes,
they may not be able to evaluate which of two acts is preferable. Additionally,
Bewley makes an inertia assumption to the effect that an agent will stay at the
status quo unless there is a different act which dominates the status quo for all
possible priors. The difference between the present account and Bewley’s is that
Bewley assumes incompleteness and inertia, then deriving a representation which
requires that an act will be preferred to the status quo only if it dominates the
status quo for all priors in a given set of priors – a unanimity representation. The
main difference between Bewley’s representation and ours is that whilst Bewley
assumes, via inertia, that agents will be biased toward the status quo, our model
merely assumes crispness of the status quo and uncertainty aversion, thereby
deriving status quo bias.
A second model connected to ours is Loomes, Orr and Sugden (2009), which gives
an account of status quo bias within reference-dependent subjective expected util-
ity theory (RDSEU). Loomes et al. explain status quo bias via taste uncertainty,
namely the case where agents are uncertain with respect to the utility they derive
from the consumption of a particular good. Taste uncertainty can be understood
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as a particular kind of ethical uncertainty, namely that where the utility value of
a particular consequence is fully determined by the agent’s taste; in this sense,
Loomes et al.’s model is more restricted in scope than the present account. Fur-
thermore, the reliance of Loomes et al.’ account on reference dependence can
be seen as a limitation of the model, since under reference-dependence, acts are
evaluated in terms of the utility differential they generate with respect to some
neutral reference point. In this sense, Loomes et al.’s model has a stronger flavour
of bounded rationality than the model proffered here.
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 4.2 will give Ghirardato’s model,
and investigate the question to what extent Ghirardato’s model embodies require-
ments of rationality. Section 4.3 will discuss the notions of option uncertainty
aversion and relative option uncertainty aversion in Ghirardato’s framework, and
will argue that uncertainty aversion may be rational. Section 4.4 will model the
status quo bias formally, showing that a more option uncertainty averse agent
will have a tendency to prefer the status quo. We then argues that status quo
bias may be rational. Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 A model of option uncertainty
Ghirardato’s (2001) model is an extension of Savage’s framework, which we pre-
sented in Chapter 1. For ease of reference, the notation used in Chapter 1 is
continued here. Just like in Savage’s model, there is a set of states of the world,
denoted S, the elements of which are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaus-
tive. A typical element of S is denoted s. Furthermore, the set of consequences is
denoted X , elements of which are denoted x. Thereby, all elements of X are to be
thought of as “sure experiences of the deciding person”, i.e. fully specified payoffs
over which no uncertainty can arise. The novelty of Ghirardato’s model is the
introduction of an algebra A of subsets of X containing all singleton elements,
a typical element of which is denoted X. Let U denote the set of all nonempty
subsets in A, i.e. U ≡ A\∅. Agents are assumed to envision a set X as the result
of their actions. Notice also that the notation x will be used to denote both an
element of X and an element of X .
Unlike Savage’s model, where acts are functions from states of the world to con-
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sequences, in the present model acts are functions from states of the world S
into U . The set of acts F is then defined as F ≡ US . The so-defined acts are
correspondences from S into X . In summary:
States of the world : S = {..., s, ...}.
Events: E := 2S = {..., A,B,E, F, ...}.
Consequences: X = {..., x, ...}.
Algebra of subset of X : A = {..., X, ...}
Set of nonempty subsets ofA: U = {..., X, ...}
Acts: F := US = {..., f(·), g(·), ...}.
The agent is assumed to have a preference relation  on F , with asymmetric and
symmetric components  and ∼. Finally, we will say that an event A is null if
f ∼ g for every f, g ∈ F which differ only on A. The first axiom corresponds to
Savage’s postulate P1:
[Axiom 1] (Weak Order):  is a weak order on F .
(i) (Completeness): Either f  g, or g  f .
(ii) (Transitivity): If f  g and g  h, then f  h.
The set of acts considered here is, however, much larger than that in Savage’s
model: Not only does the weak order assumption apply to all functions from the
set of states to the set of consequences, but also to all functions from states to
the set of all non-empty subsets of the set of consequences. The cardinality of the
set F is therefore much larger than that of the set A of Chapter 1. This makes
Axiom 1 a very demanding requirement.
By implication of Axiom 1, the agent is also able to rank all constant acts, where
here a constant act is an act which pays out the same set X ∈ U of consequences in
every state; the agent can therefore rank all elements of U in order of preference.
Furthermore, Ghirardato introduces the term crisp act for those acts for which
f(s) is a singleton at every state, and denotes these Fc ⊆ F . The set of Savage
acts of Chapter 1 is identical to the set of crisp acts in Ghirardato’s model.
The following condition is an extension of Savage’s postulate P2 to the larger set
F :
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[Axiom 2] (Sure-Thing Principle): For all events A ⊆ S and all acts f(·), f∗(·), g(·)
and h(·) ∈ F : [
f∗(s) if s ∈ A
g(s) if s /∈ A
]

[
f(s) if s ∈ A
g(s) if s /∈ A
]
⇒
[
f∗(s) if s ∈ A
h(s) if s /∈ A
]

[
f(s) if s ∈ A
h(s) if s /∈ A
]
.
Just like Savage’s P2, the axiom requires that the agent’s preferences be separable
across events (see Chapter 1). Of course, the objections against Savage’s P2 apply
also to Axiom 2 above.
The following condition is an extension of Savage’s P3 to the larger set F . Its
interpretation mirrors that of P3 in Chapter 1: The agent’s evaluation of sets
of consequences X,Y ∈ U should not hinge on the state they obtain in. Of
course, while in Savage’s framework a constant act is one which results in the
same (unique) consequence at every state, in Ghirardato’s model a constant act
pays out the same consequence set X in every state.
[Axiom 3] (Eventwise Monotonicity): For all non-null events A ⊆ S, con-
sequence sets X,Y ∈ U and acts f(·) ∈ F :[
X if s ∈ A
f(s) if s /∈ A
]

[
Y if s ∈ A
f(s) if s /∈ A
]
⇔ X  Y.
As in Savage’s model, the agent’s beliefs can be elicited from their preferences
over acts, yielding a likelihood relation over events. This is expressed in the
following axiom:
[Axiom 4] (Comparative Probability): For all events A,B ⊆ S and conse-
quence sets X,Y,X ′, Y ′ ∈ U such that X  Y and X ′  Y ′:[
X if A
Y if ¬A
]

[
X if B
Y if ¬B
]
⇔
[
X ′ if A
Y ′ if ¬A
]

[
X ′ if B
Y ′ if ¬B
]
.
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Like in Savage’s model, Axiom 4 allows us to defined a relative likelihood ranking
∗ of events as follows: For all events A,B ⊆ S and consequences x, y ∈ X such
that x  y,
A ∗ B ⇔
[
x if A
y if ¬A
]

[
x if B
y if ¬B
]
.
The following nondegeneracy condition is identical to Savage’s P5:
[Axiom 5] (Nondegeneracy): There exist x and y ∈ X such that x  y.
Axiom 6, the Archimedean axiom, also parallels Savage’s P6. It is used to ensure
continuity of the preference relation.
[Axiom 6] (Small Event Continuity): If f, g ∈ F are acts such that f  g
and x ∈ X then there is a finite partition Π of S such that, for every A ∈ Π:
f 
[
x if s ∈ A
g(s) if s /∈ A
]
and
[
x if s ∈ A
f(s) if s /∈ A
]
 g
Finally, axiom 7 imposes a dominance condition on preferences, holding that if
an act f is worse than any of the consequences of another act g conditionally on
event A, then act g should not be preferred:
[Axiom 7] (Uniform Monotonicity): For all events A ⊆ S and all acts f, g ∈
F , if [
f(s) if s ∈ A
h(s) if s /∈ A
]
 ()
[
X if s ∈ A
h(s) if s /∈ A
]
for all h(·) and each X ∈ g(A), then:
⇒
[
f(s) if s ∈ A
h′(s) if s /∈ A
]
 ()
[
g(s) if s ∈ A
h′(s) if s /∈ A
]
for all h′(·).
Ghirardato shows that since Axiom 1 – 7 are extensions of Savage’s P1 – P7, a
similar representation to Savage’s can be obtained. In particular, there exists a
function V : U → R and a probability measure P on (S, 2S) such that, for every
act f, g ∈ F ,
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f  g ⇐⇒
∫
S
V (f(s))Pds ≥
∫
S
V (g(s))Pds (4.1)
However, this representation does not capture the agent’s attitude to the uncer-
tainty over consequences: the representation above treats the consequence f(s)
of an act f as if it were a unique, sure consequence, rather than a set of individual
consequences X = {x1, ..., xm}. Two further axioms are required to model the
agent’s attitude towards this uncertainty. In particular, Ghirardato introduces
the following dominance condition:
[Axiom 8] (Contingencywise dominance): Given X ∈ U and f ∈ Fc, sup-
pose that for every x ∈ X, f(s)  x(resp. x  f). Then f  X (resp. X  f).
The interpretation of axiom 8 is that if a crisp act f which yields a unique
consequence at every state is strictly better than any of the consequences of a non-
crisp act yielding a set X at every state, then the crisp act should be preferred.
The axiom is normatively appealing: an act with uncertain consequences none of
which are better than the consequences of a crisp act should not be preferred by
the agent.
One further axiom is needed for the representation. It holds that for every set of
consequences X, there is a singleton consequence x which is better than it, and a
singleton consequence which is worse than it. This is expressed in the following
condition:
[Axiom 9] (Outcome Boundedness): For any X ∈ U , there are x, y ∈ X
such that x  X  y.
Finally, Ghirardato introduces the following notation: given a real-valued func-
tion u : X → R, let UI ⊆ U denote the set of non-empty sets X such that
infx∈X u(x) ≤ supx∈X u(x). Ghirardato is then able to prove the following result:
Theorem 1 (Ghirardato, 2001): If  satisfies Axioms 1 – 9, then there is a
convex-ranged probability measure P on (S, 2S), a non-constant bounded utility
function u : X → R and a function α : U → [0, 1] such that, if we define
V : F → R by
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V (f) ≡
∫
U
[
α(X) inf
x∈X
u(x) + (1− α(X)) sup
x∈X
u(x)
]
ϕf (dX) (4.2)
with ϕf (U) ≡ P ({s ∈ S : f(s) ∈ U}) for U ⊆ U , then for all f, g ∈ F
f  g ⇐⇒ V (f) ≥ V (g).
P is unique, u is unique up to positive affine transformation, and α is uniquely
defined on U .
Let us now consider the features of this representation. First, note that the util-
ity function in equation (4.2) is a function of the fine-grained consequences x,
which, as we mentioned earlier, are ultimate consequences or sure experiences of
the deciding person. It is this dependency of the agent’s utility on ultimate con-
sequences which makes this a representation which explicitly models the agent’s
attitude to the uncertainty over consequences. Notice the contrast with the ex-
pression in equation (4.1), where the agent’s utility V depends only on f(s).
Expression (4.1) therefore does not model the agent’s attitude to uncertainty.
In Theorem 1, infx∈X u(x) designates the least utility value for any particular
consequence within the consequence set X at a state s, and supx∈X u(x) refers to
the highest utility value for a particular consequence in a consequence set X at
a state s. The agent evaluates acts by considering a convex combination of the
least and greatest utility values resulting at any state, so that the utility value
associated with a consequence set X lies within the range spanned by the least
and greatest utility value of the final consequences contained in X. The agent
then weighs the so-computed utility values of consequence sets X at the states by
the likelihood of each state being true, and ranks acts according to their expected
utility thus obtained.
The factor α(X) reflects how strongly the agent weighs the least as opposed to
the highest utility value for any consequence set. Ghirardato interprets α(X) as
reflecting the agent’s optimism or pessimism regarding the uncertainty: When
α(X) is equal to one, the agent evaluates the set X purely on the basis of the
least utility it could yield. A value of α(X) equal to zero would reflect optimism
towards the uncertainty over the true consequence in the set X: the agent then
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evaluates the set X only in light of the highest utility value it could realise.
Thereby, α(X) depends on the particular consequence set X the agent evaluates:
for instance, the agent may be very pessimistic regarding the uncertainty over the
true consequence within the set X, so that α(X) = 1, but may at the same time
be very optimistic regarding the uncertainty over the true consequence contained
in the consequence set Y , so that α(Y ) = 0.
Finally, note that the function P on (S, 2S) is a probability measure; the agent
thus holds additive beliefs over the states in the state space.
4.2.1 Option uncertainty and rationality
Let us now turn to the question to what extent the axioms of Ghirardato’s model
above can be interpreted as requirements of rationality in situations of option
uncertainty. Axioms 1 – 7 closely follow Savage’s model, they are indeed direct
extensions of the concepts to the larger set of acts F considered here. So, prima
facie, all criticisms one may raise against Savage’s axioms apply with equal force
to axioms 1 – 7.
However, the move from acts as functions from states of the world to consequences
to correspondences from states into consequences implies that the restrictions on
preferences in axioms 1 – 7 are now applied to a much larger set of acts than
that considered in Savage’s model. For instance, the completeness requirement
of axiom 1 above requires the agent to rank all acts in F . In Savage’s framework
the total number of acts is X S . In contrast, in Ghirardato’s framework the total
number of acts will be 2X×S , an order of magnitude larger than the set of constant
acts in Savage’s framework. For instance, if |X | = |S| = 2, the total number of
acts in Savage’s framework is X S = 4, whereas in Ghirardato’s framework, if
|X | = |S| = 2, the total number of acts is 2X×S = 16. With three consequences
and three states, there are 27 Savage acts, and 512 Ghirardato acts. Axiom 1
above is, therefore, a much stronger requirement, and perhaps a less convincing
one, than Savage’s P1.
In contrast, axiom 8, contingencywise dominance, is very convincing as a re-
quirement of rationality: It holds that an agent must check for dominance when
choosing between acts. Axiom 9, outcome boundedness, is required to ensure
that an given consequence set X will be ranked in utility between the utility val-
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ues of the least and greatest utility values of its elements. The axiom precludes
uncertainty averse preferences of the following kind: suppose that an agent ranks
two constant and crisp acts f and g as indifferent, but prefers each of acts f and
g to a constant act h which is defined as h(s) = {f(s), g(s)} for all states s in S.
For instance, act f could be an act which results in the consequence ‘dinner’ at
every state, and act g could be an act which has as its consequence ‘drinks’ at
every state; the set of all consequences is then X = {‘dinner’,‘drinks’}. Although
one might be indifferent between ‘dinner’ and ‘drinks’, one might prefer either
of them to the uncertain prospect h which yields the consequence X={‘dinner’,
‘drinks’} at every state. Holding f ∼ g but f  h (resp. g  h) would violate
axiom 9, since there would be no single consequence x ∈ X such that X  x.
In Ghirardato’s model, h will be ranked as indifferent to acts f and g in virtue
of axiom 9, although one might think that the greater uncertainty contained in
h would make it less preferable than acts f and g. In this sense, axiom 9 is
a rationality condition, ruling out this particular kind of uncertainty aversion.
However, Ghirardato’s representation permits for another type of uncertainty
aversion, which we will discuss in greater detail in the following section.
4.3 Option uncertainty aversion
We now turn to the notion of option uncertainty aversion consistent with Ghi-
rardato’s model. Notice first that in Theorem 1 above the factor α(X) is a
variable depending on the particular set X the agent evaluates. This means that
the agent may be very pessimistic in evaluating a set of consequences X, and
at the same time very optimistic with respect to option uncertainty when eval-
uating the set Y . It is thus interesting to consider the case where the factor α
is constant, so that the agent expresses the same degree of uncertainty aversion
in all evaluations between acts. In order to model the case where α is constant,
Ghirardato introduces the following additional axiom:
[Axiom 10] (Option Uncertainty Attitude Robustness): For every finite
set X ∈ U and x ∈ Xc, suppose that X ′ = X∪{x}, and that x and x′ (respectively,
x and x′) are the -maximal (respectively, -minimal) elements of X and X ′
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respectively, and that x  x. Then, for every A ⊆ S
X ∼
[
x if s ∈ A
x if s /∈ A
]
⇐⇒ X ′ ∼
[
x′ if s ∈ A
x′ if s /∈ A
]
Thereby, Xc denotes the complement of X. The axiom holds that if an agent
is indifferent between a constant act which pays out X at every state and an
act which pays out the preference-minimal element of X in event A and the
preference-maximal element of X under the complement of A, then they should
also be indifferent between a constant act X ′ which is larger than X and an act
which pays out the preference-minimal element in X ′ under the event A and the
preference-maximal element of X ′ in the complement of A. An agent’s attitude
to option uncertainty should not be affected by adding an element to the set
of consequences they currently envision. Assuming axioms 1 – 10 then yields a
variant of Theorem 1 with constant α, provided that the set of consequences X
is finite:
Lemma 1 (Ghirardato, 2001): If  satisfies Axioms 1 – 10 and if X is finite,
then there is a convex-ranged probability measure P on (S, 2S), a non-constant
bounded utility function u : X → R and a constant α ∈ [0, 1] such that, if we
define V : F → R by
V (f) ≡
∫
U
[
α inf
x∈X
u(x) + (1− α) sup
x∈X
u(x)
]
ϕf (dX) (4.3)
with ϕf (U) ≡ P ({s ∈ S : f(s) ∈ U}) for U ⊆ U , then for all f, g ∈ F
f  g ⇐⇒ V (f) ≥ V (g).
P is unique, u is unique up to positive affine transformation.
Suppose now that an agent’s preferences satisfy axioms 1 – 10, and are hence
representable using the utility function V (·) given in Lemma 1.
Let us now turn to uncertainty attitude. As observed above, an agent is extremely
averse (i.e. pessimistic) with respect to option uncertainty if they attach a utility
value to a set of consequences X at a particular state equivalent to the least
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utility value of any of its elements. In contrast, the agent is option uncertainty
loving (i.e. optimistic) if they attach a utility value to a set of consequences X at
a particular state equivalent to the highest utility value feasible for its elements.
Ghirardato thus defines option uncertainty pessimism and optimism as follows:
[Axiom 11] (Option Uncertainty Pessimism / Optimism): Given X,Y ∈
U , suppose that for every x ∈ X there is a y ∈ Y such that x  y (respectively
for every y ∈ Y there exists an x ∈ X such that x  y), then X  Y .
This definition fixes the notion of aversion to option uncertainty Ghirardato’s
model permits. Of course, when imposing axioms 1 – 10 and option uncer-
tainty pessimism, the agent’s preferences will be representable as given in Lemma
1 with a constant value of α equal to one; the value function then becomes
V (f) ≡ ∫U infx∈X u(x)ϕf (dX). Conversely, imposing axioms 1 – 10 and option
uncertainty optimism implies that α is constant at zero, yielding the value func-
tion V (f) ≡ ∫U supx∈X u(x)ϕf (dX).
It may be interesting to ask, then, under what circumstances it is the case in
Ghirardato’s model that one preference relation is more option uncertainty averse
than another. In particular, assume that axioms 1 – 10 hold, so that the agent
expresses a constant level of option uncertainty aversion with respect to all con-
sequence sets X. It follows from axioms 1 – 10 that preferences are representable
as in Lemma 1. Assume that both preference relations 1 and 2 agree on the
ranking of constant acts x, y ∈ X , so that x 1 y ⇔ x 2 y. Assume fur-
ther that both 1 and 2 agree on the likelihood ranking of events, such that
A ∗1 B ⇔ A ∗2 B. Then it follows from Lemma 1 that a higher value of α
implies a greater degree of option uncertainty aversion: the larger α, the more
the agent will evaluate sets of consequences in light of their least element. This
yields the following notion of relative option uncertainty aversion:
[Definition 1] (Relative Option Uncertainty Aversion): Consider two pref-
erence relations 1 and 2 such that 1 and 2 satisfy axioms 1 – 10 and assume
that ∀x ∈ X , x 1 y ⇔ x 2 y, and ∀A,B ∈ 2S, A ∗1 B ⇔ A ∗2 B. Then 2 is
more uncertainty averse than 1 if and only if α(2) > α(1).
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4.3.1 Option uncertainty aversion and rationality
Let us now address the question whether option uncertainty aversion, as charac-
terised in Ghirardato’s model, is rational. First, let us look at the role of α, which
imposes that the agent evaluates sets of consequences as linear combinations of
their least and most preferable elements. This evaluation rule does not take into
account the size of the set X, in spite of the fact that the size of the set X under
consideration may matter in determining the degree of the agent’s aversion to op-
tion uncertainty. For instance, consider two outcome sets X = {$0, $1000} and
Y = {$0, $1, $2, ..., $1000}. The first outcome set has only two outcomes, namely
winning nothing and winning $1000. In contrast, the second outcome set includes
all intermediate outcomes between $0 and $1000. It would seem reasonable that
an agent would be much more option uncertainty averse with respect to the set X
than Y , as Y offers a number of payoffs which are better than winning nothing,
whereas the set X offers only one outcome which is better than winning nothing.
It is clear from the example that taking linear combinations of least and most
favourable elements of a particular consequence set fails to take into account the
additional information concerning the nature of all intermediate outcomes, which
may be relevant to the agent’s attitude to option uncertainty.
Let us now ask whether axiom 10 is a requirement of rationality. Intuitively, it
seems plausible that an agent should be required to exhibit the same attitude
to uncertainty for all acts in a given set of acts. If the agent’s decision problem
consists in choosing a particular medium of transportation to travel from A to
B, it would seem irrational if the agent is very uncertainty averse with respect to
flying, but not with respect to riding a motorbike. So it seems that the agent’s
attitude to uncertainty should be constant. However, axiom 10 may not reflect
our intuitive notion of what it means to have a constant attitude to uncertainty.
An agent whose uncertainty aversion can be modelled by a coefficient α = 2/3 will
appear only mildly uncertainty averse when this constant is applied to the set
X above, but will appear extremely uncertainty averse when the same constant
α = 2/3 is applied to the set Y above. It appears that a linear α fails to reflect an
intuitive notion of constancy of uncertainty attitude. Within the constraints of
the model, however, it is not straightforward to construct a more plausible notion
of a constant attitude to uncertainty.
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We have not, so far, addressed the normative question to what extent option
uncertainty aversion as such is rational. As we have seen, Ghirardato’s model
is consistent with all attitudes to option uncertainty ranging from option uncer-
tainty pessimism to optimism, where option uncertainty aversion is understood
in the particular sense of attaching a relatively large weight to the least preferable
outcome of a particular outcome set X. This seems reasonable: the normative
model should not prescribe a particular attitude to option uncertainty, as, de-
pending on the particular decision problem, uncertainty aversion or attraction
may be rational. An argument to this effect for the case of ambiguity has been
given by Nehring (2009), who argues that an agent’s uncertainty-averse decisions
should be seen as decisions aiming at robustness in light of uncertainty, rather
than at avoiding uncertainty. A similar argument can be made for the case of
option uncertainty: an agent who exhibits uncertainty aversion will aim to make
decisions such that their decision will yield favourable results even if one of the
worse (or the worst) possible consequence of their action is true. Choosing such
that the decision is robust to uncertainty is a rational strategy for coping with
uncertainty.
One important psychological reason why people may be particularly averse to
option uncertainty is that they may feel personally responsible for the outcomes of
their actions. For instance, when faced with the decision whether or not to launch
an attack on Iran, the Head of State of Israel may evaluate the alternatives in an
uncertainty averse way, given that many lives may be lost as a direct consequence
of his decision. Taking a decision which turns out to have bad consequences
may then be associated with particularly severe regret over not having chosen
a different alternative with less severe worst-case outcomes. More specifically,
suppose an act f yields a consequence set X with a least element x at a particular
state s, and an act g yields a consequence set Y with least element y at the same
state s. Supposing that x ≺ y, the agent may feel severe regret for having chosen
act f when nature chooses state s and x occurs, since they may attribute the
fact that x occurred to their choice of f over g. They may then regret not having
chosen act g, which has a more favourable least element at s. Anticipating the
potential for regret may lead agents to be more uncertainty averse than they
would be without the feeling of personal responsibility for consequences.
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red black yellow
o1 $20 $0 $0
o2 $0 $20 $0
o3 $#black $0 $0
Table 4.1: Option uncertainty in the Ellsberg gambles
4.3.2 Descriptive evidence on option uncertainty aversion
Option uncertainty is a type of uncertainty which has found little attention in
the literature. However, there is an empirical study by Eliaz and Ortoleva (2011)
the results of which can be interpreted as a test for option uncertainty aversion.
Amongst other tests, Eliaz and Ortoleva introduce a variant of the Ellberg para-
dox where the prize the agent receives is conditional on the composition of the
urn. Eliaz and Ortoleva assume that there are 60 balls in total, 20 of which are
red, and the distribution over black and yellow balls is unknown. In Table 4.1,
gambles o1 and o2 are the standard Ellsberg gambles, and gamble o3 pays out a
prize in dollars equivalent to the number of black balls in the urn. Gamble o3 can
be interpreted as an act featuring option uncertainty, since the payoff of gamble
o3 ranges between $0, in case there are no black balls in the urn, and $40, if 40
out of the 60 balls in total are black. Assuming the principle of insufficient reason
(see section 2.4), the agent would hold that there are 20 black and 20 yellow balls
in the urn. Under this assumption, the expected payoff of gamble o3 is $20 with a
probability of 1⁄3; this makes the expected payoff of o3 just equivalent to that of
gamble o1. Eliaz and Ortoleva find that in the experiment 67 out of 80 subjects
prefer gamble o1 to o2, consistently with the results of Ellsberg (1961). However,
it is furthermore the case that 68 out of 80 subjects prefer o1 to o3, consistently
with option uncertainty aversion.
4.4 Introducing status quo bias
Ghirardato’s model provides a convincing framework for modelling the concept
of option uncertainty introduced in Chapter 2. Before modelling the status quo
bias formally, let us consider some possible conceptions of status quo bias, so as
to clarify the nature of the account of status quo bias given here.
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First, it is important to distinguish between the status quo bias, endowment effect,
status quo reference effect and omission bias, since these effects are interrelated.
The status quo bias refers to cases where agents favour, for no evident reason, the
status quo over other available alternatives. Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988)
first observed the bias, and tested it using the following example (Samuelson and
Zeckhauser, 1988, p.12):
You are a serious reader of the financial pages but until recently have
had few funds to invest. That is when you inherited a large sum of
money from your great uncle. You are considering different portfolios.
Your choices are: (a) invest in a moderate risk company [...], (b) a
high risk company [...], (c) treasury bills [...], (d) municipal bonds.
Samuelson and Zeckhauser then presented a separate group of people with the
following choices, which explicitly give a status quo:
You are a serious reader of the financial pages but until recently have
had few funds to invest. That is when you inherited a portfolio of
cash and securities from your great uncle. A significant portion of this
portfolio is invested in moderate-risk Company A. You are deliberating
whether to leave the portfolio intact or to change it by investing in
other securities. (The tax and broker commission consequences of any
change are insignificant.) Your choices are: (a) invest in a moderate
risk company [...], (b) a high risk company [...], (c) treasury bills [...],
(d) municipal bonds.
The authors observed that the status quo option (in this case, investing in moder-
ate risk company A) becomes significantly more popular if it is singled out as the
status quo. Status quo bias has been observed in a variety of decision problems,
ranging from investment decisions (see, e.g. Patel, Zeckhauser and Hendricks,
1991, Rubaltelli et al., 2005, and Kempf and Ruenzi, 2006) to moral decision
making (see Bostrom and Ord, 2006, and Tetlock and Boettger, 1994) and medi-
cal decision making (see Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler, 1991, and Johnson and
Goldstein, 2004).
A separate but related anomaly in decision making is the endowment effect, which
was first observed by Thaler (1980), and investigated in the context of prospect
theory by Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1991). This refers to cases where
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an agent holds a particular good which they would like to neither buy nor sell:
it seems to them that the good is too expensive to buy, and too inexpensive to
sell. The endowment effect is observed empirically as a gap between willingness
to pay (WTP) and willingness to accept (WTA). An agent who succumbs to
the endowment effect will generally be biased toward the status quo, namely
that of holding the good, rather than buying or selling it. For instance, the
endowment effect has been observed by Knetsch and Sinden (1984) using the
following experiment: experimental subjects were given either a lottery ticket
or $2. After some time, all subjects were given the opportunity to trade the
lottery ticket for $2 or vice versa; yet very few subjects chose to switch. The
endowment effect can be seen as a special case of status quo bias, where the status
quo consists in holding a particular consumption good. We conceive here of the
status quo as an act, which need not, but may, consist in holding a particular
good. The endowment effect can be explained in the framework proposed below
if we understand option uncertainty as ethical uncertainty, namely the case where
the agent is unsure which utility value best reflects their desire for a particular
good. In particular, it may be the case that the agent understands the utility they
derive from holding a good better for the status quo than for other alternatives.
A further anomaly in close connection to status quo bias is the reference effect,
which holds that agents evaluate alternatives in comparison to a given reference
point (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991). According to reference-based theories
(such as prospect theory), alternatives are evaluated in light of the gain or loss
they offer relative to a neutral reference point. The status quo is then a natural
reference point with which other alternatives are compared; status quo bias can
be explained as resulting from loss aversion relative to the reference point. An
expected utility model in this spirit has been suggested by Loomes, Orr and
Sugden (2009), who analyse status quo bias in a reference-dependent subjective
expected utility (RDSEU) model. The account of status quo bias proffered here
differs from reference-based accounts in the sense that the agent is able to compare
all acts; they will not exclusively compare acts to the status quo. In this sense, the
option uncertainty framework is more general than reference-dependent accounts.
However, in our model the agent is averse to option uncertainty, which can – in
the extreme case of option uncertainty pessimism – be interpreted as a form of
loss aversion.
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Finally, it is important to distinguish between the status quo bias and omission
bias. Thereby, omission bias refers to the case where an agent fails to act, rather
than deliberating whether or not to act and deciding in favour of the status quo
(Ritov and Baron, 1990). For instance, Johnson and Goldstein (2004) show that
in countries where the default legislation is that all citizens who do not opt out are
organ donors (e.g. France, Austria, Belgium), there are significantly more organ
donors than in countries where the default legislation is that citizens do not donate
organs (e.g. UK, Germany, Denmark). These data are perhaps best understood
as exemplifying omission bias, since they reflect a failure to act, rather than a
conscious choice for not acting. A second example which may be best understood
as omission bias is given in the following example from Kahneman, Knetsch and
Thaler (1991, p.199):
One final example of a presumed status quo bias comes courtesy of
the JEP staff. Among Carl Shapiro’s comments on this column was
this gem: “You may be interested to know that when the AEA was
considering letting members elect to drop one of the three Association
journals and get a credit, prominent economists involved in that deci-
sion clearly took the view that fewer members would choose to drop a
journal if the default was presented as all three journals (rather than
the default being 2 journals with an extra charge for getting all three).
We’re talking economists here.”
Again, it seems plausible to assume that members elect do not generally entertain
the option of dropping journals, so that status quo bias arises out of a failure to
see the possibility of action, rather than a conscious choice in favour of the status
quo. In the model proposed below, omission bias may be comprehensible as an
unconscious choice between the status quo and alternative acts, where the status
quo is implicitly ranked as better than other alternatives. This behaviour may
be motivated by reasoning to the effect that unless deviating from the status
quo will lead to unambiguously better outcomes, the status quo is chosen over
other alternatives. In this sense, omission bias can be understood as the special
case of status quo bias where alternatives to the status quo are not consciously
entertained by the agent, due to the certainty of the status quo relative to other
alternatives. In particular, our model does not require that the status quo be
consciously chosen over other alternatives.
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4.4.1 Modelling status quo bias
Turn now to the characterisation of the status quo. In particular, let f ∈ F
denote the status quo act, and assume that f ∈ Fc:
Assumption 1: Let f ∈ Fc be the status quo.
Assumption 1 holds that the status quo is a crisp act, i.e. one where option
uncertainty plays no role. Let us investigate assumption 1 in light of the differ-
ent interpretations of option uncertainty we have given in Chapter 2. We have
argued that option uncertainty can be understood either as a non-uniqueness of
consequences at particular states, or alternatively as ethical uncertainty, namely
uncertainty over the utility value an agent attaches to a particular consequence
at a given state. In each case, assumption 1 has different implications.
In the case where option uncertainty is interpreted as non-uniqueness of conse-
quences at states, assumption 1 holds that for the status quo, a unique conse-
quence exists at every state. On assumption 1, the agent finds it easier to as-
sess what consequences follow from the exercise of the status quo than for other
alternatives. This may be the case when the agent holds superior, uncertainty-
reducing information with respect to the status quo, such that the agent under-
stands the status quo act better than they understand other alternatives. For
instance, if the status quo act is to live in a particular area, than the experience
of having lived in the area before may enhance the agent’s knowledge of the con-
sequences of continuing to live in the same area. In contrast, there may be much
greater uncertainty in determining the consequences of living in an unknown area;
one’s neighbours may not be nice, or one’s way to work from a different location
may require using a route which has a traffic jam every day. Assumption 1
would hold, when option uncertainty is interpreted as the non-uniqueness of con-
sequences at particular states, that such factual uncertainties are fully resolved
for the status quo.
Assumption 1 is particularly convincing, however, under the interpretation of
option uncertainty as ethical uncertainty. In the case of ethical uncertainty, as-
sumption 1 holds that the agent is able to determine the utility value of the
consequences of the status quo act with exactitude, whilst they may not be able
to do so for alternative acts. For instance, if I am a regular costumer of Star-
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bucks, I find it easier to assess what the coffee will taste like than when I go
to the new Italian coffee shop around the corner. Secondly, as pointed out in
Bradley and Drechsler (forthcoming), ethical uncertainty may concern not the
factual properties of a particular consequence (e.g. the taste of the coffee), but
rather the utility value one would derive from that consequence (i.e. how much
enjoyment the taste of the coffee produces). For instance, even though one may
know all the specifications of a particular car, say, one may not be able to assess
to what extent these specifications are desirable. Assumption 1 seems justified
particularly when we interpret ethical uncertainty in this latter sense, as prior
experience with a given commodity may resolve uncertainty of this kind.
This leads to the main claim of this chapter, namely that an agent who is more
option uncertainty averse will be more biased toward the status quo: under a
more uncertainty-averse preference relation 2 the set of acts judged at least as
good as the status quo, i.e. D := {g ∈ F : g  f}, will be smaller or equal to the
set of elements judged at least as good as the status quo under a less uncertainty
averse relation 1. This can be expressed as follows: for any two preference
relations 1 and 2 such that 2 is more uncertainty averse than 1 according
to definition 1 above,
|D2| := {g ∈ F : g 2 f} ≤ |D1| := {g ∈ F : g 1 f}. (4.4)
This finding can explain at least part of the experimental evidence for status quo
bias, since uncertainty averse agents will decide more binary decisions between
acts in favour of the status quo than less uncertainty averse agents. If many
agents are option uncertainty averse and for this reason favour the status quo,
this may then show up in experimental evidence as a bias towards the status quo.
Formally, compare an agent whose preferences are represented by 2 and whose
coefficient of option uncertainty aversion is given by α(2) with an agent whose
preferences are represented by 1 and whose coefficient of option uncertainty
aversion is given by α(1). If α(2) is larger than α(1), then the set of acts D2
deemed preferable to the status quo under 2 will be smaller than the set of acts
judged as better than the status quo under 1. This is expressed in the following
theorem, the proof of which is contained in the appendix:
Theorem 2: Let 1 and 2 satisfy axioms 1 – 10. Assume that ∀x ∈ X ,
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x 1 y ⇔ x 2 y, and that ∀A,B ∈ 2S, A ∗1 B ⇔ A ∗2 B. Assume also that X
is finite. Then
α(2) ≥ α(1)⇒ D2 ≤ D1. (4.5)
It is easy to see this using a simple example (assume, for simplicity, that all acts
are constant): suppose you hold a mobile phone contract with Deutsche Telekom,
which you have held for several years. You pay roughly £50 every month. Since
you distrust mobile phone companies generally, you are unsure which amount
exactly you would pay were you to change providers – there may be small print
in another mobile phone contract you do not understand and you can’t assess
the implications of. So you suppose that your phone bill with Orange would
range between £20 and £60 every month. Suppose then that you are mildly
uncertainty averse, with an α = 3/4. You calculate accordingly that your expected
phone bill with Orange would be given by 3/4 × £60 + 1/4 × £20 = £50, so you
are indifferent between staying with Deutsche Telekom and switching to Orange.
An option uncertainty pessimistic agent would hold an α = 1, computing thus
that the expected bill with Orange is £60. So the more uncertainty averse agent
will prefer remaining with Deutsche Telekom to switching to Orange, revealing a
greater attachment to the status quo.
Let us analyse the option uncertainty account of status quo bias using Samuelson
and Zeckhauser’s example introduced above. The example explicitly mentions
that “until recently [you] have had few funds to invest”. It does not seem far-
fetched to assume that the agent has absolutely no practical experience with
investment decisions, if it is the first time in their life where such a decision has
to be made. It is also natural to assume that when no status quo is specified,
all options seem uncertain to the agent. So it is also reasonable to assume that,
having constructed the state space S = {‘boom’, ‘recession’} the agent envisages
several possible consequences at each state for each of the acts a,b,c and d. When
a status quo is singled out, however, the agent may reason that this must have
been a ‘safe’ strategy in the past, since their uncle accumulated a significant
fortune: the agent now takes the fact that their uncle accumulated a large sum
of money as evidence to the effect that the investment in the moderate risk
company has been successful. Under the representation where a status quo is
specified, the agent therefore envisions unique consequences at every state for the
act of investing in a moderate risk company, but continues to entertain several
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possible consequences at every state for the acts c,d and e. It would then seem
reasonable that the agent is biased towards keeping the portfolio as it is.
4.4.2 Status quo bias and rationality
The status quo bias seems, in many instances, irrational: when many potentially
better alternatives are available, why should one choose to remain at the status
quo? We have given an account here of status quo bias which partially rationalises
it. Let us be clear in which way it is rationalised, and in which way it is not.
Firstly, note that we are here explaining status quo bias by reference to uncer-
tainty averse preference. This seems rational to the extent that (i) the status
quo is crisp, and (ii) the agent is uncertainty averse. We have argued in section
4.1 above that uncertainty aversion may be rational, and will therefore focus on
substantiating (i). The assumption that the status quo is crisp is justified to the
extent that the agent holds either uncertainty-reducing objective information,
or uncertainty-reducing subjective information. The former applies in the case
where there is option uncertainty in the form of non-uniqueness of consequences,
whereas the latter applies to the case where option uncertainty takes the form of
ethical uncertainty.
Let us focus on the case where consequences are non-unique first. Clearly, it is
not always the case that the status quo is in fact crisp in that case. For instance,
suppose your status quo act is living in New Orleans. One potential outcome
of continuing to live in New Orleans is that your house may be destroyed by a
hurricane, since these occur on a regular basis in that part of the world. There
is, in fact, great uncertainty over what consequences follow from continuing to
live in New Orleans. Nevertheless, an agent may favour continuing to live in
New Orleans over moving away due to status quo bias. The model proposed here
cannot account for cases where the agent does not hold uncertainty-reducing
objective information with respect to the status quo; a bias towards the status
quo where the status quo is itself uncertain cannot be explained by our model.
This may be seen as a limitation of the account.
However, the assumption that the status quo is crisp does seem justified in many
other cases, where the agent’s prior experience with the status quo act eliminates
option uncertainty. For instance, if an agent has visited a particular holiday
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destination previously, they may have learnt certain features of the destination,
such as the distance to the beach, the quality of the hotel, and so forth, from
past experience, therefore eliminating uncertainty of this factual kind. Ultimately,
however, whether the assumption that the status quo is crisp is justified depends
on the source of option uncertainty in particular decision problems.
Let us turn now to the case of ethical uncertainty. Assumption 1 then holds that
the agent is certain with respect to the utility value a particular consequence
affords them in the case of the status quo, whereas they may not be certain
with respect to the utility values of other alternatives. The ethical uncertainty
explanation of status quo bias can explain habitual behaviour in consumption
choices. For instance, Samuelson and Zeckhauser give the example of a colleague
who chose the same lunch for 26 years, namely a ham and cheese sandwich on rye
bread. One day, Samuelson and Zeckhauser’s colleague ordered a chicken salad
sandwich instead, and has continued to order this for lunch ever since. Prima
facie, it may seem as though this habitual behaviour is irrational, since the col-
league could have had a healthier, tastier or cheaper diet by alternating their
lunch choice. However, one may reason that the choice of the ham and cheese
sandwich just reflects the fact that they know that this choice affords them some
level of utility, whereas they did not know what utility value they would attribute
to alternative lunch choices. Once Samuelson and Zeckhauser’s colleague tried
the chicken sandwich, this uncertainty was resolved: they were then able to at-
tribute a unique utility value to the consumption of chicken sandwich. However,
since the colleague continued to choose the chicken sandwich ever since, it seems
reasonable to assume that the colleague continued to use an option uncertainty
averse decision rule, evaluating all alternative options in light of their potentially
worse utility values.
4.4.3 Related literature
The empirical pervasiveness of the status quo bias has led to the development of a
number of models featuring status quo bias. Bewley’s (2002) model of Knightian
uncertainty models status quo bias in the sense that agents will deviate from the
status quo only when another alternative is preferred to the status quo for all
priors in a given set of priors. In Bewley’s model, status quo bias is linked to
ambiguity, whereas our account proceeds from a framework of option uncertainty.
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Furthermore, whilst Bewley’s model assumes status quo bias by postulating iner-
tia, our account rationalises the bias. However, Bewley (2002) shares the intuition
behind this paper in the sense that agents will trade the status quo for another
alternative only when the competing act is certainly better than the prevailing
one.
Loomes, Orr and Sugden (2009) explain status quo bias within a consumer choice
model. Loomes et al. proceed from reference-dependent subjective expected util-
ity theory, where agents are uncertain about the utility which will be yielded by
their consumption experience in different taste states of the world. Loomes et
al.’s model shows why the bias toward the status quo may be more or less strong
depending on the decision environment. However, their model is more restrictive
than ours in the sense that it explains status quo bias only in the special case of
taste uncertainty, a particular kind of ethical uncertainty. Furthermore, our ac-
count differs from Loomes et al.’s in that we do not assume a reference-dependent
framework; hence, the agents modelled here can be seen as more rational than
those modelled in Loomes et al.’s framework.
A model of status quo bias within a revealed preference framework has been
suggested by Masatlioglu and Ok (2005). Masatlioglu and Ok assume the status
quo bias axiomatically. In particular, Masatlioglu and Ok’s status quo bias axiom
holds that if an alternative is chosen when it is not the status quo, it will be
chosen uniquely when it is the status quo. Masatlioglu and Ok’s model can be
seen as a generalisation of revealed preference theory which allows for status quo
bias and includes the standard framework as a special case. In contrast to their
model, the present account rationalises status quo bias, by giving a rational choice
explanation for status quo bias rather than assuming the bias axiomatically.
Finally, in a recent contribution Ortoleva (2010) links status quo bias to ambiguity
aversion. In this sense, Ortoleva’s model is strongly related to ours, since it
provides a link between uncertainty and status quo bias. In contrast to our
account, however, Ortoleva assumes status quo bias axiomatically, using a similar
approach to Masatlioglu and Ok (2005). Ortoleva then shows formally that an
agent who is biased toward the status quo will be more averse to ambiguity than
one who is not. Ortoleva’s result can be seen as complementary to our own, as we
proceed from assuming uncertainty aversion and deriving bias towards the status
quo.
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4.5 Conclusion
This chapter has argued that once we extend Savage’s framework to allow for un-
certainty over the true consequence of actions, we can account for the empirical
phenomenon of status quo bias, which might otherwise seem irrational. In partic-
ular, the chapter is based on Ghirardato’s (2001) contribution, which generalises
Savage acts such that correspondences, rather than functions, from states of the
world to consequences are envisaged by the agent. We interpreted Ghirardato’s
framework as one of option uncertainty, as introduced in Chapter 2.
We then argued that on two relatively weak assumptions, namely that the sta-
tus quo is a crisp act, and that agents are option uncertainty averse, one can
account for status quo bias. In particular, we argued that the status quo may
be perceived as crisp either because the agent holds objective knowledge which
reduces the uncertainty surrounding the status quo, or because the agent holds
superior subjective information, such that the agent can assess the utility value
they would derive from the status quo better than for other alternatives. The
interpretation of option uncertainty as ethical uncertainty allows us to explain
status quo bias in consumption choices, as well as brand loyalty.
To the best of our knowledge, there is, so far, no model which explains status
quo bias in a non-reference dependent set-up; for instance, Loomes, Orr and
Sugden (2009) consider the status quo bias within reference-dependent subjective
expected utility. Furthermore, those models which treat status quo bias either
stipulate it axiomatically (e.g. Ortoleva, 2010, and Masatlioglu and Ok, 2005),
or assume the bias behaviorally (see, e.g. Bewley, 2002). The present chapter
offers a rational explanation of status quo bias appealing neither to reference-
dependence, nor by assuming the bias. The approach taken here demonstrates,
above all, that once we grant that the rationality constraints on agents must be
weaker under conditions of uncertainty, we are able to give rational explanations
of empirical phenomena such as status quo bias.
129
CHAPTER 4. OPTION UNCERTAINTY
A.1 Appendix
Proof of Theorem 2:
We would like to show that (A) α(2) ≥ α(1) implies that (B)
|D2| := {g ∈ F : g 2 f} ≤ |D1| := {g ∈ F : g 1 f}.
We will prove the claim by contradiction: ¬B ⇒ ¬A.
Assume that ¬B, such that |D2| := {g ∈ F : g 2 f} > |D1| := {g ∈ F : g 1 f}.
Then it must be the case that ∃g such that g ∈ D2(f) and g /∈ D1(f). We have
then that g 2 f but g ≺1 f . From g 2 f , by Lemma 1, we have V2(g) ≥ V2(f).
By the assumption of crispness of f , V (f) =
∫
U u(x)ϕf (dX). Then we have
V2(g) =
∫
U
[
α inf
x∈X
u(x) + (1− α) sup
x∈X
u(x)
]
ϕg(dX)
≥ V2(f) =
∫
U
u(x)ϕf (dX).
From g ≺1 f , by Lemma 1, we have V1(g) < V1(f). From the crispness of f ,
V (f) =
∫
U u(x)ϕf (dX), so that:
V1(g) =
∫
U
[
α inf
x∈X
u(x) + (1− α) sup
x∈X
u(x)
]
ϕg(dX)
< V1(f) =
∫
U
u(x)ϕf (dX).
By assumption, 1 and 2 agree on the ranking of all elements x ∈ X ; hence,
x 1 y ⇔ x 2 y. Whence u1(x) ≥ u1(y) ⇔ u2(x) ≥ u2(y). By the unique-
ness properties of u(·), it is the case that infx∈X u1(x) = infx∈X u2(x) and
supx∈X u1(x) = supx∈X u2(x). Furthermore, by the assumption that A ∗1 B ⇔
A ∗2 B, we have ϕ1 = ϕ2. Hence, V2(g) ≥ V2(f) and V1(g) < V1(f) if and only
if (C) α(2) < α(1), contradicting (A) as required. 
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Axiomatising Bounded
Rationality:
The Priority Heuristic
Mareile Drechsler, Konstantinos Katsikopoulos
and Gerd Gigerenzer
Expected utility theory remains to this day the dominant decision theoretic frame-
work in economics. Much of the appeal of expected utility theory lies in its ele-
gant axiomatic characterisations (e.g., von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944, and
Savage, 1954), which lend themselves to a normative reading. It has, however,
been shown empirically that the axioms of expected utility are systematically
violated by people. For instance, Allais (1953) has demonstrated violations of
the independence axiom, and Kahneman and Tversky have empirically identified
a number of violations of expected utility theory, including framing effects, the
reflection effect, and the fourfold pattern of risk-taking (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992).
An alternative approach to studying human decision making is to study how
human beings make choices in the real world. To obtain a more realistic account
of human decision making, Selten (2001) and, before, Simon (1991), have called
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for a theory of bounded rationality that is based on an empirical analysis of
the cognitive processes that lead to choice. The formal study of simple heuristics
provides one approach towards this end (Gigerenzer and Selten, 2001). A heuristic
is a strategy that relies on limited search for information and does not involve
the calculation of a maximum or minimum. Instead, it is composed of rules for
search, stopping, and decision making consistent with the observation that people
often search for information sequentially in time and stop search at some point
rather than engaging in exhaustive search. A limitation of this approach is that it
has so far not been characterised axiomatically (for an exception, see Rubinstein,
1988).
This chapter gives an axiomatic characterisation of a family of lexicographic the-
ories of choice which include the priority heuristic as a special case. The priority
heuristic is a heuristic used to make binary decisions between gambles. The
heuristic is remarkable because it predicts the choices between gambles of the
majority extremely well (Brandsta¨tter, Gigerenzer and Hertwig, 2006), as well as
accounting for a number of violations of expected utility theory, in particular the
common consequence and common ratio effects, reflection effects, and the fourfold
pattern of risk taking (Katsikopoulos and Gigerenzer, 2008). An axiomatisation
will be helpful in at least two ways: first, it will make it possible for theorists
to study the relation of the priority heuristic to other axiomatic theories, such
as cumulative prospect theory (see Wakker and Tversky, 1993). Second, it will
allow for new empirical tests via the axioms of the heuristic. Our axiomatisation
is close to Luce (1978).
The representation given here is for a parameterised version of the priority heuris-
tic. While the version of the heuristic with fixed parameters predicts the data
nicely, there is a need for a parameterised version as well. For example, param-
eters are needed in order to account for individual differences, and for inconsis-
tencies in choice (Rieskamp, 2008). The axiomatisation suggested here makes no
claims with respect to parameters. Studying this generalisation of the priority
heuristic does not mean we advocate a research program in which heuristics are
populated with parameters, which are fitted anew to each data set. Rather, we
see the generalisation as covering other possible fixed parameters of the priority-
heuristic, in the case that independent theory or evidence suggests such fixed
values in some situations.
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The representation uses semiorders (Luce, 1956), which have the property of hav-
ing a transitive strict preference part, and an intransitive indifference part. This
seems reasonable and consistent with real world evidence, since utility may not
be perfectly discriminable. This is argued, for instance, by Armstrong (1950):
“The nontransitiveness of indifference must be recognised and explained on any
theory of choice, and the only explanation that seems to work is based on the im-
perfect powers of discrimination of the human mind whereby inequalities become
recognisable only when of sufficient magnitude.”
We proceed as follows. Section 5.1 introduces the priority heuristic and reviews
relevant analytical and empirical results. Section 5.2 gives a brief introduction
to measurement theory, the mathematical framework representation results such
as the one proffered in this chapter employ. Section 5.3 presents a representation
theorem for the heuristic in choices where gambles differ on two attributes (an
outcome and a probability). Section 5.4 generalises the result to the case of
three attributes (two outcomes and a probability). Section 5.5 concludes with a
discussion of the present contribution to the foundations of a theory of bounded
rationality in the sense of Selten (2001) and Simon (1991).
5.1 The Priority Heuristic
The priority heuristic is a model of how people make choices between gambles.
Its domain are difficult risky-choice problems, that is, problems in which no al-
ternative dominates the other and expected values are close (ratio ≤ 2). A large
part of the evidence on people’s choice behaviour derives from simple monetary
gambles. The priority heuristic proposes that people make choices by using at
most three attributes: the minimum outcome, the probability of the minimum
outcome, and the maximum outcome. For choosing between two gambles with
nonnegative outcomes (then called gains), the priority heuristic has a search rule,
stopping rule, and decision rule (Brandsta¨tter, Gigerenzer, and Hertwig, 2006):
Search Rule: Go through attributes in the order: Minimum gain, probability of
minimum gain, maximum gain.
Stopping Rule: Stop search if the minimum gains differ by 1/10, or more, of the
maximum gain (across the two gambles); otherwise, stop search if probabilities
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of the minimum gains differ by .1 or more.
Decision Rule: Choose the gamble that is more attractive in the attribute (gain
or probability) that stopped search.
The more attractive gamble is the one with the higher (minimum or maximum)
gain or with the lower probability of minimum gain. For negative outcomes (the
minimum and maximum outcomes are then called losses), the difference in the
statement of the heuristic is that “gain” is replaced by “loss”. The more attractive
loss is the lower one and the more attractive probability of minimum loss is the
higher one. Our axiomatisations refer to gambles with gains and it will be obvious
how they would be restated for gambles with losses.
Formally, we axiomatise a relation , defined on A× B × C, where A is the set
of minimum outcomes, B is the set of probabilities of minimum outomes, and C
is the set of maximum outcomes, such that (a1, b1, c1)  (a2, b2, c2) iff
(i) a1 − a2 > max{c1, c2}
10
, or
(ii) |a1 − a2| ≤ max{c1, c2}
10
and
b2 − b1 > .1 , or
(iii) |a1 − a2| ≤ max{c1, c2}
10
and
|b2 − b1| ≤ .1 and
c1 ≥ c2
The priority heuristic is lexicographic in the sense that an attribute is used for
making a choice only if the attributes that precede it in the search order do not
allow making a choice (see also Luce, 1956). For more discussion on the heuristic,
for example, on why the aspiration levels for stopping search were fixed to .1, see
Brandsta¨tter, Gigerenzer, and Hertwig (2006) and Katsikopoulos and Gigerenzer
(2008).
To illustrate how the heuristic works, consider one of the problems posed by Allais
(1953, p. 527), known as the Allais paradox, where people choose first between
gambles A and B:
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A: 100,000,000 with probability 1.00
B: 500,000,000 with probability .10
100,000,000 with probability .89
0 with probability .01
By subtracting a .89 probability to win 100 million from both gambles A and B,
Allais obtained the following gambles, C and D:
C: 100,000,000 with probability .11
0 with probability .89
D: 500,000,000 with probability .10
0 with probability .90
The majority of people chose gamble A over B and D over C (MacCrimmon, 1968),
and this constitutes a violation of the independence axiom. Expected utility
theory does not predict whether A or B will be chosen; it only makes conditional
predictions such as “if A is chosen from A and B, then C is chosen from C and
D.” The priority heuristic, in contrast, makes stronger predictions: It predicts
whether A or B will be chosen, and whether C or D will be chosen. Consider
the choice between A and B. The maximum gain across the two gambles is 500
million and therefore the aspiration level for gains is 50 million. The difference
between the minimum gains equals 100 − 0 = 100 million, which exceeds the
aspiration level, and search is stopped. The gamble with the more attractive
minimum gain is A. Thus, the heuristic predicts the majority choice correctly. In
the choice between C and D, minimum gains are equal. Thus the next attribute
is looked up. The difference between the probabilities of minimum gains equals
.90 − .89 = .01, which is smaller than the aspiration level for probabilities of .1.
Thus the choice is decided by the last attribute, maximum gain, in which gamble
D is more attractive. This prediction is again consistent with the choice of the
majority.
More generally, Katsikopoulos and Gigerenzer (2008) have mathematically shown
that the priority heuristic implies common consequence effects, common ratio
effects, reflection effects, and the fourfold pattern of risk attitude. In fact, because
the parameters of the heuristic (the order in which attributes are searched, and
the aspiration levels that stop attribute search) are fixed, the priority heuristic
implies the effects simultaneously.
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On the other hand, modifications of expected utility theory, such as cumulative
prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), that are consistent with the
effects by appropriately setting parameters, cannot simultaneously account for
the empirical evidence (Neilson and Stowe, 2002). For instance, the probability
weighting functions of cumulative prospect theory, as estimated by Wu and Gon-
zalez (1996), imply that people will purchase neither lottery tickets nor insurance
policies. Neilson and Stowe (2002) also showed that no parameter combinations
allow for these two behaviours and a series of choices made by a large majority
of participants and reasonable risk premia. Similarly, Blavatskyy (2010) showed
that the conventional parameterisations of cumulative prospect theory do not
explain the St. Petersburg paradox. Overall, in multi-parameter models, the
parameter values fitted to one set of data are not necessarily robust, in the sense
of generating accurate predictions for new sets of data. For more on the impor-
tance of distinguishing between fitting and prediction in economic modelling, see
Harless and Camerer (1994), and Binmore and Shaked (2010).
No model of risky choice can predict people’s behaviour in every pair of gambles
correctly; therefore it is crucial that researchers refrain from constructing pairs
that fit their model when testing it against competing theories. To avoid such a
possible bias, Brandsta¨tter, Gigerenzer, and Hertwig (2006) tested the predictive
power of the priority heuristic exclusively against sets of gambles designed by
the authors of competing theories (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and
Kahneman, 1992; Lopes and Oden, 1999) as well as randomly generated gambles
(Erev et al., 2002, see Brandsta¨tter, Gigerenzer, and Hertwig, 2006). These test
sets included two-outcome gambles, five-outcome gambles, and choices based on
certainty equivalents. Across 260 pairs of gambles, the priority heuristic predicted
87% of majority choices correctly, while cumulative prospect theory predicted 77%
(the second most predictive theory was the security-potential/aspiration theory
of Lopes and Oden, with 79% of majority choices).
The limits of the predictive power of the priority heuristic were analysed using 450
pairs of gambles designed by Mellers, Weiss, and Birnbaum (1992). The priority
heuristic was more predictive than the modifications of expected utility theory
when the problems were difficult (i.e., the ratio of the expected values of the two
gambles was ≤ 2) but not when problems were easy (ratio > 2) or dominated.
For easy problems, however, none of the modifications of expected utility theory
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could outperform the simple theory of expected value (for a discussion of the
evidence, see Birnbaum, 2008, and Brandsta¨tter, Gigerenzer, and Hertwig, 2006).
These studies suggest that non-linear transformations of probabilities or monetary
values may be needed neither for easy problems nor for difficult ones. Difficult
problems can be modeled by the priority heuristic and easy ones by expected
value theory, each of which is based on non-transformed values and probabilities.
This result clarifies that “overweighting of small probabilities and underweighting
of large probabilities”, which is often evoked to account for anomalies, is in fact
not necessary.
Leland (2010) distinguishes three approaches towards descriptive theories of choice.
What he calls the “road taken” is the representation of lotteries as prospects that
leads to a preoccupation with explaining violations of independence and has led
to a plethora of modifications of expected utility theories, such as prospect the-
ory. A representation of lotteries in terms of Savage’s action-by-state matrices
instead of prospect, however, makes violations of independence transparent, in-
frequent, and not the main problem. In this approach, the “road less travelled,”
more substantial violations such as transitivity and preference for dominated al-
ternatives become more central, as in regret theory (Loomes and Sudgen, 1987).
Common to both approaches, nevertheless, is that choices are interpreted as re-
vealing properties of preferences. In the third approach, the “road not taken,”
choices do not reveal properties of the preferences but instead properties of the
decision processes that individuals use to satisfy their preferences. The priority
heuristic is a formal model of this third approach, as are the similarity models by
Rubinstein (1988), and Leland (1994, 2002).
5.2 Measurement Theory
Measurement theory is predominantly concerned with the question of how cer-
tain abstract quantities, such as length, weight, and size, can be associated with
numbers. In particular, we would like to attribute numbers to abstract quanti-
ties in a systematic fashion: Certain properties, or regularities, of the abstract
quantity should be preserved. For instance, the abstract notion of “length” has
the property of being additive: If I put one rod next to another rod of the same
length (both pointing in the same direction), then the resulting rod will be twice
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as long as the two individual ones. A representation is, therefore, a transforma-
tion which preserves properties. In the present decision theoretic context, the
abstract entity to be measured is preference, and the properties to be preserved
under the transformation are expressed in the axioms on the preference relation.
In mathematics, transformations such as these are called homomorphisms. A
homomorphism in general is a structure-preserving map between two algebraic
structures; this is expressed in the following quote from The Foundations of Mea-
surement (Krantz et al., 1971):
...if 〈A,R1, ..., Rm〉 is an empirical relational structure and
〈R,S1, ..., Sm〉 is a numerical relational structure, a real valued func-
tion φ on A is a homomorphism if it takes each Ri into Si, i = 1, ...,m.
In our particular case of preference representations, the map φ will be between
a structure 〈A,〉, where A is the set of acts, and  is the preference relation
defined on A, and a structure 〈R,≥〉, where R is the real line, and ≥ denotes
“greater or equal”. Particular axioms imposed on  will therefore yield particular
kinds of numerical representations for ≥.
There are, then, two types of axioms: Necessary and structural axioms. Loosely
speaking, necessary axioms ensure that an appropriate homomorphism φ exists.
There may be, however, several functions (or a class of functions) which yield
the representation, only some of which may be interesting to the case considered.
Then, structural axioms constrain the class of functions to those that are of
interest; they are used to obtain the uniqueness properties of the representation.
Structural axioms tend to lend themselves less easily to a normative reading,
since they are used predominantly for technical reasons. For instance, Savage’s
axiom P6 (Small Event Continuity) implies that events are continuously divisible,
making his theory inadequate for cases of countable state spaces. Moreover,
Savage’s axioms can be categorised as follows: P1 is an ordering axiom, P2 –
P4 are independence conditions (which play the role of making the utility and
probability components separable and linear), P5 is a non-triviality condition,
P6 an Archimedean condition (ensuring that the utility function is real valued),
and P7 a dominance axiom (making the representation applicable to non-simple
measurable acts). (Fishburn, 1981).
There are several degrees to which a representation can be unique. In particular,
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the scales used can be nominal, ordinal, interval or ratio scales. Nominal scales use
one-to-one transformations. Ordinal scales are unique up to monotonic increasing
transformations, i.e. if the functions φ and φ′ both map 〈A,〉 into 〈R,≥〉,
then φ′ = f(φ). Interval scales are unique up to affine (positive monotonic)
transformations, such that φ′ = αφ+ β, where α and β are constants and α > 0.
Ratio scales are unique up to multiplicative transformation, i.e. φ′ = αφ, with
α > 0 (Heilmann, 2010). In both the vNM and Savage representation theorems,
the probability distribution is unique, and utility is measured on an interval scale.
5.3 Axiomatisation of Two-Attribute Lexicographic
Heuristics
5.3.1 Preliminaries
In this section it is assumed that the two gambles have equal minimum gains1.
This means that in this section we ignore the first step of the priority heuristic
where minimum gains are compared.
Let B and C be sets containing the attributes of the gambles. A gamble is a pair
(b, c) with b ∈ B and c ∈ C, where b denotes the probability of the maximum2
outcome and c the value of the maximum outcome. Let  be a binary relation
on B × C, the preference relation over gambles. The relation  is not assumed
to be transitive.
Assume that  is independent in the following sense: For all b1, b2 in B and for
all c1, c2 in C,
(b1, c1)  (b2, c1) iff (b1, c2)  (b2, c2) (5.1)
1Some important empirical evidence, such as the possibility effect of Kahneman and Tver-
sky (1979), refers to zero minimum outcomes; theoretically, Rubinstein (1988) also makes this
assumption.
2The priority heuristic, as stated in Section 5.1, compares probabilities of minimum outcomes.
Given the additivity of probabilities, for gambles with two outcomes the probability of the
maximum outcome is the complement of the probability of minimum outcomes. For convenience,
we consider the mathematically equivalent case where the probabilities of maximum outcomes
are compared.
139
CHAPTER 5. AXIOMATISING THE PRIORITY HEURISTIC
(b1, c1)  (b1, c2) iff (b2, c1)  (b2, c2) (5.2)
The property of independence is expressed in the priority heuristic in the sense
that the heuristic does not use trade-offs between attributes. Statement (5.1)
induces an unambiguous order on B, denoted B, and statement (5.2) induces
the unambiguous order on C, denoted C .
Furthermore, we define strict preference, , and indifference, ∼, in terms of  in
the usual sense: For all b1, b2 inB, and for all c1, c2 in C,
(b1, c1)  (b2, c2) iff (b1, c1)  (b2, c2) and not (b2, c2)  (b1, c1) (5.3)
(b1, c1) ∼ (b2, c2) iff (b1, c1)  (b2, c2) and (b2, c2)  (b1, c1) (5.4)
Note that neither  nor ∼ can be assumed to be transitive, since the weak
preference relation  is not assumed to be transitive. The strict preference and
indifference relations on B and C, B, ∼B, C and ∼C are defined similarly.
Next we define another relation on B, denoted PB, which expresses the lexi-
cographic nature of the decision rule of the priority heuristic. The following
definition of PB expresses the fact that the first attribute searched, probabilities,
dominates the second attribute searched, maximum outcomes: For all b1, b2 inB
b1PBb2 iff for every c1, c2 in C, (b1, c1)  (b2, c2) (5.5)
Suppose P is a binary relation on B. Then we can define two other relations,
I(P ) and W (P ) in terms of it. The interpretation we would like to give to
these relations is that I(P ) is an indifference relation on B, and W (P ) is a weak
preference relation on B which is defined in a non-standard way (Luce, 1956 and
1978).
b1I(P )b2 iff not b1Pb2 and not b2Pb1 (5.6)
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b1W (P )b2 iff either
(i) b1Pb2 or (5.7)
(ii) b1I(P )b2 and there exists a b3 inB
such that b1I(P )b3 and b3Pb2, or
(iii) b1I(P )b2 and there exists a b4 inB
such that b1Pb4 and b4I(P )b2
This definition expresses the intuition that one probability is weakly preferred to
a second probability if (i) the first probability is strictly preferred to the second,
or (ii) the first and second probabilities are indistinguishable, and there exists
a third probability that is indistinguishable from the first and strictly preferred
to the second, or (iii) the first and second probabilities are indistinguishable,
and there exists a fourth probability such that the first probability is strongly
preferred to the fourth, and the fourth probability is indistinguishable from the
second.
This intuition is expressed by the stopping rule of the priority heuristic: a user
of the heuristic may weakly prefer obtaining the maximum outcome with a prob-
ability of b1 = .23 to obtaining it with a probability of b2 = .22. This weak
preference may arise not because s/he has a strong preference for .23 over .22,
but rather because s/he cannot discriminate between the two probabilities of .23
and .22, and there exists a third probability, e.g. b3 = .33, such that s/he has a
strict preference for .33 over .22 and cannot distinguish between .33 and .23; this
is an example of case (ii) just above.
Let us now turn to the definition of a semiorder, as presented by Luce (1956). A
semiorder is characterised by the properties of having a transitive strict prefer-
ence part, and an intransitive indifference part. These properties make semiorders
particularly well suited to modelling the behaviour of people who may express
indifference between two elements they can essentially not distinguish. Never-
theless, there may exist a threshold beyond which indifference switches to strict
preference. A semiorder is defined as follows:
A binary relation P on B is a semiorder iff, for all b1, b2 in B
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(i) not b1Pb1 (5.8)
(ii) b1Pb2 and b3Pb4 imply either b1Pb4 or b3Pb2
(iii) b1Pb2 and b2Pb3 imply either b1Pb4 or b4Pb3
The first part of the definition holds that the relation P on B is irreflexive.
The second and third parts of the definition convey the intuitive idea that an
indifference interval should never span a strict preference interval (see Luce, 1956).
We now turn to the concept of an indifference interval. This formalises the idea
that even though one attribute value may be weakly preferred to another attribute
value, they may not be sufficiently different to induce a strict preference for one
of them. The two attribute values will then span an indifference interval, such
that all elements of it are considered indifferent, and such that b1 and b2 delimit
the interval from above and below. For example, in the context of the priority
heuristic, the probabilities b1 = .33 and b2 = .23 would span an indifference
interval. The concept is formalised as follows:
If P is a semiorder on B, and if b1W (PB)b2 and b1I(PB)b2, the set
B(b1, b2) = {b3 | b1W (P )b3 and b3W (P )b2} (5.9)
is called an indifference interval.
Finally, we introduce the relation PC on C which is designed to single out that
part of  where the dominant component, B, does not discriminate. Let B(b3, b4)
be an indifference interval, and let b1, b2 be elements of it. Then for all indifference
intervals B(b3, b4), and for all c1, c2 in C
c1PCc2 iff for every b1, b2 inB(b3, b4), (b1, c1)  (b2, c2) (5.10)
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5.3.2 Axioms
Consider a binary relation onB×C, with the derived conceptsB, PB,W (PB), B(b3, b4)
and PC defined above.
[Axiom 1]  is reflexive, complete, and independent
[Axiom 2] PB is a semiorder
[Axiom 3] W (PB) is identical to B
[Axiom 4] PC is a simple order
[Axiom 5] PC is identical to C
[Axiom 6] There exists a finite or countable subset of B,
X = {..., x−2, x−1, x0, x1, x2, ...} such that for all xi−1, xi, xi+1 in X
(i) xi B xi−1,
(ii) B(xi−1, xi+1) is an indifference interval,
(iii) for b1 in B, there exists an xi−1, xi in X with xi B b1 B xi−1
[Axiom 7] For every b1 in B, there exists some b2 in B such that b2I(PB)b1, and
for any b3 in B with b3 B b2, then b3PBb1
Axioms 1 to 5 are necessary, whilst Axioms 6 and 7 are structural. This makes
Axioms 6 and 7 less suited for constructing empirical tests. Axiom 6 states that
the indifference intervals on B span all of B (for the priority heuristic, the entire
probability scale), and overlap one another. This axiom ensures that the scales
over B and C agree. Axiom 7 requires that the set of elements indistinguishable
from a given element be closed from above. Together, Axioms 6 and 7 ensure the
existence of a supremum.
Axiom 1 is standard except for the assumption that the preference relation over
gambles  is not necessarily transitive, a property that the priority heuristic does
not always satisfy. The property of independence implies that each attribute in
(b1, c1) affects the relation  independently of the other attribute.
Axiom 2 requires that the strictly dominating part of , PB, is transitive; this
follows from the conjunction of statements (i) and (iii) of the definition of a
semiorder. The definition of a semiorder implies that indifference intervals can-
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not cover elements between which there exists a strict preference. Also, the
indifference relation I(PB) will not be transitive, as is the case for the priority
heuristic. Axiom 4 is used to impose an order on that part of  where the first
component of the tuples (b1, c1) does not dominate. Thus if two elements b3 and
b4 are indistinguishable, then only elements of C should determine choice, and
these should be ordered according to a simple order. In particular, Axiom 4 en-
sures that the restriction of the set B ×C to B(b3, b4)×C agrees with the order
between elements of C, which is a simple order.
Axiom 3 forces the order B on B induced by independence to be identical to
the weak order W (PB) on B, which was defined in terms of the relation PB. This
implies that both B and PB will be representable using the same numerical
scale. Axiom 5 forces the order C on C induced by independence to be identical
to the simple order PC on C, which was defined on the indifference intervals only.
This implies that both C and PC will be representable using the same numerical
scale.
This axiom system is similar to the one used by Luce (1978) for axiomatizing
a two-attribute lexicographic model. Luce’s (1978) model produces trade-offs
between attributes in its second step, whereas this is not the case for the priority
heuristic, which considers the second attribute alone when the first attribute does
not determine choice.
5.3.3 Representation Theorem
[Theorem 1] Suppose 〈B × C,〉 satisfies Axioms 1 - 7. Then there exist real-
valued functions φB and δB on B, and φC on C such that for all b1, b2 in B, and
c1, c2 in C,
1. δB(b1) = sup
b2
b2I(PB)b1
[φB(b2)− φB(b1)] > 0
2. b1PBb2 iff φB(b1) > φB(b2) + δB(b2)
3. b1W (PB)b2 iff φB(b1) > φB(b2)
4. c1PCc2 iff φC(c1) ≥ φC(c2)
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5. (b1, c1)  (b2, c2) iff either
(i) φB(b1) > φB(b2) + δB(b2), or
(ii)−δB(b1) ≤ φB(b1)− φB(b2) ≤ δB(b2), and φC(c1) ≥ φC(c2)
If f(.) is a strictly increasing and continuous function, and α, βC > 0 are con-
stants, then φ′B, δ
′
B and φ
′
C form another representation such that:
φ′B = f(φB) δ
′
B = f(φB + δB)− f(φB) φ′C = αφC + βC
If such a representation exists, then Axioms 1 - 5 must hold. For the proof, see
Appendix.
5.3.4 Comments
Jointly, Axiom 2 and 4 imply that empirically people find it hard to distin-
guish between probabilities which are close (Axiom 2), but they can distinguish
very well between maximum outcomes (Axiom 4). This prediction about peo-
ple having different abilities distinguishing outcomes and probabilities is a strong
prediction and, to the best of our knowledge, a new one that should be tested
empirically. This prediction is indirectly supported by research indicating that
(i) people spend more time on outcomes than on probabilities suggesting that
outcomes are more important than probabilities (Schkade and Johnson, 1989),
(ii) in the extreme, people neglect probabilities altogether, and instead base their
choices on the immediate feelings elicited by the gravity or benefit of future events
(Loewenstein et al., 2001), (iii) highly emotional outcomes tend to override the
impact of probabilities (Sunstein, 2003), (iv) anxiety is largely influenced by the
intensity of the shock, not by its probability of occurrence (Deane,1969), and
heuristics have been reported that rely on outcomes while ignoring probabilities,
but not vice versa (Brandsta¨tter, Gigerenzer & Hertwig, 2006, Table 3).
Theorem 1 axiomatises a class of heuristics of which the priority heuristic is a
special case. By setting φB and φC to the identity functions and δB to .1, the
representation expresses the priority heuristic for the case of equal minimum out-
comes. Note that whilst setting the function φB to the identity function, the
representation theorem yields a lexicographic structure with linear transforma-
tions of the probabilities, the theorem can also yield structures that use non-linear
transformations of probabilities.
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5.4 Axiomatisation of Three-Attribute Lexicographic
Heuristics
5.4.1 Preliminaries
This section extends the framework of section 5.2 to the case of three attributes:
minimum outcomes, probabilities of maximum outcomes, and maximum out-
comes. We make the simplifying assumption that the maximum outcome, across
all choices between gambles that the user of the priority heuristic is considering,
is constant, and thus, the first step of the priority heuristic has a constant aspi-
ration level. The general case of varying maximum outcomes remains an open
problem that may require a different axiom system3. Under our assumption, the
approach of Section 5.2 applies smoothly, and thus we go over the main concepts
briefly.
Let a gamble be a triple (a, b, c) with a ∈ A, b ∈ B, and c ∈ C, where the set
A includes minimum outcomes, B denotes the set of probabilities of maximum
outcomes, and C denotes the set of maximum outcomes. Let  be a binary
relation on A × B × C, the preference relation over gambles. The relation  is
not assumed to be transitive.
Attributes affect the relation  independently from each other: For all a1, a2 ∈ A,
for all b1, b2 inB, and for all c1, c2 in C:
(a1, b1, c1)  (a2, b1, c1) iff (a1, b2, c2)  (a2, b2, c2) (5.11)
(a1, b1, c1)  (a1, b2, c1) iff (a2, b1, c2)  (a2, b2, c2) (5.12)
(a1, b1, c1)  (a1, b1, c2) iff (a2, b2, c1)  (a2, b2, c2) (5.13)
The relations A on A, B on B, and C on C are derived from the independence
3In the first step of the priority heuristic, the aspiration level is given by 10% of the maximum
outcome across both gambles. On this assumption, the aspiration level is a function of maximum
outcomes, thereby violating the independence condition (11) above.
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conditions.
The strict preference relation  and the indifference relation ∼ on A × B × C
are defined as previously (see Section 5.2.1), and so are the relations A, ∼A on
A, B, ∼B on B, and C , ∼C on C. The definitions of the indifference relation
I(P ) and the weak preference relation W (P ) are the same as in Section 5.2.1.
Similarly, the concepts of a semiorder and of an indifference interval are defined
as previously.
We now define the relations PA on A, PB on B, and PC on C. Thereby, the
PA relation singles out that part of  where the first attribute, minimum values,
dominates the other two attributes, probabilities, and maximum outcomes. The
PB relation, by contrast, singles out that part of  where the first attribute,
minimum values, does not discriminate, and where the second attribute, proba-
bilities, dominates the third attribute, maximum values. Finally, the relation PC
is defined such that it characterises that part of  where neither the first, nor the
second attribute discriminates. We assume that both PA and PB are semiorders,
and that PC is a simple order. Indifference intervals induced by the semiorder PA
on A will be called A(a3, a4), and indifference intervals induced by the semiorder
PB on B will be called B(b3, b4). The resulting structure will thus have nested
indifference intervals, capturing the lexicographic nature of the decision rule of
the priority heuristic. Consider the following definitions of PA, PB, and PC :
For all a1, a2 inA,
a1PAa2 iff for every b1, b2 inB (5.14)
and for every c1, c2 in C, (a1, b1, c1)  (a2, b2, c2)
For all indifference intervals A(a3, a4) and for all b1, b2 inB,
b1PBb2 iff for every a1, a2 inA(a3, a4) (5.15)
and for every c1, c2 in C, (a1, b1, c1)  (a2, b2, c2)
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For all indifference intervals A(a3, a4), B(b3, b4) and for all c1, c2 in C,
c1PCc2 iff for every a1, a2 inA(a3, a4) (5.16)
and for every b1, b2 inB(b3, b4), (a1, b1, c1)  (a2, b2, c2)
5.4.2 Axioms
Consider a binary relation  on A × B × C, and the derived concepts A, PA,
W (PA), A(a3, a4), B, PB, W (PB), B(b3, b4), C , and PC defined above.
[Axiom 1]  is reflexive, complete, and independent
[Axiom 2] PA is a semiorder
[Axiom 3] W (PA) is identical to A
[Axiom 4] PB is a semiorder
[Axiom 5] W (PB) is identical to B
[Axiom 6] PC is a simple order
[Axiom 7] PC is identical to C
[Axiom 8] There exists a finite or countable subset ofA, Q = {..., q−2, q−1, q0, q1, q2, ...}
such that for all qi−1, qi, qi+1 in Q
(i) qi A qi−1,
(ii) A(qi−1, qi+1) is an indifference interval,
(iii) for a1 in A, there exists an qi−1, qi in Q with qi A a1 A qi−1
[Axiom 9] There exists a finite or countable subset ofB, X = {..., x−2, x−1, x0, x1, x2, ...}
such that for all xi−1, xi, xi+1 in X
(i) xi B xi−1
(ii) B(xi−1, xi+1) is an indifference interval
(iii) for b1 in B, there exists an xi−1, xi in X with xi B b1 B xi−1
[Axiom 10] For every a1 in A, there exists some a2 in A such that a2I(PA)a1,
and for any a3 in A with a3 A a2, then a3PAa1
[Axiom 11] For every b1 in B, there exists some b2 in B such that b2I(PB)b1,
and for any b3 in B with b3 B b2, then b3PBb1
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5.4.3 Representation Theorem
[Theorem 2] Suppose 〈A×B × C,〉 satisfies Axioms 1 - 11. Then there exist
real-valued functions φA and δA on A, φB and δB on B, and φC on C such that
for all a1, a2 in A, b1, b2 in B, and c1, c2 in C,
1. δA(a1) = sup
a2
a2I(PA)a1
[φA(a2)− φA(a1)] > 0
2. δB(b1) = sup
b2
b2I(PB)b1
[φB(b2)− φB(b1)] > 0
3. a1PAa2 iff φA(a1) > φA(a2) + δA(a2)
4. a1W (PA)a2 iff φA(a1) > φA(a2)
5. b1PBb2 iff φB(b1) > φB(b2) + δB(b2)
6. b1W (PB)b2 iff φB(b1) > φB(b2)
7. c1PCc2 iff φC(c1) ≥ φC(c2)
8. (a1, b1, c1)  (a2, b2, c2) iff either
(i) φA(a1) > φA(a2) + δA(a2), or
(ii) −δA(a1) ≤ φA(a1)− φA(a2) ≤ δA(a2), and φB(b1) ≥ φB(b2), or
(iii) −δA(a1) ≤ φA(a1) − φA(a2) ≤ δA(a2), and −δB(b1) ≤ φB(b1) − φB(b2) ≤
δB(b2), and φC(c1) ≥ φC(c2)
If f(.), g(.) are strictly increasing and continuous functions, and α, βC > 0 are
constants, then φ′A, δ
′
A, φ
′
B, δ
′
B, and φ
′
C form another representation such that:
φ′A = f(φA) δ
′
A = f(φA + δA)− f(φA)
φ′B = g(φB) δ
′
B = g(φb + δB)− g(φB)
φ′C = αφC + βC
If such a representation exists, then Axioms 1 – 7 must hold. The proof of The-
orem 2 is a straightforward extension of the proof of Theorem 1 (see Appendix).
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5.4.4 Comments
The interpretation of the axioms mirrors that given in Section 5.2.2. Note that
Axiom 2 implies that people find it hard to distinguish between close minimum
values. This is a strong prediction of the framework and should be tested empir-
ically. We are not aware of any research that has addressed this hypothesis.
Theorem 2 axiomatises a class of heuristics of which the priority heuristic is a
special case. By setting φA, φB, and φC to identity functions, δA to some constant,
and δB to .1, the representation expresses the priority heuristic for the case of a
constant maximum outcome.
5.5 Towards a Theory of Bounded Rationality
The term “bounded rationality” has been used for at least three different research
programs: Optimisation under constraints (e.g. Sargent, 1993), deviations from
optimisation (e.g. Kahneman, 2003), and for the study of decision processes in
situations where optimisation may be out of reach (Gigerenzer and Selten, 2001;
Simon, 1955; Selten, 2001). Note that these three uses are not the same. The first
two emphasise rationality and irrationality, respectively, but share optimisation
as a reference point. The third program models the process of decision rather
than optimisation or deviations from optimisation. As mentioned before, in this
program, choices reveal decision processes (Leland, 2010). The priority heuristic
is such a formal model of the decision process. The three building blocks – rules for
search, stopping, and decision – are also part of other heuristics in what is termed
the “adaptive toolbox” of humans (Gigerenzer and Selten, 2001). To date, the
study of bounded rationality has accumulated converging evidence that heuristics
can model decision making in both experts and laypeople, and that heuristics
can often make more accurate predictions than can complex forecasting models,
including linear regression, neural networks, Bayesian models, and classification
trees (Katsikopoulos, 2011). Yet as Selten (2001, p. 14) noted, a comprehensive,
coherent theory of bounded rationality is not yet available.
This chapter is a step in the direction of providing a theory of bounded rational-
ity, in particular, by providing greater conceptual clarity through the use of an
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axiomatic representation. In general, axioms give exact behavioural characteri-
sations which can be tested empirically. Also, by using axioms on (unobservable)
preference relations and thereby yielding a representation result which models
decisions consistent with heuristics, this chapter provides a link between existing
axiomatic theories of decision making and bounded rationality.
The contribution made here can be seen as an exercise consistent with the em-
piricist school of thought: Starting from observable phenomena, by abstraction a
theory is derived – the priority heuristic –, and from the theory, we obtain math-
ematical concepts – the axiomatisation. This contrasts with approaches in the
tradition of expected utility theory, where mathematical principles are used on
the basis of an a priori notion of rationality, rather than on the basis of evidence.
However, our approach is, in fact, consistent with the origins of probability and
decision theory: Decision theory was first studied by Blaise Pascal and Pierre de
Fermat as an attempt to understand gambling behaviour. The priority heuristic
is a theory which, as explained above, predicts just these choices between gam-
bles well, and is therefore a good starting point for the derivation of axiomatic
characterisations of bounded rationality.
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A.1 Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1
Sufficiency
Statement 1 and 2: Define δB by Statement 1. Axioms 6 and 7 insure the
existence of the supremum, and by Axioms 6(ii) and 6(iii), δB > 0. By the
definition of δB and Axiom 7, Statement 2 follows.
Statement 3: By Axioms 2 and 6, and Theorem 16.7 of Suppes et al. (1989),
there exists a real-valued function φB on B such that b1W (PB)b2 iff φB(b1) >
φB(b2), and with the asserted uniqueness properties.
Statement 4: By Axiom 4 and Theorem 2.1 of Krantz et al. (1971), there exists
a real-valued function φC on C such that c1PCc2 iff φC(c1) ≥ φC(c2), and with
the asserted uniqueness properties.
Statement 5: Statement 4 says that φC preserves PC . By the definition of PC ,
it is identical to  when  is applied to B(b3, b4)×C and restricted to C. So, φC
also preserves the order  when it is applied to B(b3, b4)×C and restricted to C.
By Axiom 6 (ii), there are successive indifference intervals on B with nontrivial
regions of overlap. Forcing the local scales to agree yields a global scale on B×C.
The restriction of this scale to C, φC preserves PC as well. Statement 5 follows
from this, together with the other four statements and the whole construction.
Necessity of Axioms 1 to 5
Axiom 1: The reflexivity and completeness of  follow immediately from State-
ment 5. To show independence of the first attribute from the second, con-
sider a c1 in C and assume (b1, c1)  (b2, c1). By Statement 5, this means
φB(b1) > φB(b2) + δB(b2), which in turn means that (b1, c2)  (b2, c2) for any
c2 in C. To show independence of the second attribute from the first, con-
sider a b1 in B and assume (b1, c1)  (b1, c2). By Statement 5, this means that
φC(c1) > φC(c2), which in turn means that (b2, c1)  (b2, c2) for any b2 in B.
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Axiom 2: Part (i) of the definition of a semiorder follows immediately from
Statement 2.
For Part (ii) of the definition, we assume b1PBb2, b3PBb4 and show that if also
not b1PBb4, then b3PBb2. By Statement 2, b1PBb2 implies φB(b2) + δB(b2) <
φB(b1), and not b1PBb4 implies φB(b1) ≤ φB(b4) + δB(b4). Thus, also φB(b2) +
δB(b2) < φB(b4) + δB(b4). This, together with φB(b4) + δB(b4) < φB(b3) (which
holds from b3PBb4 and Statement 2), means that φB(b2) + δB(b2) < φB(b3), or,
by Statement 2, b3PBb2.
For Part (iii) of the definition of a semiorder, we assume b1PBb2 and b2PBb3,
and considering a b4 in B, we show that either b4PBb3 or b1PBb4. Specifically,
we show that, if (a) φB(b4) ≥ φB(b2), then b4PBb3, and if (b) φB(b4) < φB(b2),
then b1PBb4.
For (a), b2PBb3 implies, by Statement 2, that φB(b2) > φB(b3)+δB(b3). Together
with φB(b4) ≥ φB(b2), this means φB(b4) > φB(b3) + δB(b3), or, by Statement 2,
b4PBb3.
For (b), we first show that b1PBb4 holds if additionally φB(b4)+δB(b4) ≤ φB(b2)+
δB(b2). This, together with φB(b2) + δB(b2) < φB(b1) (by b1PBb2 and Statement
2), means that φB(b4)+δB(b4) < φB(b1), or, by Statement 2, b1PBb4 as required.
To complete the argument, we show by contradiction that φB(b4) + δB(b4) ≤
φB(b2) + δB(b2). Suppose φB(b4) + δB(b4) > φB(b2) + δB(b2). Then it is possible
to find a b5 in B such that: φB(b4) + δB(b4) = φB(b5) > φB(b2) + δB(b2). By
Statement 2, φB(b5) > φB(b2) + δB(b2) implies b5PBb2.
By Statement 2, φB(b4) + δB(b4) = φB(b5) implies that not b5PBb4. Also, by
Statement 1,φB(b4) + δB(b4) = φB(b5) implies that φB(b4) < φB(b5) < φB(b5) +
δB(b5). By Statement 2, this implies that not b4PBb5. Together, not b5PBb4 and
not b4Pbb5 imply that b5I(PB)b4.
By the assumption of (b), φB(b4) < φB(b2) and by Statement 1, φB(b4) <
φB(b2) + δB(b2). By Statement 2 this implies that not b4PBb2. Furthermore,
from φB(b4) + δB(b4) > φB(b2), which we assumed for contradiction, it follows
that not b2PBb4. From not b4PBb2 and not b2PBb4 it follows that b4I(PB)b2.
Having established b5I(PB)b4, b4I(PB)b2 and b5PBb2, by the definition of weak
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preference b4W (PB)b2.
By Statement 3, b4W (PB)b2 implies φB(b4) > φB(b2) which is inconsistent with
the assumption of (b), φB(b4) < φB(b2). Whence, φB(b4) + δB(b4) ≤ φB(b2) +
δB(b2) as required.
Axiom 3: By Statement 5, φB preserves the order B and by Statement 3, φB
preserves the order W (PB), so B and W (PB) are identical.
Axiom 4: By Statement 4 and Theorem 2.1 of Krantz et al. (1971), Axiom 4
follows.
Axiom 5: By Statement 5, φC preserves the order C and by Statement 4, φC
also preserves PC , so C and PC are identical.
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Conclusion
6.1 Introduction
Taking Savage’s subjective expected utility theory as a starting point, this thesis
has argued for the distinction between different types of uncertainty: ambiguity,
option uncertainty and state space uncertainty. We have argued that it is essential
to understand the nature of uncertainty – and, in particular, the idea that not
all uncertainties are alike – to be able to model decision making in a large and
uncertain world in a precise way. Real world decisions are rarely clear-cut cases
of small world decision making, where the agent’s uncertainty can be reduced to
uncertainty over what the true state is. Once one grants this claim, a number
of “anomalies” in decision making, which may otherwise seem irrational, become
comprehensible.
This chapter will return to the fundamental arguments on which this thesis is
based. In particular, this chapter gives an argument for pluralism in decision
theory, perhaps the most contentious claim of this thesis. Our pluralist view of
decision theory implies that the rationality conditions imposed under uncertainty
are different from those imposed within a typical small world. We conclude with
an overview of the applications of decision making under the types of uncertainty
characterised in this thesis.
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6.2 Idealisation and abstraction
Savage’s theory of decision making in small worlds abstracts from all particulars a
decision situation might have, condensing decision making to its very essence: all
decisions are based on beliefs and desires. Consistency of one’s decision with one’s
personal beliefs, as characterised in the probability function over the state space,
and desires, as expressed in the agent’s utility function over consequences, is then
the criterion for optimality. In a recent paper, Hosni (forthcoming) phrases this
as follows:
“Standard Bayesianism can be fruitfully seen as the solution to the fol-
lowing problem: [...] How should a maximally idealised agent behave
when facing a maximally abstract choice problem?”
An idealised agent then has no cognitive limitations, it is this assumption which
motivates the rationality assumption on the part of the agent. An agent is said
to be idealised when limitations in time, information, and computational capac-
ities play no role in the decision making process of the agent. The idealisation
assumption on the agent gives rise to the normative content of Bayesian decision
theory, as an idealised agent will not make any mistakes, and can therefore be
seen as making optimal decisions that more limited agents should strive to attain.
In an abstract decision problem, the specific situation the agent is faced with is
reduced to only those features which are decision-relevant. Savage’s theory can
be seen as an abstract theory in the sense that a small world model is designed
to capture every relevant aspect of the decision maker’s problem. An abstracted
decision problem contrasts with the real world decision problem, which contains
details which are irrelevant to the decision problem.
This thesis has maintained both the idealisation and abstraction assumption
above. In particular, we have argued that the uncertainty the agent perceives
prevents the agent from modelling a given decision problem as a small world,
not, as one might think, because the agent has cognitive limitations which pre-
vent them from taking more optimal decisions, but rather because the agent faces
situations of uncertainty that even an idealised agent cannot respond to more op-
timally. For instance, consider again John and Lisa’s problem (see section 3.1),
where John and Lisa consider buying an insurance policy against heart disease.
John and Lisa obtain contradictory figures regarding the likelihood of develop-
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ing such a disease. Even when we assume that John and Lisa have no cognitive
constraints, it is not clear what the rational response to the problem is.
However, the nature of the idealisation of the agent changes as one considers
decision problems under uncertainty greater than that compatible with Savage’s
theory. Savage’s theory assumes that the agent will perceive any given decision
problem as a small world, such that no uncertainty other than that over what
state in a given state space is true matters to the decision. In this thesis, this latter
assumption is relaxed, such that agents are permitted to perceive the uncertainty
over the true consequences of their actions, or uncertainty over what probability
distribution over the state space is true. Arguably, such an agent can be seen as
less idealised, as they are presumed to be incapable of performing the reduction
of uncertainty required to model a decision problem using a small world.
We have also maintained Savage’s abstraction assumption, as the large world
frameworks we constructed differed from the real world problems in the sense
that all irrelevant details which a real world problem may contain were considered
immaterial. The large world decision problems we constructed were assumed to
be exactly the problem the agent faces; no relevant details were assumed to
be elided, and no irrelevant details were included in the representation of the
problem.
6.3 Pluralism of decision theory under uncertainty
Thus, whilst we grant that Savage’s decision theory answers the question how
a maximally idealised agent should behave when facing a maximally abstract
choice problem for the most part successfully, two different readings of Savage’s
theory are possible. On a first reading, Savage’s theory can appear to be a general
theory, as prima facie, it seems possible to cast any particular decision problem
in the mould of Savage’s decision theory. On a second view, Savage’s theory
is a specific theory, and only some, maybe even few, decision problems can be
analysed in the fashion of Savage’s framework. This thesis is committed to this
latter view, and it is on this position that our argument for a pluralistic approach
to decision theory is based.
To rephrase these views in the terminology of this thesis, on the view that Savage’s
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theory is general it is the case that subjective expected utility theory applies to
both small and large worlds, whereas on the view that Savage’s theory is specific,
it is applicable only to small worlds. Binmore (2007) refers to adherents of the
first view as “Bayesianites”, and proponents of the latter view as “Bayesians”,
where he counts himself as a Bayesian, but not as a Bayesianite (Binmore, 2007,
2009). Quite conceivably, Savage himself would side also with the Bayesian, rather
than Bayesianite, view, for he holds that “the “Look before you leap” principle is
preposterous if carried to extremes” (Savage, 1954, p. 16). Moreover, the latter
half of Savage’s Foundations of Statistics is committed to characterising decision
making under complete ignorance, which suggests that Savage adheres to the
view that under extreme uncertainty, subjective expected utility theory is not
applicable.
The kinds of large worlds this thesis has identified can be seen as intermedi-
ate between complete ignorance and cases of mild uncertainty typically modelled
within small world matrices. Ambiguity, option uncertainty and state space un-
certainty are each cases which deviate from the typical small world setting in the
sense that there is a source of uncertainty which the small world model does not
capture, but each case deviates from the small world model only via a minimal
extension. Due to the strong similarity between small world models and the large
world models suggested here, it may be tempting to ask “wouldn’t the decision
maker be more rational if they modelled the problem as a small world decision
matrix?” We answer this question in the negative: under uncertainty, deviations
from the behaviour which is rational in the small world setting are permissible.
An agent who treats a large world problem as a small world model will act as if
the greater uncertainty present in the large world were irrelevant. This strategy
will not necessarily be successful, however, unless uncertainty really is irrelevant.
Otherwise, the agent may be unpleasantly surprised by some factor that the small
world decision matrix they constructed did not take account of (Binmore, 2009).
For instance, consider a decision maker who would like to decide between buying
a Porsche and a Ferrari, and assume that since the decision maker has not driven
a sports car before, they are unsure what value best represents their desire for
the consequence of possessing a Porsche or Ferrari. When the agent treats this
decision problem as a small world, attaching a unique utility value to the con-
sequences of all acts, then on buying the Porsche, the agent may find that the
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greater noise of the car and the somewhat uncomfortable seats do not generate
quite as high a utility value as the agent’s small world model attributed to the
consequences of buying the car. In short, when an agent treats a large world
problem as a small world, the agent risks being unpleasantly surprised.
Savage’s theory is specific in the sense that it applies only to small worlds, namely
cases where it is possible to reduce uncertainty over what to do to uncertainty over
what the true state is. As this thesis has aimed to show, such a representation
cannot always be found, and in those cases where it is not possible to represent
the decision problem as a small world, Savage’s theory must be extended appro-
priately. Savage’s theory can be extended to situations of uncertainty by asking
the same question Savage’s theory replies to, namely that of how an idealised
agent should behave in a maximally abstract decision problem, but by deviat-
ing from Savage’s theory by answering this question in a manner which takes
the greater uncertainty of large worlds into account. Using this strategy one
can apply variants of Savage’s theory to worlds larger than those considered by
Savage.
We have argued in this thesis that depending on the kind of uncertainty faced
by the agent, different normative constraints must be placed on the preferences
of the agent. For instance, Chapter 3 has argued that under ambiguity, Savage’s
axioms P2 and P4 are not compelling as requirements of rationality. Chapter 4
has argued that under option uncertainty, Ghirardato’s axioms 8 and 9 can be
seen as rationality postulates governing the attitude the agent has with respect
to option uncertainty. The view that different types of uncertainty require differ-
ent rationality postulates on the agent’s preferences can be seen as a pluralistic
account of decision making, which denies that a single set of axioms is valid for
all possible decision problems.
A related stance to the concept of rationality has been taken by Gilboa, Postle-
waite and Schmeidler (2009). The authors argue that there may not be a unique
set of axioms or rules which can be seen as synonymous with the notion of ratio-
nality; according to Gilboa et al., rationality is not a binary notion. In particular,
the authors argue that “the quest for a single set of rules that will universally
define the rational choice is misguided”. This thesis concurs with Gilboa et al.
in the sense that we adhere to the view that a response which is rational in a
situation of option uncertainty may appear irrational in the context of ambiguity,
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and a decision made under ignorance may be far from optimal, but, given the
constraints of the situation, rational nevertheless. The notion of rationality which
is appropriate must be relative to the decision problem faced by the agent, and
in particular relative to the severity of uncertainty the agent must grapple with.
However, the pluralism this thesis advocates is not an unconstrained one; Chapter
2 has shown that in some cases, reductions of one type of uncertainty to another
are admissible, as no further insight is gained by distinguishing certain types of
uncertainty from others. Reduction can and should be conducted to the extent
that the reduced representation fully captures the decision problem faced by the
agent. Pluralism is required only where the pluralistic account yields new, and
more convincing, theoretical insights than the more general, reduced theory can
achieve. Conversely, we have not claimed that the classification of uncertainty
this thesis has advocated is exhaustive. It may well be that there exist other
decision-relevant kinds of uncertainty we have failed to distinguish.
The pluralist view of decision theory advocated here implies that it may be the
case that two different representations for a given decision problem exist; for
instance, some decision problems may either be cast into a model with option
uncertainty, or as a problem featuring ambiguity. This raises the question which,
if any, is the “right” representation for the decision problem, and how the agent
should evaluate the possible different frameworks against each other. In answering
this question, it is useful to return to Savage’s example of a man buying a car and
pondering the question whether or not to buy it with a radio installed, which we
discussed in section 1.4. As we explained in Chapter 1, Shafer’s (1986) response
to Savage’s example is that ultimately it is up to the decision-making agent to
decide which representation is best suited to making an optimal decision; there
is no unique framework which is objectively the best representation. A similar
argument must hold true for an agent who is debating whether to analyse a given
decision using a representation featuring option uncertainty versus a representa-
tion containing ambiguity. This is consistent with the subjective nature of the
optimality of a decision problem: In Savage’s framework, a s decision is optimal
if taken consistently with the agent’s personal beliefs and desires. There exists
no extraneous device which would make the optimality of the agent’s decision
verifiable.
Let us investigate this argument in greater detail. As discussed in Chapter 2, a
160
CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION
decision problem containing option uncertainty may be converted into a decision
problem containing ambiguity via a refinement of the state space. A decision
problem containing option uncertainty would be fully reduced to a problem with
ambiguity if it is possible to refine the state space sufficiently to obtain unique
consequences at every state. Yet, as we argued in Chapter 2, such a reduction
may not be possible in all cases, such that there remains residual uncertainty
with respect a particular consequence at a particular state. We may ask then,
to what extent the decision making agent should aim to reduce option uncer-
tainty to ambiguity. In answering this question, it is useful to remind ourselves of
the fact that the reduction of option uncertainty to ambiguity will not eliminate
uncertainty, but rather convert one kind of uncertainty to another. Given that
uncertainty cannot be eliminated via refinement, which level of refinement is best
suited to the analysis of the decision problem depends on the subjective stance
of the agent towards the decision problem. A decision problem should be mod-
elled using a decision matrix containing option uncertainty whenever the agent
perceives option uncertainty as relevant to their decision problem; similarly, a de-
cision problem should be modelled using a decision matrix containing ambiguity
whenever the agent perceives the decision problem as ambiguous.
6.4 The role of heuristics under uncertainty
This thesis has argued that whilst under mild uncertainty (see section 2.3) Sav-
age’s framework is valid from a normative point of view, in large world scenarios
Savage’s theory is limited. In large and uncertain worlds, the limitations of the
agent’s information must be taken into account, and decision rules inconsistent
with Savage’s theory may be rational. Whilst Savage’s framework is convincing
as a normative model for decisions under mild uncertainty, we may ask also what
models are descriptively adequate. Chapter 5 of this thesis investigates the nor-
mative implications of such a descriptively successful model, namely the priority
heuristic. By axiomatising the priority heuristic, this thesis allows for detailed
comparisons between, for instance, Savage’s theory and the priority heuristic.
Although we do not wish to advocate the priority heuristic as a normatively valid
model for decision making under mild uncertainty, descriptive theory is an impor-
tant domain of research in its own right, particularly with a view to prediction.
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While the priority heuristic is strong descriptive model for choice under risk, it
would be interesting for further research to study a variant of the priority heuristic
adequate to situations of uncertainty. In particular, as this thesis showed norma-
tive claims must be weaker under uncertainty than under risk. The concepts of
rationality and optimality must of necessity be relative to a given (small world)
model, and consequently relative to the information the agent has. However,
under extreme cases of uncertainty, e.g. the absence of all probabilistic informa-
tion, heuristic decision making may be appropriate. Under severe uncertainty,
bounded rationality and rationality may coincide.
One reason why heuristics are a successful decision-making strategy in the face of
uncertainty is that under uncertainty, the decision maker’s task changes from one
of choice (that of choosing the best action relative to a given model) to a task of
inference (that of predicting how the world will evolve). Savage’s framework relies
on the idea that the agent is exclusively faced with a choice, but not an inference
task. Given a small world model, Savage’s framework requires the agent to weigh
consequences by their respective probabilities, and add over the possible states of
the world; a decision which maximises subjective expected utility is then called
rational. Under uncertainty, however, the agent must make good decisions despite
the fact that they are not given a particular small world environment; Savage’s
weighing and adding strategy may be out of reach. Agents faced with changing
environments will then be confronted with a task of making robust decisions,
i.e. decisions which sacrifice optimality with respect to a particular decision
environment for success over a broad range of the decision environments. It is
the fact that under uncertainty, optimality may be out of reach which makes
heuristic decision rules adequate to situations of uncertainty.
To date, there exists no heuristic which would be suitable to modelling choice
under uncertainty; this is a task future research may address. However, heuristic
decision rules appropriate for situations of uncertainty may seem more rational
than one might expect, potentially yielding close analogies between normative
models and models of bounded rationality.
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6.5 Applications
Uncertainty is an endemic feature of decision making, and taking account of
uncertainty implies that we can model with exactitude decision problems which
do not fit the mould of the small world. Once one models decision making in large
worlds precisely, many empirical phenomena which may otherwise seem irrational
become comprehensible. Let us consider how the concepts of ambiguity, option
uncertainty and state space uncertainty can be applied to various domains of
theoretical and empirical inquiry. These domains of applications may serve as
a basis for further research, as the implications of the presence of the types of
uncertainty identified in this thesis have not been studied in great detail to date.
Ambiguity
Chapter 2 of this thesis has identified ambiguity with uncertainty over the correct
probability distribution over the state space. This kind of uncertainty may affect
decision making in many particular instances, as we rarely hold sufficient infor-
mation to assign unique prior probabilities to all states. However, to date much
of economic theory is based on Bayesian decision theory. It is therefore interest-
ing to consider how relaxing the first tenet of Bayesianism helps in explaining
experimental evidence.
A review of the possible applications of the ambiguity literature to economic
theory is contained in Mukerji and Tallon (2004), who identify three domains in
which economic modelling may gain from modelling ambiguity and ambiguity
attitude: financial markets, contract theory and game theory. In each case,
uncertainty over the correct probability distribution over the state space may
affect economic decision making.
With respect to financial markets, Dow and Werlang (1992) applied Schmeidler’s
(1989) Choquet expected utility model to portfolio choice of agents, and show
that when an agent is ambiguity averse, there may exist a nondegenerate price
interval at which the agent will strictly prefer a zero position in a risky asset to
either buying or selling it short. Such an interval would be reduced to a unique
point in the case of an expected utility decision maker, who would switch between
buying and short selling at that point.
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Epstein and Wang (1994) extend Gilboa and Schmeidler’s (1989) multiple prior
model to a dynamic setting, and show that in an economy where prices of as-
sets are determined at an equilibrium, indeterminacy in the equilibrium prices
can arise. This implies that a large volatility in prices may be consistent with
equilibrium. Epstein and Miao (2003) use this finding as an explanation of the
home bias in asset demand: agents buy more assets from their own country than
from foreign countries. This can be explained by ambiguity aversion, provided
that agents perceive home assets as less ambiguous in their payoffs than foreign
assets.
The effect of ambiguity aversion on optimal risk-sharing arrangements in con-
tracts is studied by Chateauneuf, Dana and Tallon (2000). The authors show
that in a general equilibrium setting, the Pareto-optimal outcome will obtain
when agent’s preferences satisfy the axioms of the CEU model, and when all
agents hold the same beliefs. However, when agents do not hold the same beliefs,
the Pareto-optimal outcome may not obtain.
Mukerji (1998) investigates the effects of the presence of ambiguity on incentive
contracts, the implications of which hinge on contingent events. In particular,
when agents are ambiguity-averse, the best possible contracts may be incomplete
and inefficient.
Finally, the concept of ambiguity has been applied to non-cooperative game the-
ory. Lo (1996) gives a definition of strategic equilibrium in normal form games
when agents hold MEU preferences. Dow and Werlang (1994), Klibanoff (1996)
and Marinacci (2000) respectively define equilibrium concepts with ambiguity
aversion which differ from Lo’s as they do not restrict equilibrium beliefs to only
those which are best responses; they therefore allow other priors than only those
which are best responses as equilibrium beliefs. Thereby, the set of rational equi-
librium strategies is larger than that envisage by Lo.
These applications of the concept of ambiguity show that many empirical obser-
vations, such as, for instance, the home bias in asset demand, become comprehen-
sible once we grant that ambiguity may affect decision making. Our stance that
ambiguity may be objectively given substantiates the view that these empirical
phenomena do not arise out of the irrationality of agents, but rather constitute
rational reactions to the presence of ambiguity. It may be interesting, then, to
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study the implications of the presence of objective ambiguity on financial decision
making, contract theory and game theory. In each of these cases, the assumption
that ambiguity is an objective feature of the decision problem seems justified.
The framework suggested in Chapter 3 provides one way of modelling ambiguity
objectively, and can be used to study ambiguity in a variety of economic contexts.
Another avenue for future research is to examine the connection between ambi-
guity and social norms. In real world settings where agents do not have access
to probabilistic information, or where probabilistic information is sparse, social
norms may dictate particular responses to ambiguity. For instance, threats from
unknown diseases, such as BSE (Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy) are per-
ceived by the public as particularly severe, and ambiguity averse responses are
common (Anand, 2002). Similarly, Gigerenzer (2006) shows that in the after-
math of the September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks, fatalities due to road traffic
accidents peaked as a result of the fact that agents who would otherwise travel by
airplane chose to travel by car instead. Thereby, terrorist attacks are one instance
of low probability, high damage events, so-called dread risks. Both in the case
of BSE and in the case of terrorist attacks, we can assume that risks are poorly
understood by the public, and are hence perceived as ambiguous. There is then
a social norm to respond to this ambiguity in an an extremely ambiguity-averse
manner.
Option uncertainty
In chapter 2, we identified option uncertainty with uncertainty over the true out-
come of one’s action at any given state, and we have argued that option uncer-
tainty is separate from ambiguity. Option uncertainty may affect decision making
in many real world situations, and the theoretical study of option uncertainty may
yield interesting theoretical insights.
Chapter 4 has shown that Eliaz and Ortoleva (2011) have conducted an exper-
iment the results of which can be interpreted as revealing option uncertainty
aversion. It may be interesting for further research to study option uncertainty
aversion in greater detail, and to investigate the relation between option uncer-
tainty aversion and ambiguity aversion. One question which further research
might address is whether ambiguity averse agents are also option uncertainty
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averse, and if so, to what degree. Eliaz and Ortoleva’s variation of Ellsberg’s
paradox featuring what we call option uncertainty is a good starting point for
further investigation.
Moreover, Chapter 4 has shown that option uncertainty aversion can explain
status quo bias. Perhaps it would be possible to study the relation between
option uncertainty aversion and status quo bias experimentally, for instance, by
comparing the decisions an agent makes when no status quo is singled out with
those when the agent is endowed with a certain status quo gamble. Using a
similar set-up to Eliaz and Ortoleva’s, one could test whether agents who are
more averse to option uncertainty reveal a greater bias toward the status quo.
In Chapters 2 and 4 we have also argued that one possible interpretation of option
uncertainty is ethical uncertainty, namely uncertainty regarding what values best
reflect the agent’s desire for consequences. This interpretation may be useful
whenever decisions which have an ethical aspect need to be made. For instance,
this might be the case in military decision making; in section 2.1, we gave the
example of the Head of State of Isreal deciding on whether to launch an attack on
Iran. Uncertainty over the value of the consequences of launching an attack may
have an impact of the agent’s decision making process. A further domain where
ethical uncertainty may be particularly important is medical decision making.
It may be interesting to apply the concept of option uncertainty to these two
domains, and to study ethical uncertainty empirically.
Finally, it is possible to envisage applications of option uncertainty to game the-
ory, since game theory can be seen as an extension of individual choice theory.
For instance, consider the case where in a two-player normal form game, the pay-
offs agents receive are contained within an interval. Then players would need to
consider in their choice of strategy not only their own payoffs for any given strat-
egy and the strategy of the opponent, but also how option certainty averse they
are themselves, and how option uncertainty averse they think their opponent is.
State space uncertainty
In Chapter 2, we have identified state space uncertainty as the case where unfore-
seen contingencies may occur, such that the state space can no longer be assumed
to be exhaustive. One natural application of state space uncertainty is contract
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theory, where unforeseen contingencies may affect the contracting parties. Kreps’
(1992) model of unforeseen contingencies can be interpreted as a model of incom-
plete contracts. In particular, in Kreps’ model the agent entertains a state space
which contains some elements which the agent does not understand. The agent is
then willing to contract only over those states he does understand, but not over
the states he doesn’t understand. A contract contingent on such a state space is
then incomplete. Kreps gives a representation theorem for the agent’s preferences
over so-defined contracts.
Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (1998) argue that Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart
and Moore (1988) and Hart’s (1995) model of incomplete contracts can be inter-
preted as a model of unforeseen contingencies in Kreps’ spirit. In particular,
Grossman, Hart and Moore argue that in many cases contracts are incomplete,
since it is impossible to specify, at the time a contract is signed, all the terms and
conditions for all possible contingencies. Hence, contracts will often be incom-
plete. Grossman, Hart and Moore show that when a contract is used to regulate
trade between two parties who must each make relationship-specific investments,
then first-best results will not generally obtain. In particular, the second-best
outcome will then involve under-investment.
Kraus and Sagi (2006) apply the concept of unforeseen contingencies to asset
pricing in financial markets. The authors interpret unforeseen contingencies as
exogenous events which agents fail to foresee, and which affect the welfare of the
agents - an unforeseen contingency will then result in a utility shock. Kraus and
Sagi argue that an agent who makes decisions under unforeseen contingencies
behaves just like an agent who experiences private taste shocks. This inter-
pretation of unforeseen contingencies yields an interesting analogy with ethical
uncertainty: both under ethical uncertainty and under unforeseen contingencies
the agent’s utility function may not be stable. In Kraus and Sagi’s model, agents
are assumed to be consciously unaware, in the sense that they know that un-
foreseen contingencies may impinge on their optimisation process. The authors
show that securities can be traded only on demand- and price-contingent events.
Furthermore, the market will be incomplete, and the agent’s preferences will not
satisfy expected utility theory.
The topic of unforeseen contingencies has not received much attention in the
literature, presumably because it is difficult to find a compelling answer to the
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question how a rational agent should behave when unforeseen contingencies may
affect their optimisation problem. However, particularly in the case of optimal
contracting and financial markets the topic of unforeseen contingencies seems
highly relevant, as in each case, unforeseen contingencies occur on a regular basis.
It is therefore important to devise models which allow for unforeseen contingen-
cies; this is a task further research may address.
6.6 Concluding remarks
This thesis has examined types of uncertainty which are incompatible with Sav-
age’s decision theory for small worlds. We have argued that these types of uncer-
tainty are what we may call large world decision situations, namely cases where
a small world representation facilitating the application of Savage’s subjective
expected utility theory is not feasible. These types of uncertainty require sep-
arate treatment to problems which are representable using small world decision
matrices, since a reduction of the uncertainty would imply eliding details of the
large world matrix which are relevant to the agent’s decision problem. We have
argued that in large worlds, the requirements of rationality placed on the agent’s
preferences differ from those applicable in small worlds.
Uncertainty is not a binary concept, but rather comes in shades of grey. An
agent’s uncertainty may not only vary in severity, but also in type. Chapter 2 of
this thesis has provided a framework which allows the classification of different
types of uncertainty, and which can be used to characterise the impact of the
different types of uncertainty on agents’ decisions with greater precision. This
taxonomy opens up numerous avenues for future work; in particular, option un-
certainty and ethical uncertainty are novel concepts which may have theoretical
and empirical applications in a wide range of fields.
We hope to have shown in this thesis that minimal extensions to Savage’s theory
for small worlds can yield interesting new insights, for many of the most chal-
lenging decisions we have to make within the course of our lives are precisely
those that are beset with uncertainty greater than that compatible with a Savage
small world. It is in those cases that it is particularly important to approach
decision problems in a rational manner. Whilst the contribution this thesis has
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made may be but a small step towards understanding decision making in large
worlds, perhaps it can be seen as one piece of the puzzle that is decision making
under uncertainty.
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